

ज्ञानपीठ मूर्तिदेवी जैन ग्रन्थमाला [संस्कृत ग्रन्थाङ्क-२२]

श्रीमद्भट्टाकलङ्कदेवप्रणीतस्य

सवृत्तिसिद्धिविनिश्चयस्य

रविभद्रपादोपजीवि-अनन्तवीर्याचार्यविरचिता

सिद्धिविनिश्चयटीका

(डॉ० महेन्द्रकुमारन्यायाचार्य संकलित 'आलोक' टिप्पण-प्रस्तावनादिसहिता)

[प्रथमो भागः]

[ग्रन्थोऽयं काशी हिन्दूविश्वविद्यालयेन 'पीएच० डी०' इत्युपाधिकृते स्वीकृतः]



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सम्पादक—

डॉ० महेन्द्रकुमार जैन न्यायाचार्य, जैन-प्राचीन न्यायतीर्थ, एम० ए०, पीएच० डी० आदि
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
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
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कारवरी १६५३



JÑĀNAPĪTHA MURTIDEVĪ JAINA GRANTHAMĀLĀ

SANSKRIT GRANTHA, No. 22

SIDDHIVINISHCHAYATIKA

OF

SHRI ANANTAVIRYACHARYA,

THE COMMENTARY

ON

SIDDHIVINISHCHAYA AND ITS VRITTI

of

BHATTA AKALANKA DEVA

[VOL.1]

[Thesis Approved for the Ph. D. Degree of The Banaras Hindu University.]



EDITED WITH

‘ALOKA’ AND INTRODUCTION etc.

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IN MEMORY OF HIS LATE BENEVOLENT MOTHER

SHRĪ MŪRTI DEVĪ

BHĀRĀTĪYA JNĀNAPĪTHA MŪRTI DEVĪ
JAIN GRANTHAMĀLĀ

SANSKRIT GRANTHA NO. 22

IN THIS GRANTHAMĀLĀ CRITICALLY EDITED JAIN ĀGAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL,
PAURĀNIC, LITERARY, HISTORICAL AND OTHER ORIGINAL TEXTS
AVAILABLE IN PRĀKRIT, SANSKRIT, APABHRANSHA, HINDI,
KANNADA, TAMIL ETC., WILL BE PUBLISHED IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE LANGUAGES WITH THEIR
TRANSLATIONS IN MODERN LANGUAGES

AND

CATALOGUES OF JAIN BHANDARĀS, INSCRIPTIONS, STUDIES OF COMPETENT
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FOREWORD

[1]

A complete history of Indian philosophy during the early mediaeval age remains yet to be written. It represents probably the most prolific period in the intellectual life of India when scholastic metaphysics and logic, like other branches of Indian culture, had their origin and development. It covers nearly a thousand years before the advent of Islamic invaders. Like Nyaya Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, Vedanta, Vyakarana and Agarnik schools on the orthodox side, the Buddhist and Jaina schools also produced some of their best philosophic writers during this period. Thanks to the untiring labours and admirable perseverance of modern scholars some of the best works of these schools, supposed to have been irrevocably lost, are being gradually recovered and brought to light. We are sincerely grateful to these pains taking workers for what they have been doing in this field.

I congratulate Dr. Mahendra Kumar Jain, M. A., Nyayacharya, Ph. D. of the College of Oriental Learning, Banaras Hindu University on his remarkable achievement in the sphere of early Jain philosophical speculations. Having recovered Siddhi Vinishchaya, the lost work of the veteran Jain logician, Akalanka and having edited it and its commentary by Ananta-virya he has rendered an invaluable service to the cause not only of the Jain philosophy but of the entire mediaeval philosophy of India. The text of Akalanka's work had to be reconstructed by him from the single manuscript of a single commentary, with occasional help derived from other sources. The labours involved in this text have naturally been immense and it is a pleasure to find that we are at last presented with the fruits of his long continued labour in the form of an excellent critical edition of the text and commentary accompanied by a learned introduction (116 pages in English and 164 pages in Hindi) and by notes in Sanskrit (named Aloka) by the editor himself. It is true that in a work of this kind it is not possible to ensure absolute freedom from inaccuracies but there is no doubt that a tolerably correct and readable text of Akalanka's *magnum opus* is now available to us for closure study and further investigation.

Gopinath Kaviraj

2 A, Siga }
Varanasi }

(Mahamahopadhyaya, M. A., D. Litt.,
Ex. Principal, Govt. Sanskrit College, Varanasi)

*"Victory to Akalanka's Sacred Word, which
is like a moon in the sky of Anekanta."*

—Shubhachandra.

INTRODUCTION¹

The Introduction to the present work is given under three divisions :

1. The material available for the present volume and its critical utilisation,
2. The authors and their age, and
3. Historical and Philosophical discussion of the ideas embodied in the original text, *Siddhiviniścaya* of Akalaṅka and its *tīkā* by Anantavīrya.

The mediæval period of Indian Philosophy has to be accredited for producing the epoch-making philosophers like Kumārila, the great exponent of Mīmāṃsā, Dharmakīrti, the brilliant logician of Buddhism, and Akalaṅka, the very pinnacle of logical acumen and philosophical wisdom. Akalaṅka was the most original interpreter of Jaina epistemology and he built a system of Nyāya which later came to be known as *Akalaṅka-nyāya*.

In the present volume, Akalaṅka's *Siddhiviniścaya* (SV) with *vṛtti* (SVV) of the author himself and *Siddhiviniścaya-tīkā* (SVT) of Anantavīrya are published for the first time with the help of a single manuscript, and that too has been only available for SVT, out of which the other two, namely, the SV and SVV have been reconstructed.

1. THE MATERIAL FOR THE EDITION

1. *The Ms. of Siddhiviniścaya-tīkā :*

The Ms. of the *Siddhiviniścaya-tīkā* was found out from Koḍāyagrāma in Cutch, in 1926, by the revered Pt. Sukhalalji while he was editing *Sanmati Tarka*. Panditji has given some quotations from the SVT in his edition of *Sanmati Tarka*, in the foot-notes.

Unfortunately, the Ms. of SVT is full of mistakes, firstly because² some of the letters are disfigured due to the leaves having got stuck up, and secondly perhaps because the original Ms. from which the one under reference is copied, was written in *paḍimātrā* style and the copyist being

¹ The English Introduction gives only the gist of Hindi Intro. The readers are, therefore, requested to consult the Hindi Intro. for detailed discussions.

² See Hindi Intro. p. 2.

unable to distinguish the *mātras*—‘*ā*’ and ‘*e*’; has made the confusion of vowels, which mainly accounts for mistakes at various places. Besides many such causes there are blank dotted spaces just as : given in the Ms. which indicate that either some letters have been brushed out of the original Ms. or it did not have that portion at all. Leaf numbering 487 is missing in the Ms.

From the *Praśasti*, at the end of the Ms., it is clear that this was written by Sāhu Dhanarāja of Nāmaḍāgotra for Dharmasūri of Viśālagaccha beginning from Āryarakṣita. Further it is known that the Ms. is a copy of the Ms. which was got written by Śānti, a generous *aṇuvratī Śrāvaka* and presented to Nāgaudevagaṇi. The copyist was Viṣṇudeva who copied it in Samvat 1662. From the external evidences, e.g. the quality of the paper etc., of the present Ms. it can be conjectured that this copy was prepared without the lapse of any long interval of time. Reference has already been made to the fact that the Ms. is full of mistakes and omissions. The corrections in SVT have been given in round brackets () and additions have been shown in square brackets [].

2. The reconstruction of *Siddhiviniścaya* and its *Vṛtti*:

As already stated, SV and SVV are reconstructed with the help of SVT, so with a view to substantiate the correctness of the reconstruction of the said texts, the references to SV and SVV, found here and there in the SVT and other Jaina as well as non-Jaina works, have been added in the foot-note called *Āloka-Tippaṇa*. The SV. and SVV of Akalaṅka have been reconstructed by selecting words from the SVT. It was, indeed, very difficult to reconstruct SV in various metrical forms; still it had to be done and an appreciable success has, it is hoped, been achieved. The difficulty is felt still more when SVT is silent at certain places; and at such spots the reconstruction has only been possible where other sources were available. It is quite possible that in such a stupendous text as SVT, comprising almost as many as eighteen thousand verses (*granthāgṛa*), the words of SV and SVV, selected for commentary, may be merged in the SVT or the words of the SVT may be mistaken to be those of SV and SVV.

Being quite aware of these difficulties, attempt has been made to the best of the author's capacity to reconstruct SV and SVV. Hence, the SV and SVV have been printed in square brackets []; such brackets are also given for the words which are added with the help of the works other than SVT.

To substantiate our reconstruction, cross-references are given in the foot-notes giving the text of SV and SVV, referred to in SVT. Such references are alphabetically shown in the Appendix No. 8.

The following table shows the number of verses of SV reconstructed in the present volume. They are as follow :

1. <i>Pratyakṣasiddhi</i>	28
2. <i>Savikalpasiddhi</i>	29
3. <i>Pramāṇāntarasiddhi</i>	24
4. <i>Jīvasiddhi</i>	24
5. <i>Jalpasiddhi</i>	28½
6. <i>Hetulaṅkāśasiddhi</i>	43½
7. <i>Śāstrasiddhi</i>	30
8. <i>Sarvajñasiddhi</i>	43
9. <i>Śabdāsiddhi</i>	45
10. <i>Arthanayasiddhi</i>	28
11. <i>Śabdanayasiddhi</i>	31
12. <i>Nikṣepasiddhi</i>	16

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In addition to SV, the SVV, which is reconstructed in prose, will come to about 500 verses if metrically composed.

3. *The Nature of Quotations :*

The references drawn from works other than the text are printed in double inverted (".....") comas with the sign of (*), in Grate No. 2. The sources of the quotations are given in square brackets just at the end of the quotation. There are some quotations in the text before us, which are referred to such authors and their works as are not traceable in the works available to the editor of this volume. In such places, similar references are given in the foot-notes ; besides variant readings are also supplied from other sources. At the same time, the quotations which throw some light upon historical matters have been carefully scrutinised and critically reviewed.

4. *Āloka-Tippaṇa by the Editor :*

A large number of references relevant to the arguments for and against the topics discussed, have been added in foot-notes called *Āloka*, so that such comparative notes may give a clear idea of the historical development of the problems. The explanatory notes are also supplied. Variant readings of the quotations are given in the Notes which are based on more

than two-hundred and fifty works, the detailed survey of which has been given at the end under *Saniketa-Vivarana*-Appendix No. 12.

5. *Appendices :*

The following is the list of topics dealt with in various Appendices.

1. The alphabetical arrangement of the first and the third *pāda* of *Siddhiviniścaya*.
 2. The Kārikās included in SVV.
 3. The quotations of the SVV.
 4. The Variant readings of SV and SVV referred to in SVT.
 5. The alphabetical list of the technical words of SV and SVV.
 6. Kārikās by Anantavīrya in SVT.
 7. The quotations, with references, of SVT.
 8. SV and SVV as quoted in SVT.
 9. The authors and works quoted in SVT.
 10. Axioms and Epigrams.
 11. Some technical words of SVT.
 12. Abbreviations.
-

2. THE AUTHORS

1. Bhatta Akalaṅka

It can be said without much exaggeration that Akalaṅka is a brilliant personality in the Jaina Philosophical literature; undoubtedly, he occupies the highest place in the Jaina Nyāya literature. Though the *Āgamas* do contain discussions about *Pramāṇa*, the credit goes to Akalaṅka for the systematic classification of the above with correct phraseology. And thus the Jaina commentators and philosophers of the later period owe much to Akalaṅka's incisive insight to understand the old classics; in fact, Akalaṅka stands independent by himself; and his work has rightly been referred to as Akalaṅka-Nyāya.

Certainly, Akalaṅka can be compared with the intellectual giants of other systems of Indian philosophy as referred to above. Akalaṅka systematised the Jaina logic on the basis of the philosophical expositions of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena. He gave the precise meaning to the terms used in the *Āgamas* and moulded them into a systematic body of thought.

It must be readily admitted that the mediæval period, e.i., the seventh, eighth and ninth centuries, of the Indian Philosophical history is one of a brisk intellectual revolution. Every system of Indian thought was systematised by its respective exponents; this is not all. These exponents subjected other schools of thought to severe criticism. This period has to its credit, the philosophical debates giving opportunity to the exponents and scholars of different schools to study other systems intensively with a view to combat the arguments of the opponent schools. The purpose was not only to win over other schools but to have the royal patronage without which the propagation of the religion would not be effective. The literature of this era exemplifies more refutations of other schools rather than construction of their own systems.

Akalaṅka was an inspiring philosopher and he himself invited inspiration from without; this he gathered from the attacks on Jaina philosophy by the exponents of other schools, particularly the Buddhist philosophers. In his attempt to defend the teachings of Jaina *Āgamas*, without being dogmatic, he reconstructed and rejuvenated the Jaina-Nyāya on a firmer foundation.

(a) *Epigraphical references of Akalaṅka* :

As stated already, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka was an epoch-maker ; naturally, the inscriptions of later period are full of adorations and admirations for Akalaṅka's logical subtlety and philosophical sublimity. A note-worthy instance of his unrivalled popularity is witnessed by his *mangalācāraṇa*¹ of *Pramāṇasaṃgraha* which has been taken as *māṅgala śloka* in a number of inscriptions². Some of the following inscriptions will help us to know something about Akalaṅka's life.

1. The Kannaḍa inscription of Melukaḍa Vanti at Kaḍavanni refers to Mahideva Bhaṭṭāra as the disciple of Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa of Devagaṇa. The inscription is of about C.1060 A.C.³
2. In a stone inscription dated śaka 996 (1074.A.D.) of Bandali there is reference to Akalaṅka as a *guru*⁴.
3. The stone inscription of 1077 A.C. found near Balagambe Vaḍagiyaṛaḥoṇḍa refers to '*tarkaśāstradaviveka ḍolintakalaṅka-devarembudu*,' while praising Rāmasena⁵.
4. An inscription in Kannaḍa-cum⁶-Sanskrit language found in the quadrangle of Pañcabasti at Humach refers to Akalaṅka as '*Vādisimha Syādvādāmoghajihva*'⁷, flourishing after Sumatideva. The said inscription is dated Śaka 999 (1077 A.C.).
5. The Humach inscription dated 1077 A.C. refers to Akalaṅka-deva after Sīmhanandi⁸.
6. One more inscription from Humach refers *Sadasi yadakalaṅkah* while praising Vādirāja. It is dated 1077 A.C.⁹.
7. The pillar inscription of Kattile Basti refers to Jinacandra muni as '*Sakalasamayatarke ca Bhaṭṭākalaṅkah*'; it belongs to c. 1100 A.C.¹⁰.

¹ Śrīmat parama-gambhīrasyādvādāmoghaḷāṅchhanam,
Jiyāt trilokyanāthasya śāsanam Jinaśāsanam.—PMS, p. 1.

² Vide Hindi Intro. p. 7 Note 2.

³ EC. vol. VI, No. 75.

⁴ EC. vol. VII, Sikarpur, No. 221.

⁵ EC. vol. VII, Sikarpur No. 124; see also JSLS. vol. II, No. 217, p. 311.

⁶ ibid. vol. VIII, Nagar No. 35.

⁷ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 8, No. 2.

⁸ EC. vol. VIII, Nagar No. 36; JSLS. vol. II, 214.

⁹ EC. vol. VIII, Nagar No. 39.

¹⁰ JSLS. vol. I, p. 115, No. 55 (69).

8. An inscription of Eraḍukaṭṭe Basti, Meghacandra muni is spoken of as *vibudha* as Akalaṇka in Ṣaṭṭarka¹. It bears the date Śaka 1037 (1115 A.C.).
9. Similar expression is found in a pillar inscription of Gandhavarāṇa basti; its date being Śaka 1068 (1146 A.C.)².
10. The Kulturaguḍḍa inscription refers to Akalaṇka after Guṇanandideva. It bears the date Śaka 1043 (1121 A.C.)³.
11. Challengrama inscription refers to Akalaṇka as *Vāḍibhasimha* after *ekasandhi* Sumati Bhaṭṭāraka. It belongs to Śaka 1047 (1125 A.C.)⁴.
12. In Malliṣeṇa *Praśasti* inscribed on a pillar of Pārśvanātha Basti, there is detailed description of a debate of Akalaṇka Ācārya. It bears the date Śaka 1050 (1128 A.C.)⁵.
13. In the inscription of Saumyanāyaka temple at Bellur, a very brilliant tribute is paid to Akalaṇka in these words: *samaya-dīpaka unmilitadoṣa.....rajanīcarabala.....udbodhitabhavyakamala*, etc., after Sumati Bhaṭṭāraka; it bears the date Śaka 1059 (1137 A.C.)⁶.
14. In an inscription of Banasankari at Budri Akalaṇka is mentioned as guru; it belongs to c. 1139 A.C.⁷
15. Akalaṇka is referred to as *tārāvijetā*⁸; further there are verses containing the references as '*sadasiyadakalaṇkaḥ*' and '*nāhaṇ-kāraṇaśikertena*' in the inscription, written in Kannaḍa-cum-Sanskrit, of Bogadi. The date is missing; probably it belongs to 1145 A.C.⁹.
16. After Siṃhanandi, Akalaṇka is spoken as *Jinamatakuvalaya-śaśaṇka* in an inscription of Humach of Śaka 1069(1147 A.C.)¹⁰.
- 17-18. A stone inscription (about 1130 A.C.) of Kakkamma temple¹¹ at Sukadare and one more (1154A.C.) at Yallādahalli refer to Akalaṇka after Samantabhadra.

¹ *ibid.* p. 58, No. 47 (127), see also Hindi Intro. p. 8, Note 7.

² *ibid.* vol. I, p. 71, No. 50 (140)

³ EC. vol. VII. Simmoggā, No. 4; JSLS, vol. II, No. 277, p. 408.

⁴ JSLS. vol. I, No. 493, p. 395.

⁵ JSLS. vol. I, No. 54 (67), p. 101.

⁶ EC. vol. V, Badur, No. 17. JSLS. vol. III, No. 305, p. I.

⁷ EC. vol. VIII, Sorab No. 233; JSLS. vol. III, No. 313, p. 31.

⁸ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 9, Note. 3.

⁹ EC. vol. IV, Nāgamaṅgala, No. 100; JSLS. vol. III, No. 319.

¹⁰ EC. vol. VIII, Nagar No. 37; JSLS, vol. III, p. 66.

¹¹ EC. vol. IV, Nāgamaṅgala, No. 76; JSLS. vol. III, p. 60.

19. The pillar inscription of Mahānavami maṇḍapa at Chandragiri refers to Akalaṅka as *mahāmati* etc., it is dated Śaka 1085 (1163A.C.)¹
20. Akalaṅka's victory over Buddhists is referred to in a stone² inscription of Basavanapur ; it belongs to Śaka 1105 (1183A.C.) Further it refers to his colleague Puṣpasena muni and after him Vimalacandra, Indranandī and Paravādimalla³ are also referred to.
21. Akalaṅka is referred to as *Samantādakalaṅka*⁴ in a pillar inscription of Siddhara Basti ; it belongs to Śaka 1320 (1398A.C.).
22. He is also referred to as *Śāstravidāgresa* and *mithyāndha-kārabhedaka*⁵; further, it relates the fact that after Akalaṅka, the *Samgha* was divided into four branches, viz., *Deva*, *Nandī*, *Simha* and *Sena* ; it is dated Śaka 1355 (1433A.C.).
It seems from this inscription that Devasamgha came into being with Akalaṅka Deva ; naturally he must have been the first Ācārya.
23. The Humach inscription of about 1530A.C., refers to Akalaṅka as *Mahardhika* and *Devāgamabhāṣyakāra*⁶.

(b) Citations in various works :

Akalaṅka, the versatile writer, the graceful debator and an epoch-making figure, is eulogised not only in the epigraphs but in various works as well. Some of the citations are : *Tarkabhūvallabha*, *Akalaṅkadhī*, *Bauddha-buddhivaidhavyadīkṣāguru*, *Mahardhika*, *Samastavādikarīndradarponmūlaka*, *Syādvādakesarasatāśatativramūrtipancānana*, *Aśeṣakutarkavibhramatamonir mūlonmūlaka*, *Akalaṅkabhānu*, *Acintyamahimā Śāstā*, *bhūyobhedanayāvagāhaganāvāṅgmaya*, *Sakalatārkkikacakracūdamanimarīcimecakitānakhākīraṇa*, *Samantādakalaṅka*, *prakaṣitātīrthāntariyakalaṅka*, etc. Puṣpadanta in his *Mahāpurāṇa* and Asaga in his *Munisuvratākāvya* have gratefully referred to Akalaṅka. Śubhachandra is also full of reverence for Akalaṅka⁷.

¹ *ibid.* No. 103 ; JSLs. vol. II, No. 274.

² JSLs. vol. I, No. 40(64), p. 25 ; see also Hindi Intro. p. 9.

³ EC. vol. III, Tirumakuḍḍu, No. 105 JSLs. vol. III, No. 410, p. 205-6.

⁴ JSLs. vol. I, No. 105(254), p. 195.

⁵ *ibid.* No. 108 (258), p. 211.

⁶ EC. vol. VIII, Nagar No. 46 ; JSLs. vol. III, No. 667, p. 541.

⁷ Vide Hindi Introduction p. 10.

(c) *The Life-story of Akalaṅka* :

It is a matter of regret that we do not possess authoritative biography by his immediate successors ; nor did he ever write anything about himself. It is a very characteristic feature of Indian authors that they seldom write anything about themselves. At the top of this, the successors too, at times, are silent about them. It is interesting to find that Hariṣeṇa's *Kathākoṣa*¹ is silent about Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, even though both of them were, no doubt, epoch-makers. Hariṣeṇa gives the date of the completion of his work as—Śaka 853 (931 A.C.). The first reference to Akalaṅka occurs in the *Kathākoṣa*, in prose, of Prabhācandra. The *Praśasti* of the said text suggests that this work is written by Prabhācandra, the well-known author of *Nyāyakumudacandra* and *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa*. It has been proved that the date of Prabhācandra is 980-1065 A.C.² The *Kathākoṣa* was composed during the regime of Jayasīmhadeva (1055 A.C.)³. This is the only reliable text, providing substantial evidence, to know something about the life of Akalaṅka. This very text was recomposed in poetic form, with some alterations here and there, by Brahma-Nemidatta ; this fact is clearly mentioned by the author himself⁴. We have one more text, viz., *Rājāvalīkathe*, which refers to Akalaṅka ; but it is not of much help as it belongs to a very late period, i.e., sixteenth century.

The *Kathākoṣa* (KK) of Prabhācandra and Nemidatta refer to the life-story of Akalaṅka as follows : The King Śubhatuṅga of Mānyakheṭa had a minister named Puruṣottama. He had two sons : Akalaṅka and Nikalaṅka. Once, both the brothers accompanied their parents on their way to the temple on the occasion of Aṣṭāhnika festival. On this auspicious day the parents took the vow of celibacy and initiated the boys also to the same. At the prime of their youth, they did not marry in conformity to the vow taken. The father persuaded the sons that vow was meant only for eight days ; but the sons, persistent in their determination, made it a life-long vow. So they utilised their time in studying the scriptures. They joined the Buddha-maṭh in disguise in order to study. The teacher, while teaching the Dignāgas attack on *Anekānta*, could not make out the text due to some mistake and he suspended the class that day. The very next day he found the text corrected ; this led him to suspect that a Jaina student must be in their midst in disguise. In order to spot out such a student

¹ See Hindi Intro. p. 11.

² *Nyāyakumudacandra* (NKC), vol. II, pp. 50-58.

³ Dr. A. N. Upadhye holds the same view. See his Intro. to *Bṛhatkathākoṣa*, pp. 60-62 ; see also Hindi Intro. p. 11 Note 3.

⁴ vide Hindi Intro. p. 11, Note 6 ; see also NKC. II. p. 26.

he ordered his disciples to cross over the idol of Jina. Akalaṅka saved himself from this critical test by putting on a thread over the idol.

One night the teacher threw a bag of bronz vessels over the top floor where the students were sleeping, with the result that all of them woke up uttering the respective names of their deities. At this very time Akalaṅka uttered '*namo arahantāṇāmi*' etc.; this was enough to single out the 'culprit'. Both the brothers were arrested and captivated in the top floor of the maṭh. But they jumped down with the help of an umbrella and escaped.

On the way Nikalaṅka requested, nay, implored his brother to escape by hiding himself in the tank nearby so that he may not be caught by the pursuing armed guards. Nikalaṅka thought that his brother, an intellectual prodigy, could well serve the cause of Jaina literature. Akalaṅka, with inexpressible sorrow, submitted to the suggestion of Nikalaṅka. Nikalaṅka was running away but just then he was seen by a washerman. He too started running with Nikalaṅka, pursued by armed guards. At last both were slain by the horse-men.

Akalaṅka, after the completion of his studies, took to renunciation; he was a forceful debater; he impressed the royal courts by his orations at several places and thus influenced the public with the teachings of the Jinas. Once he went to the Ratnasañcayapura in Kaliṅga deśa. There, the queen Madanasundarī, the wife of King Himaśīṭala, thought of the Jaina procession of chariots on the occasion of Aṣṭāhnika. But this was not to be; for a Buddhist teacher, Saṅghaśrī came forward and interrupted by challenging any Jaina teacher to come forward and defeat him then alone the procession could proceed. The King accepted the proposal, and the Queen became very anxious. At last Akalaṅka accepted the challenge and defeated the Buddhist teacher. The success of Akalaṅka naturally led to the spread of Jainism¹.

In addition to this we have the episode of Akalaṅka given by Rice based on *Rājāvalikathe* and some other stories²: At the time of Buddhist suppression of Jainism at Kanchi the jaina Brāhmin Jinadāsa and his wife Jinamati had two sons, viz., Akalaṅka and Nikalaṅka. They sent both their sons, in disguise, to a Buddhaguru Bhagavaddāsa, since there was no Jaina teacher. The brothers progressed in their studies by leaps and bounds. Their progress led to the suspicion in the mind of the teacher.

¹ vide NKC, vol. I. Intro. p. 28.

² Jaina Hitaiṣi, vol. XI. Nos. 7-8. Art: Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva; See also NKC, vol. I. Intro. p. 28.

He tried to find out the true history of these brothers. In his examination with all types of devices, at last they were found to be Jainas.

(1) *The Tradition of Similar Legends :*

(1) The Press copy prepared by Muni Puṇyavijayaji, of *Prākṛta Kathāvali* of Bhadrēśvarasūri (12th C. A.D.¹) has a legend about Haribhadra as follows—Haribhadra took to renunciation at the instance of Jinadattācārya ; he had two disciples, namely, Jinabhadra and Virabhadra. Buddhism was at the height of its glory in Chittor at that time ; naturally Buddhists were the rivals of Haribhadra. The climax of this communal jealousy resulted in the murder of both the disciples of Haribhadra. Haribhadra took it seriously and decided to observe fast unto death ; but it was averted due to the intervention of influential personalities. Philosopher as he was, he devoted his life in writing down works on Jaina philosophy. Haribhadra was known also by his nick-name *Bhāvaviraha sūri* since he used to bless his devotees with *Bhāvaviraha*.

(2) The *Prabhāvakacarita* (1277.A.D.) of Candraprabha Sūri gives the account of two disciples of Haribhadra : Haṁsa and Paramahaṁsa ; both the brothers joined a Buddha maṭh at Sugatapura for their education. They wrote down the counter attack on Buddhist criticism of Jaina philosophy pointing out the inconsistencies in Buddhism. The teacher chanced to look into them ; naturally he became suspicious of the presence of non-Buddhist disciples at his maṭh. In order to find-out he ordered his students to cross the painting of Jinadeva ; both the brothers passed over the painting after drawing a line with the chalk representing the sacred thread on the chest of the Jina ; similar experiments—e.g. throwing the bronz vessels were undertaken to find out the non-Buddhist students ; finally, they were arrested when it was clearly revealed that they were Jainas. They tried to escape but were followed by the guards ; Haṁsa asked his younger brother to run away and to surrender to the king named Sūrapāla and died himself in fighting with the guards. The king Sūrapāla refused to give Paramahaṁsa to the guards ; on the other hand he summoned the Buddhist scholars for a debate in which Paramahaṁsa secured a grand victory over his opponents. Then he broke the pot in which the Goddess Tārā was installed to help the Buddhists. Even then he was not free from danger ; he ran away ; he approached a washer-man and bade him to run away as the army was approaching. The washer-man ran away and Paramahaṁsa took his place. When the soldiers came and asked about Paramahaṁsa, he pointed at the direction in which the washer-man was running. Thus he saved himself

¹ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 13. f. n. No. 1.

and joined his *guru*. He narrated the whole tragic end of his brother and his pathetic story with the result that he himself died due to over grief. Haribhadra, the witness of the end of his disciple in revange defeated many Buddhist scholars in debate and wrote many works to refute Buddhism. At the end of every work the word *viraha* occurs, indicative of his separation of his disciples.

(3) Similar story is given by Rājaśekharaśūri in his *Caturvīṃśati Prabandha* (1348 A.D.) with the exception that the episode of washerman is absent.

(II) *Analysis of Legends :*

In brief, the facts of education of two brothers at the seat of Buddhists, their tussle with the scholars on Buddhism, the murder of one, and the debates by the other etc., are common in all legends, except the names—Haṃsa and Paramahaṃsa which are not in consonance with the Jaina tradition. No doubt Jinabhadra and Virabhadra bear testimony of Jaina tradition ; one thing is self-expressive—that such episodes are formed to illustrate the glory of the religious tradition implying some historical fact, however dim it may be.

The episode described in *Rājāvalikathe* of the sixteenth century is simply an eulogy of the Jaina tradition. There is very little of history in it. But of all these legends the one by Prabhācandra, in his *Kathakośa*, is the oldest and reflects some historical facts as under :

(1) *Subhatuṅga was the King of Mānyakheṭa* : So far as the dynastic history of Rāṣṭrakūṭa kings goes, *Subhatuṅga* was the *Biruda* of king Kṛṣṇa I¹. The Rāṣṭrakūṭas had their capital at Mānyakheṭa ; but it was re-established near about 815 A.D. by King Amoghavarṣa². Before Amoghavarṣa, Govinda III got the trench and fort built for the protection from the Eastern Chalukyas of Vengi³. Even before this, a copper-plate of Devarahaṇḍi⁴, dated Saka, 698 (776 A.D.) refers to Mānyapura, from which it is clear that King Śrī Puruṣa's victorious army was, in Saka 698, at Mānyapura.

In spite of this, the specialists on the history of Rāṣṭrakūṭas, like Dr. Altekar, remark that there is no substantial material to prove the whereabouts of the capital of Rāṣṭrakūṭas before Amoghavarṣa⁵. After the death of Dantidurga II, in the prime of his youth, *Subhatuṅga* Kṛṣṇa I, was

¹ EI. vol. III, p. 106.

² *ibid.* vol. XII, p. 263.

³ BPRV. vol. III, p. 39.

⁴ EC. vol. IV, Nagamangala No. 85 ; JSLS. vol. II, No. 121.

⁵ The Rāṣṭrakūṭas and their Times p. 44.

on the throne. A reward of gift¹, made by Dantidurga, is found in Sāman-gaḍa, Kolhapur District, which bears the date, Śaka 675 (753 A.D.). It speaks of his glorious valour and victory. The copper-plate referring to Kṛṣṇarāja has been published by the Bhārata Saṁśodhaka Maṇḍala². Its date lies, according to English calender, in September 758. Dr. Altekar admits the year of Coronation of Kṛṣṇa I, at the age of fortyfive, as 756 A.D.³.

There is reference to Mānyapura before the time of Amoghavarṣa ; on the contrary, there is nothing to prove that Mānyakheṭa was not the capital before Amoghavarṣa. Even conceding to the fact that Amoghavarṣa made Mānyakheṭa his capital, it can be said that Mānyapura—Mānyakheṭa, had strong affinity with the Rāṣṭrakūtas by the time of the author of *Kathākośa* and it is for this reason that Kṛṣṇa, the *Subhatuṅga*, is referred to as the king of Mānyakheta.

(2) *Puruṣottama, the minister of Subhatuṅga* : Though we do not have data other than K to prove that Puruṣottama was the minister ; even then, it is not impossible that Puruṣottama might have been a feudal king or a minister of Subhatuṅga.

(3) *Debates at the Court of Himaśītala of Kalinga* : Dr. Jyotiprasad⁴ has attempted in his article, '*Akalaṅka Paramparāke Mahārāja Himaśītala*', to identify King Nagahuṣa, *Mahābhavagupta* IV (619-644 A.D.) of lunar dynasty of Trikalīṅga with Himaśītala. But he starts with the presupposition that Samvat 700, as written in *Akalaṅkacarita*, is the same as Vikrama Samvat 700 ; naturally, he has sought to find out any king of V.S. 700 (643 A.D.) ; therefore, when he found Nagahuṣa of the said period he identified him with Himaśītala.

But in the light of a correct interpretation of the said Samvat as Śaka and other arguments shown later on, it is proved that Akalaṅka's date is 720-780 A.D. ; hence, the identification by Jyotiprasad Jain is not valid⁵.

(III) *The Problem of Nikalaṅka* :

According to Pt. Kailaschandrajī it is just impossible to hold the historicity of Nikalaṅka for obvious reasons : that Akalaṅka himself is silent about Nikalaṅka, who risked his own life to save his brother (Akalaṅka) to serve the cause of Jaina literature are unthinkable facts of his

¹ IA. vol. 11, p. 111 ; see also BPRV. vol. III, p. 26.

² The Rāṣṭrakūtas and their Times p. 44.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Jñānodaya, vol. II, Nos. 17-21.

⁵ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 15 and section : Date of Akalaṅka, p. 55

life. Panditji's contention is not without its own value. The *Kathākoṣa*, in prose, is older than *Kathāvali*; naturally, it cannot have derived such a story from *Kathāvali*. If by *varatanayaḥ*, it is understood that Akalaṅka was the elder son, then he must have a younger brother.

The last lines of the 1st Ch. of TV are as follow :

Jiyāc-ciramakalaṅkabrahmā laghuhavvanṛpativaratanayaḥ,
anavaratanikhilavidvajjananutavidyaḥ praśastajanahṛdyaḥ.

This refers to Akalaṅka as the elder or pre-eminent son of King Laghuhavva. This verse is not found in the palm-leaf MSS. of Śravanbelgoḷa and Mūḍabidri, but found in the Beawar and other North Indian MSS. The verse cannot claim to be written by Akalaṅka, because it is written at the end of the very first chapter. If it be that the verse is written by Akalaṅka himself or by any immediate contemporary, it proves one thing that Laghuhavva was the father of Akalaṅka. In the Introduction to my '*Akalaṅka-Grantha-Traya*', some problems have been critically discussed; and the possibility of Laghuhavva and Puruṣottama being identical has been pointed out therein. Of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa dynasty, Indra II and Kṛṣṇa I were real brothers. After the death of Indra II, his son Dantidurga II became the ruler of the kingdom. In Kannaḍa, the father is called '*abba*' or '*appa*'. It is not improbable that Dantidurga, addressed his uncle Kṛṣṇa I as '*abba*' or '*avva*'.

It is almost a general rule, so to say people addressing in the same way as the king would address—*abba* or *avva*. Kṛṣṇa I, who had Śubha-tuṅga as his *biruda*, became the king after Dantidurga. It seems Puruṣottama might have been a junior-colleague of Kṛṣṇa I; it is for this reason, Dantidurga himself and consequently the subjects would be addressing Puruṣottama as '*Laghuhabba*'. He might have become minister during the regime of Kṛṣṇa I; and Kṛṣṇa was on the throne at his old age¹; hence, it may not be inappropriate to suppose that Puruṣottama was almost of the same age of Kṛṣṇa; and so, on this supposition, we can explain the narration of his debate by Akalaṅka in the court of Dantidurga alias Sāhasa-tuṅga².

The nickname—Laghuhabba of Puruṣottama might have been so common that he was addressed by this popular name instead of his original name. If it be conceded that the verse of *Tattvārthavārtika* was written by some body other than Akalaṅka, it is not unnatural that this unknown author could prefer popular name—Laghuhabba instead of Puruṣottama;

¹ A. S. Altekar: The Rāṣṭrakūṭas and their Times, p. 44.

² EC. vol. II, 67, Malliṣeṇa Praśasti.

though he might not be a king, it is just possible he was called a King-*Nṛpati*, due to his royal relation. If the inference to identify Puruṣottama and Laghuhabba were true, it can be said, further, that Akalaṅka might have born in or in the suburbs of Mānyakheṭṭa.

It can be said that his father was Puruṣottama, his popular name being Laghuhavva. The change from Laghuabba to Laghuhavva is phonetically possible.

One more observation may also be added here, that the aforesaid verse is not at all written by Akalaṅka; and it is inserted in some MSS. of TV copied only after Prabhācandra (980-1065 A.D.), the author of K; because, though Prabhācandra has referred to Akalaṅka's TV in his NKC (p. 646), he has not given, in his KK, the name of Laghuhabba *nṛpati* as the father of Akalaṅka.

Further, it is not inconsistent that Akalaṅka was the son of a minister of Śubhataṅga (756-772 A.D.) if Akalaṅka's date is fixed as 720-780 A.D.

(d) *Akalaṅka and other Ācāryas :*

In this section an attempt is made to discuss some of the authors who influenced Akalaṅka and also those whom he criticised.

1. *Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali :*

Puṣpadanta is the author of *Saṭprarāṇā* of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* and Bhūtabali of the rest¹ of it. It is maintained that the said work was composed in the beginning of Christian era.² Akalaṅka in his earlier writings appears before us as a philosopher concerned with the exposition of the traditional lore; but in due course he assumes the role of a first rate logician and produced works on Pure Logic and Philosophy. In his *Tattvārthavārtika* (TV) he has quoted *Jīvasthāna*³, as a scriptural evidence. This is clear in his exposition of *Manahparyāya Jñāna* by such references—*manasā manah paricchidya*, etc. quoted from *Mahābandha* (p. 24).

2. *Kundakunda :*

Kundakunda is one of the exponents of Digambara Canonical works. After Bhūtabali and Puṣpadanta, Kundakunda features as an authority on *Āgamic* lore for Akalaṅka. It is maintained that Kundakunda flourished in the beginning of Christian era.⁴ His works are imbued with philosophical ideas, which fact is eloquently attested by his 'works: *Samayaprabhṛta*,

¹ *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* vol. I, Intro. p. 20.

² *ibid.* p. 85.

³ TV. pp. 79, 135, 154.

⁴ A. N. Upadhye : *Pravacanasāra*, Intro.

Pancāstikāya, *Pravacanasāra* and *Niyamasāra*. There is hardly any doubt that Akalaṅka has drawn inspiration from the above-noted works in his discussion of *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrāvyā*.

3. *Umāsvāti* :

It is beyond any doubt that *Tattvārthasūtra* (TSu) of Umāsvāmi or Umāsvāti alias *Grddhapiccha*, is in the form of *Sūtras* in sanskrit containing, for the first time, the teachings of the *Āgamas*. There are two earliest commentaries on TSu. It has undergone two recensions ; one as accepted in the *Bhāṣya* (TSB) and the other accepted in the *Sarvārtha Siddhi* (SS). Akalaṅka accepted the latter recension and has criticised, at certain places, some *Sūtras* of the *Bhāṣya* recension and the *bhāṣya* itself. It is also found that he has composed *Vārtikā* out of the sentences from the *Bhāṣya*.¹ The last portion of the tenth chapter, of *Bhāṣya*, both in prose and verse, is taken verbatim in TV.

Further, a chapter—*Pramāṇanaya-Praveśa* of *Laghūyastraya* is the outcome in toto of “*Pramāṇanayairadhigamaḥ*”² of TSu. He quotes extensively *Sarvārtha Siddhi* recension of TSu in his SV.

4. *Samantabhadra* :

With regard to the exact date of Samantabhadra, the champion of *Syādvāda*, there is much controversy. In spite of the reference to, “*Catuṣṭayam Samantabhadrasya*” in *Jainedra Vyākaraṇa*, Pt. Sukhalalji and Pt. Premī, maintain that Samantabhadra was the elder contemporary of Pūjyapāda.³ The argument advanced in this behalf is that according to Vidyānanda, the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra is composed as a commentary on ‘*Mokṣamārgasya netāraṇi*’ which is the *mangalācāraṇa* of *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. But it is curious to find that Vidyānanda has not written commentary on this *mangalācāraṇa* in TSLV, according to him the said verse is composed by *Sūtrakāra*.⁴ Under such conditions, the reference of Vidyānanda disarms one in respect of historical background and his statement—‘*svāmimīmāṃsitam*’ loses the significance of historicity. On the other hand, Pt. Jugal Kishorji maintains that he flourished during the 2nd c. of Vikram Era.⁵ In fact, we do not have any substantial internal evidences relating to his time. The whole framework of *Anekānta* and *Saptabhāṅgi* in Akalaṅka’s works can be safely attributed to the genius of Samantabhadra.

¹ TV. p. 17.

² Tsu. 1.6.

³ JSI. pp. 45-46.

⁴ Āptaparikṣā *Kārikā* 3.

⁵ JSIV. p. 697.

Akalaṇka's *Aṣṭaśatī* is the finest specimen of scintillating intellect and incisive insight, being the commentary on *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. No doubt, the author expresses his gratefulness in an indigenous manner. His Jaina Logic and Epistemology are grounded in the aphoristic statements of Samantabhadra. Akalaṇka uses such phrases as are expressive of the greatness of Samantabhadra,—*Syādvādapuṇyodadhiprabhāvaka*, *Bhavyaika-lokanayana* and *Syādvādavartmaparipālaka*; etc.

5. *Siddhasena* :

Sanmatisūtra (SSu) is a renowned work of Siddhasena ; it is maintained that *Dvātrimśat dvātrimśatikā* (DDT) and *Nyāyāvatāra* are also the works of Siddhasena ; who probably flourished during the 5th century of Vikrama era¹. Pūjyapāda belongs to the last quarter of this period, since the latter quotes *viyojayati cāsubhiḥ*—DDT in his SS (vii. 13) ; further, the *Laghīyastraya* (v. 67) contains the sanskrit version of the *gāthā*—‘*titthayaravayana*’ from SSu 1. 3. In addition, he quotes ‘*pañṇavañijjā*’ etc. (SSu. II. 16) and ‘*viyojayati*’ (DDT. III. 16) in his TV p. 87 and p. 540 respectively. It is clear that *Sanmatitarka* was the valid text for Akalaṇka, which he quotes at several places in his TV². Besides, he refers to Siddhasena by name—‘*Asiddhaḥ Siddhasenasya*’ (SV. VI. 21) before Devanandi and Samantabhadra.

6. *Yatirṣabha* :

The author of *kaṣāya Pāhuḍa cūrṇi* is a great canonical scholar to whom is attributed *Tiloyapaṇṇatti* also. Critics are not unanimous regarding the genuineness of *Tiloyapaṇṇatti* in its present form³. As regards his time, it is proved to lie between 473 A.D. and 609 A.D.⁴. Akalaṇka writes the following verse in the opening section of his earlier work—*Laghīyastraya*⁵—

“*Praṇipaty Mahāviraṃ syādvādekaṣaṇasaptakam,
Pramāṇanayanikṣepānabhidhāsyē yathāgamam*”.

After this, he explains *Pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa*, according to *Āgamas*. It is as follows :

“*Jñānam pramāṇamātmāderupāyo nyāsa iṣyate.
Nayo Jñātūrabhīprāyo yuktito’rthaparigrahaḥ*”

¹ Sanmati Prakaraṇa, Intro. p. 41 ; NVVV. Intro. p. 141.

² NKC. Intro. p. 72.

³ TP. vol. II, Intro. p. 15 ; JSIV, p. 586.

⁴ Jayadhavalā vol. I, Intro. p. 57 and TP. vol. II, Intro. p. 15.

⁵ LT, p. 18.

Tiloyapaṇṇatti has the following two gāthās in the first chapter—

*jo na pamāṇanayehim nikkhevenam nikkhide attham,
tassājuttam juttam jattamajuttam ca paḍihādi* 118211
*nānam hodi pamāṇam nao vi ṇādussa hīdayabhāvatto,
nikkhevo vi uvāo juttie atthapaḍigahanam* 118311

It is clear that the second *Kārikā* of LT is just the sanskrit form of the second *Gāthā* of TP. It will be seen in the following pages that Akalaṅka wrote first the *Pramāṇanayapraveśa* of LT and then *Pravacanapraveśa* (PP) separately ; such separate MSS. of PP are also found¹. It seems either Akalaṅka or Anantavīrya named the compendia of both these works as *Laghīyastraya* taking into consideration all the *praveśas*. This *Kārikā* is given just after the proposition to write a treatise according to the *Āgamas—yathāgamam*, clearly indicative of its dependence on TP. The sanskrit form of a *Gāthā* of *Sanmati Sūtra* (I. 3) is found in this very text PP (p. 23).

*“tīrthayaravayanasanṅghavisesapathhāramūlavāgarāṇi,
dauvatthio ya pajjavāṇao ya sesā viyappā sim.”*

The Sk. version is : “*tataḥ tīrthakara-vacanasanṅghaviśeṣaprastāramūla-vyākāraṇāu dravyaparyāyārthikau niścetavyau*”—LT, v. 67.

On the basis of this, we can definitely say, that in his earlier stages Akalaṅka preferred to follow his predecessors and sanskritised some *gāthās* of prākṛit scriptural texts. The aphoristic statement “*Jñānam Pramāṇam*” does not reflect originality of Akalaṅka.

7. *Śrīdatta* :

Śrīdatta is referred to in *Jainendra-vyākaraṇa* (I. 4. 34) of Ācārya Devanandī ; even Akalaṅka refers to him as “*iti Śrīdattam*” in his *Tattvārthavārtika* (p. 57) ; it seems he must have been a philologist of eminence. He flourished prior to Pūjyapāda. Ācārya Vidyānanda too accredits him for his triumphant victory over sixtythree debaters ; not only this, he refers to his “*Jalpanirṇaya*”². also Further, Ācārya Jīnaseṇa respectfully refers to him as “*Pravādhībhaprabhedīn*”³. Above all the vivid influence of this Ācārya can be traced on Akalaṅka in his *Siddhiviniścaya*, especially in the chapter—*Jalpasiddhi*, and also in *Jayaparājaya-vyavasthā* in the same way as is the influence of Pātrakesarī on him.

¹ See KPTS.

² TSLV, p. 280.

³ ADP, p. I, 45.

8. *Pūjyapāda* :

Pūjyapāda is the author of *Jainendra-vyākaraṇa* and *Sarvārthasiddhi*; his date has been fixed as the 5th century A.D.¹ It is a well-known fact that Akalaṅka gave the form of *Vārtika* to several sentences of *Sarvārthasiddhi* and explained them in detail in his TV. TV quotes *Jainendra-vyākaraṇa* also; besides this, Pūjyapāda is referred to as *Śabdānuśāsanadākṣa* in SVV (p. 653); further Pūjyapāda is referred by name in the verse of SV (VI. 21) as '*Viruddho Devanandinaḥ*'. Obviously Pūjyapāda's works form the very basis of those of Akalaṅka, who has frankly expressed his indebtedness to Pūjyapāda.

9. *Mallavādi* :

Muni Jambūvijayaḥ has reconstructed the *Nayacakra* of Mallavādi from the *Vṛtti* of Sīrṇhasūrigaṇi. The *Nayacakra* refers to Bhaṭṭhari and Dignāga; hence Mallavādi cannot be taken to have existed before the 5th c. A.D. He has also referred to Siddhasena; this fact also supports the limit of his age. The discussion of *naya* by Akalaṅka in his *Nyāya-viniścaya*² and *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*³ bears eloquent testimony to the influence of *Nayacakra* which is no other text than one of Mallavādi himself. The work *Nayacakra* that is referred to by Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda is not the *nayacakra* of Devasena (933 A.D.). Though the *Nayacakra* refers to Dignāga in connection with his doctrine of *apoha* he is said to be the contemporary of Dignāga⁴. The age of Mallavādi has not been finally decided. The fact that the *Nayacakra* refers to Dignāga and is totally silent about Dharmakīrti and his disciples, leads us to the irresistible conclusion that Mallavādi flourished after Dignāga (5th c. A.D.) and before 7th c. A.D. Akalaṅka's reference to "*Sūtrapātavad rjnsūtraḥ*" in TV (1. 33) is taken from *Nayacakra*⁵ itself.

10. *Jinabhadraṇi* :

Jinabhadraṇi Kṣmāśramaṇa, the author of *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* belongs to the last quarter of the 6th and first quarter of the seventh century A.D. Muni Jinavijayaḥ fixes the date of Jinabhadra's VBH, at 609 A.D. from the *Prastāvi* of *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*⁶. Pt. Malvania regards this as

¹ JSI p. 41.

² *Nyāyaviniścaya*, iii, 477.

³ *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*, p. 125.

⁴ Dalasukha Malvania: Ācārya Mallavādikā *Nayacakra*, *Rajendrasūri Smāraka Grantha*.

⁵ *Nayacakra Vṛtti* Ms. p. 345B.

⁶ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 20.

the date of the copy of the MSS. of VBH. So the upper limit of the date of Jinabhadra is 593 A.D. At any rate one thing is clear that Jinabhadra belongs to the last quarter of the 6th century A.D., which can be pushed further upto 609 A.D. Jinabhadra divides *pratyakṣa* into *mukhya* and *sāmyavahārika*; the latter being the out-come of the joint operation of senses and mind¹. Akalaṅka also adopts the same method of division of *pramāṇa*². Thus Akalaṅka follows Jinabhadra who himself was an exponent of the Āgamic conception of *Pramāṇa*. The concept of *sāmyavahārika pramāṇa*, though the word is coined by Buddhist philosophers³, is adopted by the Jaina logicians also; Jinabhadra is first to absorb this in Jaina logic.

11. *Pātrakesari*:

According to Anantavīrya there was a work of Pātrakesari, viz., *Trilakṣaṇakadārdhana*⁴. *Tattvasaṃgraha*⁵ quotes Pātrawāmi's '*anyathānupannaṭvaṃ*' etc. The inscriptions⁶ refer to Pātraswami after Sumati. The three forms of *hetu* (reason) are propounded by Dignāga and elaborated by Dharmakīrti. The oldest reference to Pātraswāmi is made by Śāntarakṣita (705-762 A.D.) and Karṇakagomi (between the last quarter of 7th and 8th century A.D.). Hence Pātraswāmi must have lived after Dignāga (425 A.D.) and before Śāntarakṣita. It seems, therefore, that he belongs to the last part of the 6th century A.D. and earlier part of the 7th century A.D.; his famous verse '*anyathānupannaṭva*' is incorporated by Akalaṅka in his *Nyāyaviniścaya*⁷.

12. *Bhartṛhari*:

It is generally accepted on the strength of I-Tsing's record of his travels that Bhartṛhari lived in 650 A.D.; for he refers to Bhartṛhari's death just before forty years from the time of his records (691 A.D.). But recent researches have thrown much light and suggest a drift from the accepted date. Muni Jambuvijayaji in his article on "*Jainācārya Mallavādi ane Bhartṛhari no Samaya*"⁸ has put forth some arguments to reject the said date. According to him:

¹ *Vīṣṇāvākyabhāṣya*, v. 95.

² *Laghiyastraya*, v. 3.

³ *Pramāṇavārtika*, I. 7.

⁴ See Sec.: Anantavīrya as Logician, Hindi Intro. p. 67.

⁵ *Tattvasaṃgraha* p. 405.

⁶ EC. vol. VIII, Nagar No. 39 see Hindi Intro. p. 8.

⁷ *Nyāyaviniścaya*, ii. 323.

⁸ *Buddhiprakāśa*, vol. 98 Part II, November 1951.

(1) Bhartṛhari was the disciple of Vasurāta, which fact is stated by Puṇyārāja in his commentary on *Vākyapadīya* and Mallavādi in his *Nayacakra*.¹ Paramārtha Pandita wrote the biography of Vasubandhu in Chinese probably in 560 A.D., wherein it is stated that Vasurata pointed out the grammatical errors in *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, who, with a view to reply this grammarian, wrote a book, a fact which is generally accepted by scholars. The age of Vasubandhu is supposed to be 280-360 A.D.,² hence it can be surmised that Bhartṛhari, the disciple of Vasurāta who was the contemporary of Vasubandhu, might have flourished during the early part of the 5th c. A.D.

(2) Dignāga, the disciple of Vasubandhu, quotes from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (II. 156-7) two Kārikas in the last portion of 5th ch. on *Apoha* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. They are :

*saṁsthānavarṇāvayavairviśiṣṭe yaḥ prayujyate,
śabdo na tasyāvayave pravṛttirūpalabhyate.
saṁkhyāpramāṇasaṁsthānanirapekṣaḥ pravartate,
bindu ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ salilādīṣu.*

This is attested by Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on PS. viz., *Viśālāmala-vatīṣikā* where he writes in this context—'Yathāha Bhartṛhari?'. It is clear from this that Bhartṛhari was the contemporary of Dignāga; similarly, the teachers of both these scholars must have been contemporaries. We know the time of Dignāga (c. 425 A.C.). In his *Nayacakra*, Mallavādi quotes views and also 3 Kārikas of Vasurāta and Bhartṛhari³. Bhartṛhari, therefore, must have lived during the last quarter of the 4th century A.D. Scholars are indeed, indebted to Jambuvijayaji for throwing new light on this problem. Of course, before this attempt, Prof. Bruno and Kunhan Rāja have proved the date of Bhartṛhari as c. 450 A.D.⁴ In the light of these evidences, it can be remarked that Bhartṛhari about whom I-Tsing refers in his Records⁵ was certainly a Buddhist scholar, which is sufficiently self-evident in the words of I-Tsing who refers to him as the author of a commentary on *Mahābhāṣya* of about twenty-five thousand verses.....he had intensive faith in *triratna*.....he was meditating on *Śūnya*.....he became an ascetic in order to acquire *Saddharma* and in this way he changed his mode of life seven times. Therefore, that Bhartṛhari, the ascetic by way of life and Śūnyavādi by faith, is totally different from

¹ *Nayacakra*, p. 371 A, 379 B.

² Frauweinere: On the Date of Vasubandhu.

³ *Nayacakra*, p. 147, 242.

⁴ MSLT. Intro. p. 17; see also Kṣīratarāṅgiṇi, Intro.

⁵ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 22, f. no. 3, 4 and 5.

his namesake, the author of *Vākyapadīya*; the latter has denounced the use of Apabhraṁśa words in *Vākyapadīya* and he established the existence of *nitya-śabda-Brahma*.

It seems that confusion has been made in regard to Bhartṛhari, the author of *Vākyapadīya* identifying him with his namesake, the Buddhist about whose death I-Tsing refers. Besides Kumārila quotes and explains some verses from *Vākyapadīya* (II. 81). It is repeated twice in his *śloka-vārtika* (p. 251-3). Kumārila subjects to criticism the lines, '*tattvāva-bodhaḥ.....(vākyapadīya 1. 7)*' in *Tantravārtika* (p. 209-10). The ten types of sentences expounded by *Vākyapadīya* (II. 1-2) are criticised in MSLV by Kumārila. Kumārila subjects Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *sphoṭa* to searching criticism.

Dharmakīrti does not spare Bhartṛhari. The former refutes the *sphoṭa* theory in his PV (III. 257) and PVV.¹

Akalaṅka refers to Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (I. 79): '*indriyasyaiva saṁskāraḥ śabdasyobhayaśya vā*', and criticises in his TV (p. 486) the contention of this *Kārikā*; further he quotes a line from a *Kārikā*—"*śāstreṣu prakriyābhedaivavidyāivopavarnyate*", from *Vākyapadīya* (II. 235) in his TV. (p. 57).

13. Kumārila :

It is regarded that Kumārila, the outstanding exponent of Mīmāṃsā, flourished during the seventh century A.D. He, as referred to above, quotes Bhartṛhari. We have discussed the date of Bhartṛhari lying in between 4th and 5th centuries A.D. It was believed by K. B. Pathak that Kumārila refers to Dharmakīrti and criticises him. In support of this contention Pathak refers to the commentaries of Pārthasārathi Miśra and Sucarita Miśra. Pathak refers to some verses² of Kumārila as quoting the views of Dharmakīrti.

But the careful reading of the verses will reveal the truth that the said verses form the *pūrvapakṣa* of Buddhists. Though the commentators quote Dharmakīrti's '*avibhāgo'pi*' (PV. II. 354). etc., still it can be said, there is much difference in verbal expression. The views criticised by Kumārila were held by Vasubandhu and Dignāga etc.

On the other hand, it will be evident from the following discussions, that Dharmakīrti himself criticises Kumārila, who inflicted a severe attack on the conception of *Dharmajñāna* in these words :

¹ See Hindi Intro. p. 23.

² MSLV. Śūnyavāda 15-17; Hindi Intro. p. 23.

*"Dharmajñātvanīṣedhastu kevalo'tropayujyate,
sarvamanyadvijñānaṁstu puruṣaḥ kena vāryate¹."*

The Buddhist reply is given by Dharmakīrti in his PV (I. 31-35).

The definition of perception by Kumārila in MSLV (p. 168) is as follows :

*"asti hi-ālocanājñānaṁ prathamā nirvikalpakaṁ,
bālamūkādīvijñānasadrśaṁ śuddhavastujam".*

Dharmakīrti criticises in PV (II. 141) the views expressed in the above *Kārikā*, thus :

*"Kecidindriyajatvāderbāladhīvadkalpanām,
āhurbālāḥ....."*

Similarly several such views held by Kumārila are severely criticised by Dharmakīrti².

Akalaṇka is the ablest critic of Kumārila. The latter has written in MSLV (p. 85) :

*"pratayakṣādyavisamvādiḥpremeyatvādi yasya tu,
sadbhāvaavaraṇe śaktaṁ ko nu taṁ kalpayiṣyati".*

while criticising the theory of omniscience.

Akalaṇka retorts Kumārila in almost identical language :

*"tadevaṁ prameyatvasattvādir-yatra hetulakṣaṇaṁ puṣṇāti
taṁ katham cetanaḥ pratiseddhumarhati samīśayitum vā"*

(*Aṣṭaśaṭī* and *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 58.)

Sāntarakṣita has elaborately discussed the following verse taking it to be of Kumārila in his *Tattvasaṁgraha*—

*"daśahastāntaraṁ vyomno yo nāmotplutya gacchati,
na yojanaśataṁ gantum śakto'bhyāśaśatairapi".*

Akalaṇka reduces the idea in SV VIII. 12., in this way :

*"daśahastāntaraṁ vyomno notplaveran bhavādrśāḥ,
yojanānāṁ sahasraṁ kinnotplavet pakṣirāditi".*

Similarly, there are a large number³ of quotations from Kumārila in Akalaṇka's works. Akalaṇka pulverises the arguments of Kumārila against the doctrine of omniscience.

The facts that Kumārila has criticised Dignāga and is himself subjected to criticism by Dharmakīrti and Akalaṇka, go to prove that he must have flourished not later than the early part of the 7th c. A.D.

¹ This verse is quoted in the name of Kumārila in TS. p. 817; see Hindi Intro. p. 24.

² Vide Hindi Intro. p. 24.

³ See Hindi Intro. p. 25.

14. *Dharmakīrti* :

Dharmakīrti was born in Trimalaya in South¹. According to Tibetan tradition Korunanda was his father²; it is also attested by a reference, '*Kurundārakośi*³ *Kena tadatsarabhramīsāt* (read as : *tadavasarahramīsāt*)' in SVT⁴. At Nālandā, Dharmakīrti was the disciple of Dharmapāla; the latter lived upto 642 A.D.; Dharmakīrti, probably, was alive upto that period. According to Tārānātha, he was contemporary of a Tibetan king, Srongtsan Gum Po (627-698⁵ A.D.).

The Chinese pilgrim Yuwan-Chwang toured India from 629 to 645 A.D. His first visit to Nālandā was in 637 A.D. and the second one in 642 A.D.⁶. During his first visit, he was residing in a dwelling to the north of the abode of Dharmapāla Bodhisattva, where he was provided with every sort of charitable offering⁷. He refers to "some celebrated men of Nālandā who had kept up the lustre of the establishment and continued its guiding work. There were Dharmapāla and Chandrapāla who gave a fragrance to Buddha's teachings, Guṇamati and Sthiramati of excellent reputation among contemporaries, Prabhāmītra of clear argument, and Jinamītra of elevated conversation, Jñānachandra of model character and perspicacious intellect, and Śīlabhadra whose perfect excellence was buried in obscurity. All these were men of merit and learning and authors of several treatises widely known and highly valued by contemporaries"; during⁸ his second visit Śīlabhadra was the head of the Institution. Yuwan-Chwang studied Yoga from him. Obviously, Dharmapāla had retired before 642 A.D.⁹ From the records of travels, nothing can be known about the time of Dharmapāla's end of life¹⁰. However, we know that Śīlabhadra was alive in 642 A.D. i.e. during the time of Yuwan-Chwang's second visit and he might have died after 645 A.D.¹¹

¹ S. C. Vidyābhuṣaṇ, History of Indian Logic, (HIL) p. 302.

² *Darśana Digdarśana*, p. 741.

³ should be read as Kurunandadārakosi.

⁴ p. 54.

⁵ HIL, p. 306, Note 1.

⁶ On Yuwan-Chwang, vol. II, App. by Vincent Smith, p. 335.

⁷ S. Beal: The Life of Hiuen-Tsiang, p. 109.

⁸ Thomas Watters: On Yuwan-Chwang, vol. II, p. 165.

⁹ *ibid*, p. 168-9.

¹⁰ Takakusu conjectures that Dharmapāla was not alive in 635 A.D.—vide I-Tsing's Travels. Intro. p. 26.

¹¹ Yuwan Chwang's letter to Jinaprabha proves the death of Śīlabhadra, after Yuwan Chwang's return to China—Bauddha Saṃskṛti, p. 337.

The fact that Yuwan-Chwang is silent about Dharmakīrti shows according to Vidyābhūṣana¹, that he might be in preliminary stage of his studies. Rahul Sāṅkṛtyāyan² observes that—Dharmakīrti might have died when the pilgrim Yuwan-Chwang visited Nalanda; besides he did not bother himself about Logicians as he had no interest at all; so it is not surprising if Dharmakīrti is not referred to.

There is no sense in saying that simply because Yuwan-Chwang had no interest in Logic, he might have ignored Dharmakīrti. Really, Yuwan-Chwang did refer to Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu, the great stalwarts of Buddhistic Logic; besides, he refers to Guṇamati, Sthiramati etc., who cannot stand the comparison with Dharmakīrti; to refer to Dharmakīrti, the author of epoch-making seven volumes, spells the exemplary honesty of any scholar; if he would have flourished before Yuwan-Chwang, by no stretch of imagination it appears to be correct to hold that he was not interested in logic. Hence the right surmise would be that Dharmakīrti was at preliminary stages of his learning at Nālandā during the sojourn of Yuwan-Chwang.

The second pilgrim to visit India was I-Tsing, whose period of travel lies from 671 to 695 A.D.³ He stayed at Nālandā for ten years (675-685). He recorded his travels in 691-692 A.D. He refers to the line of luminous scholars in very glowing terms; suffice it to refer here, in order, Nāgārjuna, Deva, Aśvaghōṣa of the ancient period; after that, Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, Saṃghabhadra and Bhāvaviveka of the mediæval period and lastly, Jina, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Śīlabhadra, Simhachandra, Sthiramati, Guṇamati, Prajñāgupta, Guṇaprabha and Jinaprabha⁴. Further, he writes, that Dharmakīrti systematised *Hetuvīdyā* after 'Jina'. Prajñāgupta (not Matipāla) has expounded the doctrines of true religion subjecting other religions to repudiation.

From all this, it seems, Dharmakīrti was regarded as an author of the first galaxy. The very fact that he is referred to with Dharmapāla, Guṇamati and Sthiramati and also his commentator pupil Prajñā(kara)-gupta, shows that he refers to a long period of not less than eighty years. If Dharmakīrti would have died, according to Rāhulji, I-Tsing would have definitely expressed his grief just as he does about Bhartṛhari, a Buddhist monk and not the author of *Vākyapadīya*.

¹ HIL, p. 306.

² *Vādanyāya*, Intro. p. 6.

³ Vide Intro. to *Akalaṅka-Grantha-Traya*, p. 25.

⁴ I-Tsing *kī Bhārata Yātrā*, p. 277.

Against the background of this brief analysis, it can be surmised that Dharmakīrti might have lived during 625-650 A.D.; this time limit can be rightly extended from 620-690 A.D. This explains Yuwan Chwang's silence about Dharmakīrti and reference by I-Tsing and Tārānātha's contention that Tibetan king Srongtsan Gum Po (629-685) was the contemporary of Dharmakīrti. There is hardly any doubt about the fact, that Akalaṅka imbibes the method, style and the spirit of Dharmakīrti's criticism of other schools of thought, which is attested by several quotations from all the works of Dharmakīrti in his own vast literature¹.

15. *Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa* :

In the Introduction to *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* (TPS) the date of Jayarāśi, the author of TPS is fixed by Pt. Sukhalalji as not later than eighth century A.D., on the strength of the references to Jayarāśi and TPS by Anantavīrya and Vidyānanda in their respective works; and, later on he assigned him to the period of 725-825 A.D.² According to Panditji, the TPS is not referred to by Akalaṅka, Haribhadra and others belonging to the later period of 8th c. A.D.; nor do we find any indirect suggestion of them in TPS. But, admitting that TPS is not clearly referred to by Haribhadra, we see that there is a clear reference to TPS in SVV of Akalaṅka—*Bahirantaśca-upaplutam* (SVV IV. 12)³. Commenting on this, Anantavīrya, in his SVT., refers to TPS and also its author Jayarāśi⁴. Hence the upper limit of TPS is not later than the first quarter of 8th c. A.D. This conclusion is supported by other sources also. Dharmakīrti attempts to establish the identity of happiness and knowledge, in his PV (III. 252):—

“*tadatadrūpiṇo bhāvāḥ tadatadrūpahetujāḥ,
tatsukhādi kimajñānaṃ vijñānābhinnahetujam*”.

On the basis of this very argument Jayarāśi has established the identity of *rūpa* and *jñāna*, and has inserted the word ‘*rūpādi*’ in the place of ‘*sukhādi*’ in the said *Kārikā*.

Prajñākara has given a reply to Jayarāśi, in his *Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra* (p. 313) citing the altered *Kārikā* of Jayarāśi in this way:—

“*anena etadapi nirastam—
tadatadrūpiṇo bhāvāḥ tadatadrūpahetujāḥ,
tadrūpādi kimajñānaṃ vijñānābhinnahetujam*”.

¹ *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*, Intro. p. 10.

² *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, vol. II, No. 1.

³ Vide Hindi Intro. pp. 28-29.

⁴ *Tattvopaplavakaranāt Jayarāśiḥ sangatamatamavalambya brūyāt tatrāha—svasamvedana ityādi*—SVT, p. 278.

Obviously, Jayarāṣi must have lived after Dharmakīrti and before Prajñākara or at least he must have been a contemporary of both.

According to Rahulji, Prajñākara lived in 700 A.D.¹; and rightly so. It has been discussed elsewhere that Akalaṅka criticises Prajñākara's² theories of *Bhāvikāraṇa* and *svapnāntikaśarīra*. Naturally, it is not inconsistent to maintain that TPS was seen by Akalaṅka who criticises Prajñākara, the critic of Jayarāṣi. Therefore the period of Jayarāṣi can be fixed somewhere between 650-700 A.D.

16. *Prajñākaragupta* :

Amongst Dharmakīrti's commentators, Prajñākaragupta is the follower of the Āgama school; in spite of being a commentator he was an independent thinker. Dr. Vidyābhuṣan assigns him to the 10th c. A.D.³. But rightly Rāhulji relying on Tibetan tradition, opines that he belonged to 700 A.D.⁴ Rāhulji's contention is further substantiated by the references to Prajñākara found in Vidyānanda⁵ (800-840 A.D.), Jayantabhaṭṭa⁶ (810 A.D.) Anantavīrya⁷ (950-990 A.D.) and Prabhācandra⁸ (980-1065 A.D.).

Prajñā (kara) gupta referred to by I-Tsing in his Records as a critic of other systems, is none else than this very scholar who can be said to be the contemporary of Dharmakīrti; certainly, Dharmakīrti might be older than Prajñākaragupta. Therefore, latter must have flourished in 660-720 A.D. Further, it will be proved that Akalaṅka has criticised Prajñākara-gupta who is prior to Kaṇṇagomi, since the latter refers to, '*alaṅkāra evāvastutvapatipādanāt*', meaning thereby Prajñākara's PVB.

Akalaṅka⁹ has criticised Prajñākara's own theories with regard to *bhāvikāraṇavāda*, *Svapnāntikaśarīravāda* and partial validity of *pīṭaśāṅkhādijñāna*.

¹ PVB, Intro. p. (dha).

² AGT, Intro. p. 26.

³ HIL. p. 336.

⁴ *Vādayāya*, App. and PVB., Intro.

⁵ *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 278.

⁶ *Nyāyamañjari-Prameya*, p. 70.

⁷ SVT. App. 9.

⁸ PKM. p. 380.

⁹ SVT p. 96 also Hindi Intro. pp. 31-32.

17. *Arcaṭa* :

Arcaṭa is known by another name Dharmākaradatta¹. He is the author of three works : *Hetubindu Tīkā*, *Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi* and *Pramāṇa-dvayasiddhi*. In the opinion of Tārānātha, Dharmākaradatta was preceptor of Dharmottara. Dr. Vidyābhuṣana² assigns him to 700 A.D.

Rāhulji first assigned him to 825 A.D. in *Vādanyāya*³ but relying on Tibetan tradition he changed that date and has suggested it to be 700 A.D.⁴ Further he mentions that Dharmottara was his disciple. Pt. Sukhalalji assigns him to the last part of 7th c. A.D. and early part of 8th c. A.D.⁵; the age 700-725 as inferred by Rahulji and Panditji, is supported by Akalaṅka's (720-780 A.D.) reference to "*sāmānyaviśaya vyāptih tadviśiṣṭānumiteriti*", in his SVT p. 177. Anantavīrya comments on this : '*Sāmānya ityādi Arcaṭamatamādūṣayitṛṇ śaṅkate*' implying that Akalaṅka is criticising the views of Arcaṭa.

It can, therefore, be maintained that Arcaṭa might have been a contemporary of Akalaṅka.

18. *Śāntabhadra* :

Pt. Dalasukh Mālvania has proved, with evidences, that Śāntabhadra had written a commentary on *Nyāyabindu*.⁶ Dharmottara subjects to criticism the views of Śāntabhadra and Vinitadeva; Dharmottara is placed in 700 A.D. naturally, Śāntabhadra can be said to be his elder contemporary.⁷

Akalaṅka refutes the theory of *mānasa pratyakṣa* held by Śāntabhadra, in NV. (I. 161-2) as :

“*antareṇedamakṣānubhūtaṁ cet na vikalpayet,
santānāntaravac-cetaḥ samanantarameva kim.*”

This is attested by Vādirāja's reference to *Śāntabhadrastvāha*, while commenting upon this *śloka*. Further, SVT (p. 129) also refers to '*atrāha Śāntabhadraḥ*'⁸. Akalaṅka himself quotes Śāntabhadra and criticises him.

¹ *Hetubindu Tīkā* p. 233.

² HIL. p. 331.

³ *Vādanyāya*, A. M.

⁴ *Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra*, Intro. p. 7.

⁵ *Hetubindu*, Intro. p. 12.

⁶ *Dharmottara-pradīpa* Intro. p. 52.

⁷ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 33.

⁸ *ibid.*

19. *Dharmottara* :

Of all the commentators of *Nyāyabindu*, Dharmottara is unique. He not only explained the text verbatim but expounded the ideas embodied in the text. He was the disciple of Arcāṭa ; he must have flourished during the last quarter of 7th c. A.D.

The Jaina Ācārya Mallavādi has written a *Tippaṇa* on Dharmottara's commentary on *Nyāyabindu*. Pt. Malvania has discussed about the date of Mallavādi in his Intro. (p. XXIX) to *Dharmottara-pradīpa* : 'Dr. A. S. Altekar has edited a copper-plate inscription of Karkasuvārṇavarsha, a Rāṣṭrakūṭa king of Gujarat in the *Epigraphia Indica* (vol. XXI. p. 133). It mentions the names of Mallavādi of the Mūlasaṃgha-sena-āmnāya, his pupil Sumati and Sumati's pupil Aparājita. This inscription belongs to Śaka-Samvat 743. Dr. Altekar conjectures that the author of the *Nyāyabindu-tippaṇa* is probably this Mallavādi. This view is quite consistent with the date of Dharmottara'.

It is clear that Mallavādi flourished probably in 725 A.D., naturally Dharmottara can be placed in about 700 A.D. He was the author of *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, *Prāmāṇya-parīkṣā*, *Apoha-prakaraṇa*, *Paraloka-siddhi*, *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya-ṭīkā* etc.

With regard to the definition of *Mānasapratyakṣa*, there is a controversy amongst the commentators of *Nyāyabindu*. Dharmottara criticised the views of Śāntabhadra and established that *mānasapratyakṣa* should be regarded as *Āgama-siddha* and not *Yuktisiddha* as is accepted by Śāntabhadra. Akalaṅka criticises both of them in his NV (I, 169)¹.

20. *Karṇagomi* :

Dharmakīrti has written his own commentary on *Svārthānumāna* chapter of *Pramāṇavārtika* ; *Karṇagomi* has written a commentary on this *Vṛtti*. As has already been discussed elsewhere by us, he is assigned to the early part of the 8th c. A.D.². Rahulji places him in 9th c. A.D. ; because Karṇagomi refers to Maṇḍana Miśra who according to Rahulji flourished in 9th c. A.D.³.

¹ Also see NVV where Vādirāja explicitly mentions the names of Śāntabhadra and Dharmottara with their views.

² AGT. Intro. p. 30.

³ PVVT. p. 109. Karṇagomi quotes Maṇḍana's *Kārikā*—"āhurvidhātṛ pratyakṣam", with "*aduktam Maṇḍanena*".

But Rāmanāth Shastri in his intro. to *Brhātī* vol. II gives the period of Maṇḍana to be 670-720 A.D.¹. M. M. Kuppussvami has proved the time of Maṇḍana Miśra to be 615-690 A.D.².

It is but definite that Maṇḍana Miśra must be posterior to Kumārila and Prabhākara and a contemporary of Dharmakīrti.

The lower limit of the date of Karṇagomi must be fixed as later than Prajñākara (A.D. 660-720) because Karṇagomi refers to Prajñākara and the upper limit is the date of Akalaṅka because Akalaṅka refers to Karṇagomi: he must have flourished between Prajñākara and Akalaṅka, therefore, Karṇagomi must be placed in the later part of 7th c. A.D. and in the earlier part of 8th c. A.D.

Kumārila's attack on Buddhist theory of *Pakṣadharmatvarūpa*, is replied by Karṇagomi in PVVT³, and Akalaṅka criticises this view of Karṇagomi in his *Pramāṇasaṃgraha* (p. 104) in these words: "*Kālādidharmikalpanāyāmatiprasaṅgaḥ*". Further, SVT (p. 158) refers to the *Kārikā*:— "*Yathārtharūpam buddher vitatapratiḥāsānāt*", as the view held by Karṇaka; and also SV (p. 158) '*Svarūpamantareṇa* etc.' is explained by Anantavīrya:— "*Kallakastvāha*". It seems, Kallaka is identical with "Karṇaka".

21. *Śāntarakṣita*:

Śāntarakṣita is one of the most brilliant commentators of Dharmakīrti. He has commented on Dharmakīrti's *Vādanīyā*. His other monumental work is *Tattvasaṃgraha*. It is mentioned that he flourished in 705-762 A.D.⁴. He undertook his first journey to Tibet in 743 A.D. Probably he had finished his *Tattvasaṃgraha* before his departure for Tibet. There are several sentences and verses which go to show the influence of Śāntarakṣita on Akalaṅka, e.g. compare "*Vṛkṣe Śākhāḥ Śilascāge ityeṣā laukikā matih*" (TS. p. 267)—with, "*tāneva paśyan pratyeti śakhā vṛkṣeṣu laukikāḥ*" (*Pramāṇasaṃgraha*, v. 26; NV. v. 104); "*evam yasya prameyatva*" (TS. 885) etc., with "*tadevam prameyatvasattvādir yatra.....etc.*" (*Aṣṭasatī*, *Aṣṭasaṃhārī*, p. 58); and, "*astihikṣanikādyākhyā*"; (TS. p. 888) etc., with NV. v. 407.

In this way we have seen that Akalaṅka refers and refutes the views of the various commentators of Dharmakīrti such as Prajñākaragupta, Arcaṭa, Śāntabhadra, Dharmottara, Karṇagomi and Śāntarakṣita.

¹ *Brhātī*, vol. II, p. 31.

² *Brahmasiddhi*, Intro. p. 58.

³ "*Yadi evam tatkālasambandhitvameva sādhyasādhanyoh.....*" PVVT, p. 11.

⁴ TS. Intro. p. 96.

Pt. Kailashchandraji assigns Akalaṅka to the middle of 7th c. A.D. ; so he is of the opinion that the views of Dharmakīrti's commentators could not be refuted by Akalaṅka, so he concludes that the commentators of Akalaṅka were wrong in saying that some of the views criticised by Akalaṅka are those of the commentators of Dharmakīrti¹.

But taking into consideration the view of the definite age of Akalaṅka (720-780), there is a possibility of criticism by Akalaṅka of the commentators of Dharmakīrti. So there is the least possibility of error committed by the commentators of Akalaṅka in attributing some of the views to the commentators of Dharmakīrti.

(e) *The influence of Akalaṅka on his contemporaries and the subsequent writers :*

Having dealt with the problem of influence of pre-Akalaṅka philosophers over Akalaṅka, a survey of Akalaṅka's inescapable influence upon his contemporaries and subsequent writers demands closer study. At the outset, it must be readily admitted that no philosopher has an impact and stirring influence over others as Akalaṅka. Jain philosophers Digambara and Śvetāmbara alike after Akalaṅka, having accepted his views in toto, have explained and expounded his subtle thoughts ; of course, there are some Ācāryas like Śāntisūri and Malayagiri who differ in minor details from Akalaṅka. Of the non-Jaina philosophers to refer to Akalaṅka, there is only Durvekamiśra (10th c. A.D.) who quotes Akalaṅka by name² from SV in his *Dharmottarapradīpa*.³ A brief critical survey of the philosophers and of other writers who were influenced by Akalaṅka will be discussed here.

1. *Dhanañjaya*⁴ :

He is the author of *Dvīsandhāna-kāvyā* and *Nāmamālakośa*. Dr. K. B. Pathaka places him in 1123-1140 A.D. Some other scholars also hold the same view⁵.

But this view is on slippery ground because Prabhācandra (980-1065 A.D.) refers to *Dvīsandhāna* in his *Prameyacakamalamārtanda* (p. 402). Vādirājasuri (c. 1025 A.D.) eulogises him in *Parīśvanātha-carita* (p. 4) ; further Virāṣena (748-823 A.D.) quotes "*hetāvevaṃprakāśādyaḥ*" from *Anekārtha-*

¹ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 36 for detailed discussion.

² See SVT. p. 580, note 3.

³ "Yadāha Akalaṅkaḥ....." *Dharmottarapradīpa*, p. 246.

⁴ NKC. vol. II, Intro. p. 27.

⁵ History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 173.

nāma-mālā of Dhanañjaya in Dhavalā¹. It is quite plain that Dhanañjaya can be placed in 8th c. A.D.

Dhanañjaya praises Akalaṅka in these words :—

“*Pramāṇamakalaṅkasya Pūjyapādasya lakṣaṇam,
Dhanañjayakaveḥ kāvyaṁ ratnatrayamapaścimani.*”

2. *Vīrasena* (748-823 A.D.²) :

Vīrasena the famous commentator of *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, refers to Akalaṅka as “*Pūjyapāda Bhaṭṭāraka*”³ and quotes his *Tattvārthavārtika* naming it *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya*⁴.

He quotes SV also in *Dhavalā*, *Vargaṇā Khaṇḍa*, vol. XIII, p. 356 ; “*Siddhiviniścaye uktam—“avadhivibhaṅgayor-avadhidarśanameva*”. But we do not find it in the present SV.

3. *Śrīpāla* :

He was the disciple of Vīrasena and a colleague of Jināsena (763-843 A.D.) who respectfully refers to him as the “*Sampālaka*” or “*Poṣaka*” of *Jayadhavalā-ṭīkā* ; possibly, Śrīpāla belongs to the period of Jināsena. It seems, he could have seen Akalaṅka in his young age.

4. *Jināsena* (763-843)⁵ :

Jināsena is the author of *Jayadhavalā* and *Mahāpurāṇa*. Akalaṅka is respectfully referred to in his works ; further, it is a well-known fact that he corroborated with Vīrasena, his preceptor, in the commentaries on the canonical works.

5. *Kumārasena* :

He is referred to by Jināsena in *Harivaṁśa Purāṇa* (Śaka 705-783) : “*ākūpāraṁ yaśo loke.....guroḥ Kumārasenasya.....*” According to Devasena, Kumārasena established the Kāṣṭhāsāṅgha ; he was the disciple of Vinayasena who himself was the pupil of Vīrasena. Jināsena had composed the poetical work *Pārśvabhūdaya* at the instance of Vinayasena. Acārya Vidyānanda says the glory of his *Aṣṭasaḥsārī* was due to Kumārasena⁶.

¹ *Dhavalā*, vol. I, Intro. p. 27.

² JSI, p. 140.

³ “*Pūjyapāda-Bhaṭṭarakairapyabhāṇi Sāmānyanayalakṣaṇamidameva tadyathā pramāṇa-prakāśitārtha-prarūpakō nayaḥ*”.

⁴ “*Ayam vākyanayaḥ Tattvārthabhāṣyagataḥ*” *Jaya Dhavalā*, vol. I, p. 210, see, TV, for original p. 1.33.

⁵ See the footnote of p. 49 No. 3 and JSI, p. 129.

⁶ *Aṣṭasaḥsārī*, p. 295 ; see also 1. 11. p. 38.

There is a reference to Kumārasena before Akalaṅka and after Sumatideva, “*udetya.....Kumāraseno munirastamāpat.....*”¹, a fact clearly indicating the time of Kumārasena to be 720-800 A.D. at the latest. On this assumption, it is but natural that Vidyānanda could have had a thorough acquaintance with Kumārasena’s ideas and could substantiate his ideas in his monumental work *Aṣṭasahasrī*. And Jinasena could refer to him in his *Harivamśa Purāṇa* (783 A.D.); though being an elder contemporary of Akalaṅka, Kumārasena might have explained *Aṣṭasatī* to Vidyānanda who explicitly accepts the gratitude of Kumārasena.

6. Kumāranandī :

Vidyānanda refers to him in *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* (p. 72) and TSLV (p. 280) which suggests that Kumāranandī was the author of *Vādanyāya*, “*Kumāranandināścāhur-Vādanyāyavicakṣaṇāḥ*” ; further, *Patraparīkṣā* (p. 3) also refers to him. In one of the records of gift by *Prthvikongaṇi* (Śaka 698-716 A.D.) to Candranandī, there is a geneological list of teachers of Kumāranandī. It seems he lived near about 776 A.D.

Kumāranandī’s *Vādanyāya* explicitly bears the influence of SV of Akalaṅka. Though *Vādanyāya* is not available. The quotations from it bear the testimony that it is influenced by Akalaṅka-nyāya.

7. Vidyānanda :

He is the celebrated commentator on *Aṣṭasatī* of Akalaṅka. Regarding his age, he himself states in the Praśasti of his magnum opus *Tattvārthaslokaavārtika*, that he lived during the regime of Śivamāra II (810 A.D.), the heir to king Śripuruṣa of Ganga dynasty. According to Pt. Darbarilal Kothia, Vidyānanda completed his works,—*Vidyānandamahodaya* and *Tattvārthaslokaavārtika* during the reign of Śivamāra II (810 A.D.) and *Ātmaparīkṣā*, *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* and *Yuktyanuśāsanālanīkṛti* during the regime of Rācamalla Satyavākya I (816-830 A.D.). *Aṣṭasahasrī* was written after TSLV and before *Ātmaparīkṣā*. etc. It might have been completed in 810-815 A.D. and *Patraparīkṣā*, *Śrīpura-Pārśvanātha-stotra* and *Satyasāsanaparīkṣā* in 830-840 A.D.; from all this discussion it can be concluded that Vidyānanda flourished in 775-840 A.D.²

Vidyānanda wrote TSLV after *Vidyānandamahodaya*, in 810 A.D.; he might have started writing at the prime of his youth. Admitting that he was born in 760 A.D., it can be said that he could write his works from the age of forty; hence, he too flourished as a younger contemporary of Akalaṅka like Kumārasena.

¹ EC. vol. II, No. 67.

² *Ātmaparīkṣā*, Intro. Pp. 51-53.

Vidyānanda has profusely quoted Akalaṅka in his works,¹ and elucidated the works of Akalaṅka by bringing out the hidden meaning of Akalaṅkanyāya.

8. *Śilāṅkācārya* (V. 925 : A.D. 868):

Śilāṅkācārya is a well-known commentator on Āgamas; he quotes two ślokaś from LT in *Sūtrakṛtāṅgaṭīkā*².

9. *Abhayadevasūri*³ (10th c. A.D.):

Abhayadevasūri, the *tarkapañcānana* quotes some verses from LT with *vṛtti*⁴ in *Sanmati-Tarkatīkā* to substantiate the study of Pramāṇas.

10. *Somadevasūri* (10th c. A.D.):

Somadevasūri,⁵ the versatile writer quotes in his *Yasastilaka Campū*,⁶ a verse 'ātmalūbham vidurmokṣam'.....from SV (VII. 19).

11. *Anantakīrti* (10th c. A.D.):

Anantakīrti quotes *daśahastāntaram* (SV. VIII. 12) in his *Laghu sarvajñasiddhi* (p. 120) which is enriched by the arguments of Akalaṅka.

12. *Māṇikyanandi* (993-1053 A.D.)⁷.

Māṇikyanandi was the preceptor of Prabhācandra; his *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra* is the gist of Akalaṅka-nyāya⁸.

13. *Śāntisūri* (993-1047)⁹

Śāntisūri quotes in *Nyāyāvatāravārtika*¹⁰ a verse "bhedajñānāt" (NV I. 114) and "asiddhaḥ siddhasenasya" (SV VI. 21) with some alteration; he criticises (p. 53) "tridhā śrutamaviplavam" from *pramāṇasaṁgraha* (v. 2) of Akalaṅka. For the influence of Akalaṅka on Śāntisūri's *Nyāyāvatāravārtika* readers are referred to the appendix to the same (p. 297).

¹ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 40 f. ns. 1-8.

² On p. 227a and 236a, vv. 4 & 72 resp.

³ *Sanmati*, Intro. p. 83.

⁴ See Hindi Intro. p. 40 f. n. No. 12.

⁵ JSI, p. 182.

⁶ p. 280.

⁷ *Āptaparīkṣā*, Intro. p. 33.

⁸ Vide. the Appendix to Intro. to *Prameyakamalamārtanda* in which the PMS is Compared with the various works of Akalaṅka, NVV and AGT. etc.

⁹ *Nyāyāvatāravārtika*, p. 151.

¹⁰ p. 110.

14. *Vādirāja* (c. 1025 A.D.)¹:

Vādirāja, the *Syādvāda*vidyāpati is the famous commentator on NV of Akalaṅka, sometime he gives four or five meanings of certain words of Akalaṅka. The exposition of Akalaṅka's work NV by Vādirāja was mainly due to the help he received from the commentary on Akalaṅka by Anantavīrya.

15. *Prabhācandra* (980-1065)²:

Akalaṅka's works were the source of information for Prabhācandra who wrote excellent commentaries. He is the author of NKC, the commentary on *Laghyastraya* of Akalaṅka. He has been benefited by the help of Anantavīrya for the explanation of difficult portions; in addition to this, he wrote *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, the commentary on PMS; he quotes "*bhedajñānāt pratīryte*" (NV. I. 114) in *Ātmānuśāsana*tīkā, the commentary on *Ātmānuśāsana*.

16. *Anantavīrya* (c. 11th A.D.):

Anantavīrya wrote a commentary *Prameyaratnamāla* (PRM) on *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra* which is based on Akalaṅka's works and was written after *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*. He refers in PRM (III. 5) to LT and NV.

17. *Vādidevasūri* (1086-1130 A.D.):

Vādidevasūri wrote *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* with his own *tīkā* known as *Syādvādaratnākara* (SR), mostly based on *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*. He quotes LT and LTV in his SR (I. 4, II. 3 and II, 12, verses 3, 4, and 5 of LT, with *Vṛtti*). Further, he quotes a line from SV in SR (p. 641); he accepts the fundamental principles of Akalaṅka's Logic and elaborates the discussion of *Hetu* with divisions and subdivisions etc. accepted by Akalaṅka.

18. *Hemacandra* (1088-1173 A.D.):

It seems that Akalaṅka's SV has an indelible impact on the mind of Hemacandra, the *Kalikālasarvjña*, he quotes two verses from SV in his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*. He was an exponent of Akalaṅka's Logic.

19. *Malayagiri* (about 11th & 12th c. A.D.):

Malayagiri was a colleague of Hemacandra. In his *Avatyāka Nirukti-Tīkā*, he differs from Akalaṅka in holding that the use of *syāt* in *naya-vākya* is inadmissible, for the simple reason that *naya* itself constitutes

¹ for detailed discussion see NVV. vol. I and II, Introductions.

² for detailed discussion on Prabhācandra see NKC. vol. 2. Introduction.

that notion ; if *syāt* is used in this context, then it ceases to be *naya-vākya* and becomes *Pramāṇavākya*.

But Vidyānanda and others of mediæval period and Yaśovijaya of modern times uphold the doctrine of Akalaṅka. According to Yaśovijaya, the use of *syāt* in *Nayavākya* connotes the other attributes but does not denote them. In this context, Malayagiri was an isolated scholar ; no one accepted his views.

20. *Candrasena* (12th c. A.D.) :

Candrasena quotes a verse, “*na paśyāmaḥ.....etc.* from SV in his *Utpādādisiddhi*.

21. *Ratnaprabha* (12th c. A.D.) :

Ratnaprabha was the disciple of Vādidevasūri ; he respectfully refers to Akalaṅka in these words ‘*prakaṣitaīrthāntariyakalaṅkokalaṅkaḥ*’ ; he quotes a verse from LT in his *Ratnākarāvatārikā* (p. 71).

22. *Aśādhara* (1188-1250 A.D.) :

Aśādhara quotes the 4th and 72nd verses from LT in *Anagāra-dharmāmṛta*, (p. 169) and *Iṣṭopadeśa-ṭīkā* (p. 30) ; his *Prameya-ratnākara* is extinct.

23. *Abhayacandra* (c. 13th A.D.) :

Abhayacandra has written a *Tātparyavṛtti* on Akalaṅka’s *Laghū-yastraya*.

24. *Devendrasūri* (c. 13th A.D.) :

Devendrasūri refers to *Malaviddhamani.....etc.* from LT in his *Karmagrantha-ṭīka* (vol. I. p. 8).

25. *Dharmabhūṣaṇa* (of 14th c. A.D.) :

Dharmabhūṣaṇa quotes LT (v. 52) and NV (I. 3 & II. 172) in his *Nyāyadīpikā*,¹ which is merely the extracts of Akalaṅkanyāya.

26. *Vimaladāsa* (c. 15th A.D.) :

Vimaladāsa quotes a verse beginning with “*Prameyatvādibhiḥ.....*” etc. as ‘*taduktam Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadevairiḥ*’ in his *Saptabhaṅgitaraṅgiṇī*. It occurs in *svārūpasamvidhāna* (v. 3) which does not bear any testimony regarding the authorship of Akalaṅka ; Mahāsenā is also said² to be the author of this work. Vimaladāsa’s SBT is mainly based on Akalaṅkanyāya³.

¹ *Nyāyadīpikā*, Intro. pp. 96-98.

² NKC. vol. I, Intro. p. 54.

³ vide TV. IV. 42.

27. *Yaśovijaya* (17th c. A.D.) and other *Ācāryas* :

Yośovijaya, the Gaṅgeśa of Jaina Nyāya was the exponent of Navya-Nyāya in Jaina logic. He was one of the outstanding exponents of Akalaṅka's logic. In his works *Jaina-tarkabhāṣā*, *śāstravārtā-samuccayaṭīkā* and *Gurutattvaviniśaya* he quotes¹ Akalaṅka extensively ; besides he has replied to the objections raised by Malayagiri on Akalaṅka in his *Gurutattva-viniśaya*. He wrote a commentary on *Aṣṭasaḥsṛī*, which is the commentary on *Aṣṭaśatī* of Akalaṅka.

Besides all these references to Akalaṅka, there are still other philosophers who quote Akalaṅka in their respective works, e.g. *Syādvāda-siddhi* of Vāḍibhasiṃha, *Āptamīmāṃsā-vṛtti* of Vasunandi, *Śaḍ-darśana-samuccaya-vṛtti* of Guṇaratna, *Syādvādamāñjari* of Malliṣeṇa, *Viśvatattva-prakāśa* of Bhāvasena, *Pramāṇaprameyakalikā* of Narendrasena, *Nyāyamañidīpikā* (a commentary on *Prameyaratnamālā*) of Ajitasena and *Prameya-ratna-mālā-lāṅkāra* of Cārukīrti Paṇḍitācārya, etc., all these authors have glorified Akalaṅka.

From this exhaustive discussion, it is quite clear that Akalaṅka's impact on Jaina logicians is immense. Out of all these authors referred to above Vidyānanda, Anantavīrya, Prabhācandra, Abhayacandra, Vādirāja and Yaśovijaya are the commentators of Akalaṅka.

(f) *The age of Akalaṅka* :

Of epigraphical evidences that throw light upon the age of Akalaṅka, the oldest inscription to refer to him is of c. 1016 A.D. But epigraphical evidences are not to be exclusively depended upon. In this attempt the textual references are of immense help both from the standpoint of fixing the time limit and comparative studies.

The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that the time limit of Akalaṅka lies from Dharmakīrti and his line of disciples, which extends from the last part of 7th c. A.D. to the early phase of 8th c. ; particularly the age of Śāntarakṣita (762 A.D.) is definitely the lower limit of Akalaṅka's date. The upper limit of his date can be fixed with the help of the date of his commentator Vidyānanda (775-840 A.D.) and with that of Dhanañjaya (8th c. A.D.) and Virasena (748-813 A.D.) who quote him. Hence *Akalaṅka can be placed in the 8th c. A.D.*

But in the light of the newly available material even the particular decade of the eighth century can be fixed.

¹ For references to quotations see Hindi Introduction p. 43.

There is a controversy over the issue of deciding the time limit of Akalaṅka :

(1) A galaxy of scholars led by K. B. Pathak holds that Akalaṅka flourished during the last quarter of the eighth century A.D. ; this group includes S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇ, R. G. Bhandarkar, Peterson, L. Rice, Winternitz, F. W. Thomas, A. B. Keith, A. S. Altekar, Pt. Nathuram Premi, Pt. Sukhalalji, B. A. Saletore, MM. Gopinath Kaviraj.

(2) The other group of scholars maintain that 7th c. A.D. is the time of Akalaṅka, on the evidence of a *śloka* from *Akalaṅka-carita* in which the date is given as *Vikramārka Śaka* 700 i.e. 643 A.D., it includes R. Narasimhācharya, S. Srikantha Śāstri, Pt. Jugal Kishor Mukhtar, A. N. Upadhye, Pt. Kailashchandra, Jyoti Pd.¹ etc.

The arguments advanced by the first group of scholars are leading us near the truth and they are as follows—

- (1) That Akalaṅka is referred to be the son of a minister to king Śubhatuṅga of Rāṣṭrakūta dynasty in Prabhācandra's KK.²
- (2) That the Malliṣeṇa praśasti inscribed on the pillar of Pārśva-nātha Basti at Chandragiri refers that Akalaṅka narrates in the court of Sāhasatunga his victory over Buddhists at the court of king Himaśīta. Probably Sāhasatunga is identical with Dantidurga (744-756 A.D.)³.
- (3) That *Akalaṅka-carita* refers to Akalaṅka's debate in Śaka 700 (778 A.D.) in these words :

“*vikramārkaśakābdīya śatasaptapramāṇuḥ,*
kālē'kalaṅkayatino Bauddhair-vādo mahānabhūt.”⁴

Now the second group of scholars advances the arguments in the following way :

- (1) That KK refers to Mānyakheṭa as the capital of Śubhatuṅga, whereas it is Amoghavarṣa who made Mānyakheṭa the capital in 815 A.D. ; hence, the genuineness of KK is not altogether beyond doubt⁵.
- (2) That the identification of Sāhasatunga with Dantidurga II is a matter of conjecture only⁶.

¹ Vide Hindi. Intro, for the references of views expressed by these Scholars, pp. 44-5.

² K. B. Pathak, ABORI, vol. XI. p. 155.

³ Ibid.

⁴ ABORI, vol. XI. Art. by K. B. Pathak.

⁵ NKC, vol. I, Intro. p. 104.

⁶ A. N. Upadhye, ABORI, vol. XII, p. 373.

- (3) That the reference to *Vikramārkaśaka*, in *Akalaṇka-carita*, means Vikrama Samvat¹ and not Śaka.
- (4) That Virasena quotes Akalaṇka's TV as *Āgamapramāṇa* in Dhavalā (the completing date 816 A.D.), hence he must be of remote age, so he flourished in the early period of 7th c. A.D.²
- (5) *Siddhaśenagaṇi* (8th A.D.) refers to Akalaṇka's SV; hence he must have lived in 7th century A.D.
- (6) That Haribhadra (700-770 A.D.) refers to *Akalaṇka-nyāya* in *Anekānta-jaya-patākā* shows that Akalaṇka is earlier than Haribhadra³.
- (7) Jinadāsagaṇi Mahattara (676 A.D.) refers to SV in *Niśītha-Cūrṇi*⁴; naturally Akalaṇka must be placed in the early part of the 7th century A.D.⁵

Now let us examine the arguments of the second group of scholars. It has been proved by us elsewhere⁶ that Akalaṇka flourished in 720-780 A.D. on the strength of the internal and external evidences. This date is confirmed by the additional evidences that are available today. The afore-said date as already mentioned, has been proved by K. B. Pathak and defended by S. C. Vidyābhusana and Pt. N. Premiji. The age¹ proved by these scholars is substantially and firmly fixed, irrespective of the dis-proof of some of the evidences employed by them. The article on 'The Age of Guru Akalaṇka' by Dr. Saletore is a very significant contribution in this direction to firmly establish the conclusion arrived at⁷. Now let us examine the arguments one by one.

(1) As has already been discussed that the mention of Mānyakheta as the capital of Rāṣṭrakūṭa's is not a decisive factor. The reference of Mānyakheta as the capital of Śubhatuṅga in KK may be the result of an established fact of later times, that lead the author to mention it so, because of its strong affinity with the Rāṣṭrakūṭas.

¹ ABORI, vol. XII, Art. by A. N. Upadhye.

² *ibid.*

³ NKC. vol. I, p. 105.

⁴ *Pīṭhikā* gāthā No. 486.

⁵ Jugalkishor Mukhtar, *Anekānta*, Vol. I, No. 1; NKC, vol. I, Intro. p. 105.

⁶ *Akalaṇka-Grantha-Traya*, Intro. Pp. 13-32.

⁷ B. A. Saletore, *The Age of Guru Akalaṇka*, BHSJ, vol. VI, pp. 10-33. This article by the veteran scholar is of special importance; he confirms the conclusion arrived at elsewhere (AGT. Intro.).

(2) According to Malliṣeṇa Praśasti, Malliṣeṇamuni expired in Śaka 1050 (1128 A.D.) and the said inscription is engraved to commemorate the saint. This inscription refers to 'Rājan Sāhasatuṅga'; it gives a chronological list of teachers such as: *Mahāvādī* Samantabhadra, *Mahādhyāni* Simhanandi, *ṣaṃmāsavādī* Vakragrīva, *navastotrakāri* Vajranandi, Pātrakesari the author of *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana*, Śumatideva the author of *Sumati-saptaka*, Kumārasena, Cintāmaṇi, *Kavicūdāmaṇi* Śrivaradhadeva praised by Daṇḍi, *mahāvādavijeta* Maheśvara and Akalaṅka—destroyer of Tārā installed in an earthen pot. Further, some verses are put in the mouth of Akalaṅka¹. The Praśastikāra quotes these verses in the Praśasti, not as composed by himself but he accepted them as they were prevalent traditionally. This shows that they were composed in the remote past.

Further, it refers to Akalaṅka's debates in the court of Sāhasatuṅga and his effort to invite Paravādīmalla to the court of Śubhatuṅga for explanation, signifying that Sāhasatuṅga and Śubhatuṅga were two different kings; of course, before this Praśasti (1128 A.D.) Prabhacandra (980-1065 A.D.) refers to Akalaṅka's debate in the court of Himaśītala but is silent in regard to his narration at the court of Sāhasatuṅga.

So far as we know the history of Rāṣtrakūṭas, it is the rulers of this dynasty who only bear the *birudas* of the type—*śubhatuṅga*, *Nṛpatuṅga*, *Jagattuṅga*, i.e., the *birudas* necessarily have the suffix-*tuṅga*. That Kṛṣṇarāja I had the *biruda* Śubhatuṅga is sufficiently proved by several inscriptions²; there is nothing to prove the travesty of the contents of the said Praśasti. The reference to 'Rājan Sāhasatuṅga.....' etc. (v. 21) glorifies the qualities of a king with several adjectives. It is a vivid fact of history to note that Dantidurga had conquered the northern part of the kingdom of Kīrtivarmā II belonging to Solaṅki Chalukyas in the middle of 748-753 A.D. and had reestablished the sovereignty of the Rāṣtrakūṭas³. The Sāmngaḍa (Dist. Kolhapur) inscription, dated Śaka 675 (753 A.D.) records the magnificent victorious career of Dantidurga⁴. The glowing tributes of this inscription⁵ prove that this Sāhasatuṅga was prior to Śubhatuṅga, who defeated the Chalukyas; and this Sāhasatuṅga is shown to be identical with Dantidurga⁶. Dr. Altekar also upholds the same conclusion. It will be seen in the sequel, it is but definite that Sāhasatuṅga was the *biruda* of only Dantidurga II.

¹ Vide Hindi Intro. Pp. 46-47 for the text of Praśasti.

² EI, vol. III, p. 106 and vol. XVI, p. 125.

³ Bhāratake Prācīna Rājāvaṃśa, vol. III, p. 26.

⁴ IA, vol. XI, p. 111.

⁵ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 48, for the text of Inscr.

⁶ BPRV, vol. III.

It has been already discussed that Akalaṅka was a young man during the last phase of Sāhasatuṅga's reign. It can be said without any fear of contradiction that the final verdict, thanks to Dr. Saletore, on the problem of the identity of Sāhasatuṅga with Dantidurga has been passed by his research. He concludes, after a masterly analysis of the problem of identifying Sāhasatuṅga with Dantidurga II: "This is proved by an inscription on the four faces of a pillar set up in the court-yard of the Rāmalīṅgeśvara temple at Rāmeśvara near Proddhaṭūru,.....It is written in Sanskrit and Kannaḍa languages, the script being in Kannaḍa.....It belongs to the reign of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa King Kṛṣṇa III.....The inscription consists of about twenty-five verses which give the genealogical account of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas down to Kṛṣṇa III, who is praised in the record....." The lines referring to Dantidurga as Sāhasatuṅga are:

Srī-Dantidurga-eti durdhara-bāhu-vīryyo
Cālukya-sindhu-mathanodbhava-rājalakṣmīm
Yas sambabhāra ciram-ātmakul-aikakāntām
tasmin Sāhasatuṅga-nāmnī nṛpataṁ svassundarīprārthite¹

Thus, it is conclusively proved that Sāhasatuṅga was no other than Dantidurga II. The date of Sāhasatuṅga Dantidurga is 756 A.D.²

(3) In the light of this proof that Dantidurga had the *biruda* Sāhasatuṅga, the reference to the line—'vikramārkaśakābdiya' will be taken as Śaka Samvat for the following reasons:

- (i) The verse containing 'vikramārkaśakābdiya' should be read as 'vikramāṅkaśakābdiya' implying thereby Śaka era qualified by Vikrama.
- (ii) It is almost an accepted tradition followed by Jaina authors to refer Śaka era as 'vikramāṅkaśaka'. This is supported by several instances. Dhavalā was completed in 816 A.D., 'when Jagattuṅga (i.e. Govinda III of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa dynasty) had abandoned the throne and Amoghavarsha I was ruling³.' It is mentioned that Dhavalā was completed in the year 738 of Śaka (A.D. 816). The ending verses of Dhavalā run—

"aṭṭhisamhi Satasae Vikkamarāyaṅkie-susagaṇāme
Vāse suterasi bhāṇuvilagge dhavalapakke"

Hence *Vikramāṅka Śaka* must be interpreted as Śaka era⁴. Otherwise it will not tally with the time of Jagattuṅga and Amoghavarsha.

¹ JBHS, vol. VI, Pp. 29-33.

² The Rāṣṭrakūṭas and their Times, p. 10.

³ *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, vol. I, Eng. Intro. p. ii and Hindi Intro. Pp. 35-45.

⁴ Dhavalā, vol. I Hindi Intro. p. 41.

Dr. Hiralal Jain in support of this interpretation quotes a line from the commentary on Trilokasāra (v. 850) by Mādhavacandra Traividya which contains “*Śri Viranāthanūrtēḥ sakāśāt Pañcaśatottara ṣaṭ śatavarṣāni*” (605) *pañcamāsayutāni gatvā paścāt Vikramāṅkaśakarājo Jayate* etc. which shows the tradition of attaching the word *Vikramāṅka* with *Śaka* era.

Hence Samvat, referred to in Akalaṅka Carita, is in complete conformity with the historical fact of mentioning Śaka era with Vikramāṅka. This contention is also held by J. C. Vidyālaṅkāra¹.

(4) Conceding to the facts of Akalaṅka's contemporaneity with *Sāhasa-tuṅga* Dantidurga and flourishing in 720-780 A.D., it is by no means impossible for *Dhavalā* to quote TV of Akalaṅka, which was accepted as an authentic text within a short period due to its intrinsic value, the possibility of quoting it is still more enhanced when we purview that the TV was the first work of Akalaṅka.

(5) Further Acārya Siddhasenagaṇi wrote a commentary on *bhāṣya* of TSu. Pt. Sukhalalji assigns him between 7th c. A.D. and 9th c. A.D.² Because Siddhasena refers to Dharmakīrti and is referred to by Śīlāṅkācārya (Śaka 799 ; 877 A.D.) in his *Vṛtti* on *Ācārāṅga*³; hence he must have flourished during the last phase of 8th c. A.D. Panditji conjectures⁴ that Akalaṅka, Gandhahasti (Siddhasena) and Haribhadra might be contemporaries; if so, Akalaṅka's TVA or *Rājavartika* could be before Siddhasena (last quarter of 8th c. A.D.).

Though one more *Siddhiviniścaya* of Ārya Śivasvāmī has been found out; Siddhasena's reference to ‘*evaṃ.....Siddhiviniścaya sr̥ṣṭiparikṣāto*’, seems to be definitely indicating SV (VII Ch. on *Śāstrasiddhi*, v. 13) of Akalaṅka.⁵

(6) The age of Haribhadra is fixed by Muni Jinavijayaji to be 700-770 A.D. on the basis of *Kuvalayamālā* (777 A.D.) of Uddyotana who refers to Haribhadra, and on other internal evidences.⁶ It has been shown elsewhere⁷ that Haribhadra quotes verbatim the second pādas of two verses from *Nyāyamanjarī* in his *Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya* (v. 20). Though recent research⁸

¹ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 50, f. N. 4.

² *Tattvārthasūtra*, Intro. p. 46.

³ *ibid*, p. 43, Note 2.

⁴ See Hindi Intro. p. 53.

⁵ *ibid*, p. 51.

⁶ *Jaina Sāhitya Samśodhaka*, vol. I, Part 1.

⁷ NKC, vol. II, Intro. p. 38.

⁸ JBORS, vol. IV, 1955.

in Nyāya studies has shown that Trilocana, the guru of Vācaspati Miśra, had written a *Nyāyamañjarī* still it is definite that the quotation by Haribhadra is from Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*. The age of Jayanta was fixed by myself to be 760-840 A.D.¹

As has already been shown elsewhere, the date of Haribhadra should be extended to 810 A.D., in view of the fact that he quotes Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta who flourished in 760-840 A.D.²

Therefore, Haribhadra's age lies from 720 A.D. to 810 A.D. In other words, he was the contemporary of Akalaṅka.

Haribhadra's reference to "*Akalaṅkanyāyānūsāri cetoharam vacaḥ*" in Anekāntajayapaṭkā (p. 275) implies the soptless character of logic and in no way is referring to Akalaṅka's Nyāya works. In AJP there are still more references of this type e.g. "*niṣkalaṅkamatīsamutprekṣita sanyāyānūsārataḥ*", such epithets are used while discussing the *pūrvapakṣa* of Buddhists and Naiyāyikas who claim the purity of their own logic; hence it is clear that they do not refer to Akalaṅka's logic.

(7) Jinadāsagaṇi refers to *Siddhivinīścaya* in his *Niśītha Cūrṇi* but it bears no relation whatsoever with the present SV of Akalaṅka. Muni Punyavijayaji³ has found out a *ṭīkā* on a treatise named *Strimukti* of Śākatāyana; it is in a mutilated condition having some of the leaves of the first and the last portion missing. In that MS. there is reference to "*.....Bhagavadācārya-Sivasvāminah Siddhivinīścaye.....*", indicating the existence of *Siddhivinīścaya* by Śivārya, who is other than Akalaṅka; because the views quoted in the name of Śivārya from SV are against the views of Akalaṅka, particularly regarding the problem of *Strimukti*.

Śākatāyana in his *Amoghavṛtti*⁴ (1.3.-168), refers Śivārya's *Siddhivinīścaya* as:—"*Sādhu khalvidam.....Siddher-viniścayaḥ Śivāryasya Śivāryeṇa vā.....*", which fact clearly manifests that Śivārya also wrote a work named *Siddhivinīścaya*.

There is hardly any doubt that Śākatāyana had before him Śivārya's *Siddhivinīścaya* which defends *Strimukti*.

When in the year 1926 A.D. the reference to *Siddhivinīścaya* was found out in *Niśītha-cūrṇi* (NC) and the MS. of Anantavīrya's *Siddhivinīścayaṭīkā*

¹ NKC, vol. II, Intro. p. 16; in the light of recent researches a correction is required to be made in one of my arguments: the verse, '*ajñānatimīra*'.....etc., which refers to *Nyāyamañjarī* written by a guru of Vācaspati is none else than Trilocana.

² Ibid, p. 16.

³ The author is indebted to Pt. Mālvania for this suggestion.

⁴ Vide Hindi Intro. p. 53.

on Akalaṅka's SV was discovered, Pt. Jugalkishorji identified the *Siddhi-viniścaya* referred to in NC with that of Akalaṅka in his article on SVT in *Anekānta*. This evoked further research in this direction as a result of which Pt. Sukhalalji and Pt. Bechardāsji rightly pointed out that the reference to SV in NC cannot be that of SV of Akalaṅka, since Jinadāsa Mahattara is decidedly earlier than Akalaṅka¹. In fact, the SV referred to in NC should necessarily be the work of an unknown author other than Akalaṅka, who must have been a Śvetāmbara; for (i) there is no other evidence to prove that the Śvetāmbara Ācāryas have referred to a Digambara work as *darśanaprabhāva*, (ii) the reference to SV is with a Śvetāmbara work, viz. *Sanmati*, moreover it is given the first place in order of mentioning². Muni Jinavijayaji also expressed such opinions³ in his foreword to AGT. I had also my own doubts regarding this matter. If NC refers to Akalaṅka's SV., the author must be posterior to Akalaṅka; further it was a matter of doubt whether Jinadāsa was the author of *Nandī-cūrṇi*; the existence of SV, except that of Akalaṅka was not thought of;⁴ for, SV of Akalaṅka is purely a philosophical classic which could have been glorified by Śvetāmbara Ācāryas. Though Jinavijayaji attempted to establish Jinadāsa as the author of *Nandīcūrṇi* and placed him in 676 A.D. the problem of SV referred to in NC was not solved. Happily, this problem is now solved on the strength of explicit reference to Śivārya's SV in *Strimukti tīkā* and *Amoghavṛtti*. It is a matter of pretty certainty that Śivārya was Yāpaniya, since Śākatāyana who quotes SV of Śivārya, was himself a devout Yāpaniya; naturally the Śvetāmbara Ācāryas quote it (SV of Śivārya) whenever they discuss the problem of *Strimukti*. Śivārya can be placed before 7th C. A.D. on the basis of his reference in NC.

On the basis of this discussion it can be conclusively proved that NC does not refer to SV of Akalaṅka. So he can be placed in 8th C. A.D. and certainly not in the 7th C. A.D.

The Crux of the whole discussion is :—

1. Akalaṅka's narration of his victory at the court of King Himaśīṭala before Dantidurga alias *Sāhasatūṅga*; Dantidurga ruled in the year 745-755 A.D., he had *biruda Sāhasatūṅga* which fact is conclusively proved by the Pillar Inscription of Rāmeśvara temple.

¹ *Anekānta*, vol. I. No. 4.

² NKC, Vol. I Intro. P. 105. Note 3.

³ AGT. Foreword, P. 5.

⁴ Ibid, Intro. pp. 14-15.

2. The KK of Prabhācandra refers to Akalaṅka as the son of Puruṣottama who was the minister of Kṛṣṇa I (756-775 A.D.).
3. The reference to Akalaṅka's debates in Śaka 700 (778 A.D.) with the Buddhists in *Akalaṅka-carita*.
4. The reference to the influence of the following Ācāryas in Akalaṅka's works :
 - Bhartṛhari (4th or 5th c. A.D.)
 - Kumārila (the first part of 7th c. A.D.)
 - Dharmakīrti (620-690 A.D.)
 - Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (7th cent. A.D.)
 - Prajñākara Gupta (660-720 A.D.)
 - Dharmākardatta or Arcaṭa (680-720 A.D.)
 - Śāntabhadra (700 A.D.)
 - Dharmottara (700 A.D.)
 - Karṇagomi (8th cent. A.D.)
 - Śāntarakṣita (705-762 A.D.)
5. Dhanañjaya states in his *Nāma-māla*, '*pramāṇamakalaṅkasya*'; this *Nāma-māla* is quoted in *Dhavalā* (816 A.D.). Therefore Dhanañjaya must have flourished in 810 A.D.
6. Virasena's (guru of Jinasena) reference to Akalaṅka's TV in his *Dhavalā* (816 A.D.).
7. Jinasena's (760-813 A.D.) reference to Akalaṅka in *Ādi-purāṇa*.
8. Jinasena, the author of *Harivaṃsapurāṇa*, completed in Śaka 705 (783 A.D.), refers to Virasena's reputation as '*akalaṅka*'.
9. Vidyānanda's (775-840 A.D.) commentary on *Aṣṭaśatī* of Akalaṅka named *Aṣṭasaḥsārī*.
10. Inscriptions refer to Akalaṅka after Sumati. The copper plate, dated Śaka 743; 821 A.D.) recording the gift made by Rāṣṭrakūṭa Karka Suvarṇa of Gujarat to Aparājita, the disciple of Sumati and grand disciple of Mallavādi.

The TS refers to Sumati as a Digambar scholar. *Tattvasaṃgraha-Pañjika* (TSP) suggests that Sumati repudiated Kumārila's theory of *ālocanamātra pratyakṣa*. Obviously, Sumati must have followed Kumārila; his date has been fixed by Dr. Bhaṭṭācārya at about 720 A.D. If Sumati, referred to in the copper-plate, is the same as quoted in TS it can be inconsistent with this date (720 A.D.); because,

according to copper-plate inscription Sumati's disciple Aparājita lived in 821 A.D.; it can be presumed that the relation between the teacher and the taught—might have been for certain time within this long period of 100 years. It has been rightly observed by Pt. Dalsukh Mālvania, according to whom, Sumati's literary activities might be about 740 A.D. Śāntarakṣita completed his TS in 745 A.D. i.e. before his journey to Tibet where he established a Vihāra in 749 A.D. If Sumati is thought to be the contemporary of Śāntarakṣita, he might be living in 762 A.D., under such conditions, it is not improbable to maintain that his disciple Aparājita could have flourished in 821 A.D.

Akalaṅka, who is mentioned after Sumati and other two or three Ācāryas, must have flourished in 8th c. A.D.

On the strength of these evidences it can be safely concluded that Akalaṅka flourished in 720-780 A.D.

(g) *The Works of Akalaṅka*

It is needless to repeat Akalaṅka's unparalleled contribution by an inexhaustible fertility of his intellect, insight and intuition all combined; his TV stands as an example of purity, clarity of thought and sobriety of mind; his works *Aṣṭaśatī* and *Siddhiviniścaya* etc. reflect force, cogency and satire, as the then prevailing necessity to combat the Buddhist criticism stirred him and as a result of which we have several excellent works on Jaina philosophy. A brief analysis, estimation and evaluation of the various works of Akalaṅka will be given in the following pages.

(1) *Tattvārthavārtika (TV) and its Bhāṣya (TVB)*:

TV is a commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra* (TSu) of Gr̥ddhāpiccha Ācārya Umāsvāmi in a *vārtika* form resembling *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara. TV has a commentary by the author himself. The commentary is called Bhāṣya¹ or Alankāra. TV contains the discussion of *Jīva*, *Ajīva*, *Āśrava*, *Bandha*, *Samvara*, *Nirjarā* and *Mokṣa*. The *Puṣpikā* of TVB, refers to the title of the text as "*Tattvārthavārtika-vyākhyānāṅkāra*". A large portion of SS forms the very structure of *Vārtikas* of TV, similar is the case with several sentences² of *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* (TBh) some

¹ Dhavalā Vol. I, Intro. p. 67. NKC. p. 646.

² TBh, I, I.

of which he criticises at several places and also criticises some of the *sūtras* accepted by TBh; this fact clearly indicates that TBh and its *sūtras* were accessible to him. The TBh is referred to by him as *Vṛtti*¹. The prose in the last section of the 10th chapter and 32 verses of TBh are assimilated in TV by Akalaṅka. In the description of Dvādaśāṅga, while dealing *Kriyāvādī*, *Akriyāvādī*, *Ajñānika* and *Vaināyika* reference is made to the Vedic Ṛṣis of various *śākhās* such as—Sākalya, Vāṣkala, Kuthumi, Kaṭha, Mādhyandina, Mauda, Pippalāda, Gārgya, Maudgalāyana Āśvalāyana, etc.

There are several quotations from *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* and *Mahābandha* which are in perfect tune with the spirit of TV; verily, it is a mine of Jaina philosophy, Ethics, Cosmology and other allied subjects where in philosophical section deals specially the various aspects of Anekāntavāda².

There is refutation of definition of sense perception held by Dignāga. But it is curious to note that he has not criticised that of Dharmakīrti, though the first śloka, beginning with “*Buddhipūrvām kriyām*” of *Santānāntarasiddhi* of Dharmakīrti is quoted. It seems that all the works of Dharmakīrti might have not been accessible to Akalaṅka at the time of writing TV; this can be the reason to strengthen the supposition that TV is the first work of Akalaṅka.

It may be noted that Akalaṅka was also a grammarian, since he exhibits his sound knowledge of correct usage and word formation of terms used in the *sūtras*. He closely follows the *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa* of Pūjyapāda though some times he refers to Pāṇini and *Pātanjala-bhāṣya*.

So far as cosmological discussions are concerned, *Trilokaprajñapti* is served as a reference book for Akalaṅka. Besides, he refers to *Yoniprabhṛta*, *Vyākhyāprajñapti* and *Vyākhyāprajñapti-ḍaṇḍaka* etc., indicative of his vast erudition; besides TV quotes a number of standard works of different systems of thought for instance:—*Vedas*, *Upaniṣads*, *Smṛtis*, *Purāṇas*, *Paṇini-sūtras*, *Pātanjala-bhāṣya*, *Abhidharmakośa*, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, *Santānāntara-siddhi*, *Yuktyanuśāsana*, *Dvātrīṃśad-dvātrīṃśatikā* etc.

(2) *Aṣṭaśatī* :

Aṣṭaśatī, amounting to 800 verses, is a most precious work in Jaina philosophy, dealing mainly with logic; it is a brief but extra-ordinarily brilliant commentary on *Āptamīmāṃsā* alias *Devāgama* of Samantabhadra, the latter work embodies in itself the acute analysis of other schools of thought from the standpoint of Anekānta philosophy. Vidyānanda's

¹ TV, p. 444.

² Vide, TV. pp. 833-836.

work named *Aṣṭasahasrī* stands by itself as the most original work though it is a commentary on *Aṣṭasatī*, he incorporates *Aṣṭasatī* in such a way that it becomes a part and parcel of the unique work. He is supremely aware of the difficulty of commenting on *Aṣṭasatī*, a fact which is clearly expressed in the words "*Kaṣṭasahasrī siddhā Sāṣṭasahasrī*". He is proud of this stupendous achievement of such a commentary, suggestive of the par excellence of this work over such other works of Buddhists.

Aṣṭasatī comprises the discussion on *Sadekānta-asadekānta*, *bhedai-kānta-abhedaikānta*, *nityaikānta-anityaikānta* etc. In the examination of these schools, first he starts with the position held by the schools, from the authoritative texts. He discusses the concept of omniscient being, self-subsistent in itself and establishes the theory on a firm footing, on the strength of the conformity of the teachings with logic and the scriptures. Lastly, he discusses the epistemological problems, like *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *durñaya* such as "*(Pramāṇāt) tadatat-pratipatteḥ nayāt tat-pratipatteḥ (durñayāt) tadanya-nirākṛteśca*"¹. i.e. *Pramāṇa* consists in the apprehension of the intended (*Vivakṣita*) and unintended (*avivakṣita*); *naya* refers to the intended objects and *durñaya* negates the unintended ones. It criticises all the absolutistic systems upto date and has established the non-Absolutism of the Jainism.

(3) *Laghiyastraya with Vivṛti* :

The title of LT is self-expressive of the fact that it is a compendium of three small treatises. The colophon² of the *vṛtti* on LT goes to prove that the *Pramāṇa Praveśa* and *Naya Praveśa* together formed one book and was named as *Pramāṇanaya-Praveśa*. Since the *Pravacana Praveśa* has a separate *maṅglācarāṇa* and repeats mostly the topics of *Nayapraveśa*, it can be proved that it is a separate treatise³.

It seems that Akalaṅka was inspired by *Nyāya-Praveśa* of Dignāga to write a treatise on Jaina Logic namely *Pramāṇanaya-Praveśa*. As regards the designation *Laghiyastraya* of these works nothing can be definitely said as to who did this; however, we can venture to remark that either Akalaṅka himself or very probably his commentator Anantavīrya might have taken them as *Laghiyastraya* a fact which can be proved by the references to *Naya Praveśa* as a separate work by Anantavīrya in SVT.⁴ Thus there was the

¹ *Aṣṭasatī & Aṣṭasahasrī*, P. 291.

² AGT,—LT. p. 17.

³ "*iti pramāṇanaya-praveśah samāptah Kṛtirīyaṁ sakalavādi-caḥravartino Bhaṭṭā-kalaṅkadevasya.*"

⁴ SVT. p. 737.

possibility of giving the name *Laghīyastraya*. It is but natural that he should quote these for the first time as *Laghīyastraya*. However, it is also possible that it is Anantavīrya who coined the name *Laghīyastraya* for the trio of *pramāṇapraveśa*, *Naya-praveśa* and *Pravacanapraveśa*.

Thus *Laghīyastraya* (LT) includes the above three treatises, the total number of slokas being 78. At the end of *Naya-praveśa*, we have "*mohenaiva paro'pi*" which is not commented either by Prabhācandra in NKC or by Abhayacandra in *Tātparyavṛtti* nor does it have any consistency with the text. Hence it can be regarded as a spurious addition.

Akalaṅka himself wrote a commentary on LT not with a view to explain and interpret the content of the whole text but to clarify ideas of the text. Really speaking the text and the commentary are to be taken as a whole.

It is apparent that Akalaṅka followed in this regard the chapter on *Svārthānumāna* of PV and its *vṛtti* of Dharmakīrti, this is also the case with the *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* and its *Vṛtti* of Akalaṅka. Prabhācandra refers to the prose section of LT, as *Vivṛti* when he says "*Vivṛtim Vivṛṇvannāha*".

Prabhācandra's *Nyāyakumudacandra* is an exhaustive commentary on LT and its *Vivṛti*.

Laghīyastraya contains six chapters¹ embodying the exhaustive discussion of philosophy in general and epistemology in particular *Pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa*.

(4) *Nyāya-viniścaya* and its *Vṛtti*²:

Nyāya-viniścaya written in verses and prose, is designed after *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti, the original MS. of which is not available. Vādirāja has written a commentary on NV, but on the *śloka*s only. I have restored the NV by culling words from the commentary of Vādirāja,³ but the reconstruction of *Vṛtti* is impossible in absence of any commentary; there can be no doubt about the existence of *Vṛtti* of NV. Since it is quoted in SVT.⁴ That commentary was called *Vṛtti*, is proved by these words "*Vṛttimadhyavartitvāt*" etc. It appears, this *Vṛtti*, also known by the name "*cūrṇi*", is quoted by Vādirāja in NVV,⁵ thus "*tathā ca sūktam cūrṇau devasya vacanam-Samāropavyavacchedāt*".

¹ Vide Hindi, Intro, p. 58 for the Analysis of the Chapters.

² Published in *Akalaṅka-grantha-tryaya* (SJS. Vol. 12) and *Nyāya-Viniścaya-vivaraṇa* in two Volumes (BJPB).

³ Vide AGT. Intro. p. 6.

⁴ *taduktāni Nyāyaviniścaye "na caitad bahireva Pratibhāsate"* SVT. p. 141.

⁵ NVV. Vol. I. p. 301, 390.

NVV contains in all 480½ verses¹ which are of three types :—*Vārtika*, *antaraśloka* and *Sangrahaśloka* ; it has three prastāvas : *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna* and *Pravacana*, just as *Nyāyavatāra* consists of three chapters : *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna* and *Śrūta* ; similarly we find three chapters in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* also, viz., *Pratyakṣa*, *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*. It seems Akalaṅka derived inspiration from these authors.

The first chapter includes the topics : the nature of perception, the refutation of the view that knowledge is non-perceptible, the nature of substance, refutation of views held by other schools regarding the perception, etc.

The second chapter deals with the study of inference, the empirical elements in inference, the nature of *Vāda*, *nigrahasthāna*, *Vādābhāsa* etc. related with the topic of *anumāna*.

The third chapter deals with the nature of *Pravacana* (the scripture), the refutation of Buddhist theory of *Āpta*, Vedic dogma of *apauruṣeyatva* ; the proof of omniscience, refutation of *anātmavāda* of Buddhists, the conception of *mokṣa*, the theory of *Saptabhaṅgi* and *Syādvāda* etc.²

(5) *Pramāṇasaṁgraha* and its *Vṛtti* :

As the title suggests this work is a collection of statements ; really it is a work on epistemology or *Pramāṇa* ; it has a very compact style. From the maturity of judgments and acute analysis, it can be said that it is the last work of Akalaṅka ; besides, he includes some of the *kārikās* from NV. It is understood that Anantavīrya wrote a commentary, named *Pramāṇa-Saṁgrahabhāṣya* or *Pramāṇa-Saṁgrahālaṅkāra*, since he himself refers to it³.

There are nine chapters and 87½ *kārikās*. Akalaṅka wrote a supplementary *Vṛtti* on this work. *Vṛtti* and the *kārikā* together come to about the same size of *Aṣṭasatī*.

There are nine chapters in this work dealing with the topics : *Pratyakṣa*, *Parokṣa* (mediate knowledge), *Anumāna* (inference), *Hetu* (reason), its classifications, *Hetvābhāsa* (fallacies of reason), non-existent (*asiddha*) contradictory and inconclusive, *Vāda* (legitimate discourse), *Pravacana* (the nature of scripture), proof of omniscience, refutation of *apauruṣeyatva*, *Saptabhaṅgi* (the seven fold predication), *naya* and its classification, lastly conclusion on *pramāṇa* (valid-knowledge), *naya* (partial standpoint) and *nirāśeṣa*

¹ Ibid, p. 34.

² Vide Hindi Intro. pp. 58, 60.

³ SVT pp. 8, 10, 130 etc.

(6) *Siddhivinīścaya* :

The detailed discussion on this will be given in a separate section No. 3.

Besides the above mentioned works there are some others such as *Svarūpasambodhana*, *Nyāya-cūlikā*, *Akalanīkapraṭiṣṭhā-pāṭha*, *Akalanīka prāyaścitta-saṁgraha* and *Akalanīka-stotra* etc. attributed to Akalaṇka by tradition. But at a closer scrutiny it will be revealed that these works are not of Akalaṇka¹; may be they were composed by various Akalaṇkas² who flourished after the great Akalaṇka.

(h) *The contribution of Akalaṇka to Jainanyāya—Akalanīkanyāya* :

There can be no doubt that Akalaṇka was an intellectual prodigy; he stands as a tower of strength and self-confidence in the firmament of Jaina-Nyāya. He brought dignity to Jaina-Nyāya by his exemplary originality of his logical acumen. It stands much to his credit that he has established the Jaina-nyāya on a firmer footing. In fact he was fortunate to belong to the period of Indian Philosophical history which was surcharged by the sharp attacks and counter attacks by Dharmakīrti and his followers on the one hand and non-Buddhist-philosophers on the other.

The works of Akalaṇka echo the reflection and reaction of his times. The followers of Dharmakīrti had used derogatory terms such as *asthila*, *ākulapralāpa* etc. to ridicule, rather than refute, the Jaina Siddhānta. In order to combat these caustic critics, he realised the necessity of systematising the Jaina thought bringing out the strength of its teachings, before attempting to counter-attack, as a result of which we possess works systematising Jaina philosophy in general and logic in particular. His contribution to Logic is summarised below :

(1) the 'avisamvāda' non-discrepancy in the definition of *Pramāṇas* :

In Epistemology, Samantabhadra³ and Siddhasena⁴ used the term 'svaparāvabhāsaka' and 'svaparābhāsi' respectively while defining the nature of valid knowledge. According to them valid knowledge or *Pramāṇa* is self-revelatory, in other words self-revelation is the essential character of the organ of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*). Akalaṇka introduces the term 'avisamvādi'⁵ or non-discrepant to represent the essence of *Pramāṇa*; his

¹ vide NKC, vol. I. Intro. pp. 58.

² ibid. p. 25.

³ *Bṛhat-svayambhū stotra*, v. 63.

⁴ *Nyāyāvatāra*, v. 1.

⁵ *Aṣṭatātī and Aṣṭaśasrī*, p. 175.

emphasis is not so much on 'svasamivedana', since self-cognisance is a common characteristic, not only of *Pramāṇa*, but of knowledge, valid or invalid, as a whole. Hence, he used the terms 'svārthavinīścaya'¹ and 'tattvārthnirṇaya'² indicating the result of *Pramāṇa* sometime. He uses the term 'anadhigatārthādhigama'³ but without any emphasis.

Obviously, it is Akalaṅka who for the first time uses the term "avisamvādi", in definition of *Pramāṇa* in Jaina Logic. Similarly he is the first to reject the *Sannikarṣa* and *nirvikalpaka darśana* as the means of valid knowledge when he gives the term *Jñāna* in the definition of *Pramāṇa*.

(2) *The partial discrepancy*: He did not stop at this stage only, he further argues that no knowledge is valid or invalid from the absolute standpoint; validity or invalidity is conditioned by the degree of non-discrepancy. Though there may be partial discrepancy, on the strength of extensive non-discrepancy the knowledge can be valid.

(3) *Refutation of the definitions of Pramāṇa*⁴ accepted by others: Akalaṅka refutes the Buddhist theory of non-discrepancy as the test of valid knowledge; because it is inconsistent with indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) which is accepted by the Buddhist as valid knowledge. *Sannikarṣa* accepted by the Naiyāyika as the source of knowledge is untenable because it is not knowledge by itself.

(4) *The object*⁵ of *Pramāṇa* is a reality which is of the nature of substance-cum-modifications and universal-cum-particular and knowledge itself.

(5) *Matijñāna*: Akalaṅka widens the scope of *Mati*. *Mati* is confined to the knower himself, it is rather subjective; the four types—*Avagraha* (conation), *Ihā* (conception), *Avāya* (judgement) and *Dhāraṇā* (retention), have the characteristic of occurring successively, each antecedent member (of the order) is the cognitive organ and each succeeding member is the resultant. This completes the division of organ and resultant.

(6) *Ihā* (speculation or conception) and *Dhāraṇā*: *Ihā* or activation and *dhāraṇā* or dispositions (*Bhāvanā*) are accepted by the *Naiyāyika* as other than knowledge. Akalaṅka establishes them to be of the nature of knowledge because they are substantive cause and effect of knowledge.⁶

¹ SV. 1.3.

² *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, p. 1.5.

³ *Aṣṭaśatī*, *Aṣṭasaṃhāri*, p. 175.

⁴ SV. I. 3.

⁵ NV. I. 3.

⁶ LTV. I. 6.

(7) *Artha* (object) and *Āloka* (light), are not conditions of knowledge.¹ Akalaṅka admits of sense organs and mind as the conditions of knowledge and not object and light, since the latter two factors do not have relation of concomitance and difference (affirmation and negation) with knowledge.

(8) The nature of perception : Ācārya Siddhasena defined *pratyakṣa* as the negation of mediate knowledge i.e. his approach is mainly *via negativa*. Akalaṅka defines that *Pratyakṣa* is immediate-cum-lucid and further he defined the conspicuity of this, which has been accepted by the subsequent writers.

The contributions to Logic by Akalaṅka are too many to narrate in this short introduction ; suffice it to say that he had his original contribution to *Pratyakṣa*—*Sāṃvayavahārika* (empirical), *Parokṣa*—its definition and divisions : *Smṛti*, *Pratyabijñāna*, *Tarka*, *Anumāna* and *Āgama* ; the inference and its syllogistic forms ; *Hetu* and its divisions ; *Hetvābhāsa*—fallacies of reason, *Vāda*—nature and scope ; *Jāti*—fallacy of refutations ; *Jayaparājayavyavasthā*—the ground of defeat ; *Saptabhaṅgī*—*pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* and *nayasaptabhaṅgī* ; *Sakalādeśa* and *Vikalādeśa*. *Naya* and *nayābhāsa*—fallacies of partial standpoint ; discussion on assertion ; *nikṣepa*—imposition or aspect ; combating the critics of *Anekānta* etc.²

Akalaṅka has rendered the signal contribution to Jaina philosophy of *Anekānta*.

(i) *Personality of Akalaṅka :*

Thus, on the strength of epigraphical, textual and contemporary evidences it can be concluded without any misgivings that Akalaṅka was the epoch-maker of the 8th C. A.D. Famous he was as an author, equally proficient in debates also with which he vanquished the Buddhists in the court of Himaśīta ; *Mallīṣeṇa Praśasti*'s glowing tributes to Akalaṅka, in verse beginning with "*Rājan Sāhasatūṅga*" etc. reflect his forceful writings and graceful orations.

His works, both original and commentorial, stand as eloquent testimony to his penetrating mind and show a remarkable advancement in Jaina Logic. He had chivalrous disposition to help the people misled by the Buddhists. In his writings he was very satirical and caustic about

¹ LT. vs. 53. 56.

² For detailed discussions see, Introductions to AGT and NVV vol I and II ; *Jaina Darśana* pp. 146, 152, 269, 273, 286, 315-28, 344-361, 410-416, 475-514, 516-617 etc ; Hindi Intro, pp 61-65 ; 95 ff ;

Buddhists, particularly about Dharmakīrti, in retorting the euphemistic criticism of *Syādvāda* by Dharmakīrti¹. Akalaṅka replies in forceful words². The examples of scathing attack of Buddhists are innumerable in Akalaṅka's works. *Pramāṇasamgraha* embodies several such caustic remarks such as "jādyahetavaḥ", "Paśulakṣaṇam", "alaukikam", "tamasam"; which were used by Dharmakīrti himself.

That he was a celibate, his heart was burning with grief on account of the tragic end of his brother and the exertion of his utmost skill in combating the spring-tide of carping criticism by the Buddhists show his all-round capacity to succeed in re-establishing Jainism on the rock-bottom of new interpretation of Āgamic teachings.

2. Anantavīrya

Ācārya Anantavīrya was a Logician of amazing capacity though sometimes he shows leniency toward dogmatism. Truly, he was a genius of his time. He had his utmost attempt to probe into the heart of Akalaṅka's works and reveal the truth. In spite of the commentary on Siddhivinīścaya by other *Vṛddha* Anantavīrya, it seems he was not satisfied with it as it is sufficiently clear from the opening verses of SVT. He frankly expresses the deficiency of the old commentary on Akalaṅka's works, as will be clearly seen in this verse:—

*Devasyānantavīryo'pi padam vyaktam tu sarvataḥ,
na jānīte'kalaṅkasya citrametat param bhuvi.*

Though out-wardly it seems that he is expressing his own incompetency, in other way, it goes to justify my conclusion that he is referring this to the old commentator whom he quotes³ in several places.

These phrases like 'ityanantavīryaḥ' go to prove that it is *Vṛddha* Anantavīrya who is referred to, besides this, it proves also the existence of Anantavīrya before him. The commentator Anantavīrya's expressions e.g. 'anye' and 'apare' suggest that *vṛddha* Anantavīrya's commentary stands in contradiction with the meaning of original *śloka*s of SV and inconsistencies with SVT. He is not satisfied with old Anantavīrya; that is

¹ *Sarvasyobhayaṛūpatve tadviśeṣanirākerṭeḥ,
Codito dadhi khādeti kimuṣṭram nābhidhāvati.* PV, III, 181.

² *Sugato'pi mrgo jātaḥ mrgo'pi Sugatastathā.
Tathāpi Sugato vandyah mrgaḥ khādya yatheṣyate.
Tathā vastubalādeva bhedābhedavyavasthiteḥ.
Codito dadhi khādeti kimuṣṭramabhidhāvati,* NV, vv. 373-4.

³ Vide, Hindi Intro. p. 67.

to say, he was not so much influenced by *vrddha* Anantavīrya. This is not all. In order to show his own distinctness he used such adjectives 'Ravibhadrāpādopajīvi' and 'Ravibhadrāpāda-kamalacāṇarika' in the introductory verses of the chapters.

Though admittedly Anantavīrya's SVT has a lucid style, it has not the fluency due to the very compact and complicated style of Akalaṅka.

(a) *Anantavīrya as Dogmatic Logician :*

It is interesting to note that Anantavīrya, though a first rate logician, is dogmatic sometimes. This is proved by his discussion on the authorship of the following *vārtika* :

*anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim,
nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim.*

The author of this *vārtika* is Pātrakesariśwāmi, this fact is attested by Śāntarākṣita, the author of *Tattvasaṃgraha*¹ and its (TS) commentator Kamalaśīla ; also by Vālideva, the author of *Syādvādaratnākara*². This verse occurs in TS (p. 405) and it is clearly stated therein that it belongs to Pātrakesariśwāmi. It also occurs in *Pramāṇavārtikasvavṛtti-ṭīkā* (p. 9), but without the name of Pātrakesariśwāmi. Sravaṇ Belgol inscription of *Malliṣeṇa Praśasti*³ suggests that Pātrakesari had written a work—*Trilakṣṇakadarthana* (TLK). Besides, Anantavīrya's reference—*tena tadviśayatrilakṣṇakadarthanaṃ uttarabhāṣyaṃ yataḥ kṛtaṃ* (SVT. p. 371), proves that the verse cited above is taken from TLK of Pātrakesari and this is also supported by tradition. Pātrakesari and Pātraswami are identical persons. This contention is supported by Anantavīrya's reference (SVT) : '*svāminah pātrakesariṇaḥ*'. Further, Vādirāja, in his *Nyāyaviniścaya-vivaraṇa*,⁴ refers to '*pātrakesari swāmine*'. From our discussion it can be stated that the verse cited above is definitely from TLK of Pātrakesariśwāmi⁵ ; it must be noted that he was referred to by all the three names, viz., Pātraswāmi, Pātrakesari, Pātrakesariśwāmi.

In spite of these evidences, Anantavīrya ascribes the authorship of this work TLK, to Śimandharaswāmi⁶ ; he criticises the views of those who attribute the authorship to Pātrakesari in the following manner :

¹ TS. p. 60

² S.R. p. 521.

³ JSLS, Vol. I, No. 54.

⁴ NVV, Vol. II, p. 177.

⁵ *Trilakṣṇakadarthane vā Śāstre vistareṇa Pātrakesari-swāminā pratipādanāt*,—vide NVV. Vol. II. p. 234.

⁶ According to Jaina tradition Śimandharaswāmi is a living *Tīrthaṅkara* residing in Mahāvideha near Mt. Sumeru.

Anantavīrya : How do you know that Pātrakesari is the author ?

Opponent : Because he has composed a logical work *Trilakṣaṇa-kadarthana* in the form of *uttarabhāṣya*.

Anant : If it be so, it must belong to Śimandharaswāmi, since he is the composer of this *śloka*.

Opponent : How is it known ?

Anant : How do you know that Pātrakesari is the author of TLK ?

Opponent : Simply by the tradition of Ācāryas.

Anant : Exactly so, it holds good in this case also ; besides it has its own old story. If there is no proof to attribute it to Śimandharaswāmi, there is no proof regarding Pātrakesari also as the author of it.

Opponent : That it is composed for Pātrakesari, is the proof that it is the work of Pātrakesari.

Anant : Then all the works and sermons that are meant for the disciples should be attributed to the disciples themselves. Similarly, this verse cannot belong to Pātrakesari, because he must have written it for someone of his disciples ; for, it should be regarded of him for whom it is composed.

Opponent : Pātrakesari has written a commentary on this topic ; hence this verse must belong to him.

Anant : If so, there will be no author of any sūtras ; in that case the commentators would become the authors ; it must, therefore, be of Śimandharaswāmi.

From this dialogue, it appears that Anantavīrya does not accept the tradition of attributing the authorship of this śloka to Pātrakesariśwāmi by explaining the word 'svāminah' in the phrase 'amalāliḍham padam svāminah' (in SV of Akalaṅka), as referring to Śimandharaswāmi. Ācārya Vidyānanda, while explaining this verse, attributes the authorship to vārtikakara and not to Śimandharaswāmi. Anantavīrya just manipulates in this way : The goddess Padmāvati had handed over the vārtika to Pātrakesari bringing it from Śimandharaswāmi.

The gist of the whole argument is that sometimes he exhibits the elements of dogmatism by attempting to attribute the authorship of the verse to Śimandharaswāmi and also defending the impact of tradition, in spite of the just opposite opinion of earlier commentator viz., vṛddha Anantavīrya. It is also proved that there must have been prevalent a legend of this type. Of the available literature till today, it is only Prabhācandra's *Kathakośa* that refers to the history of Pātrakesari ; this also occurs in the KK of Brahma-Nemidatta of the later period.

(b) *Anantavīrya's Erudition*

Anantavīrya refers to and states the views of his predecessors to substantiate the arguments of Jain Philosophy; in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, he quotes the original sentences from the authors whom he criticises i.e., he had a very comprehensive study of other systems of thought¹. The references which are discussed below help us not only to determine the date of Anantavīrya but also to throw a new light on known and unknown authors.

1. *Vedic Literature* :

That his field of studies includes the Vedas, Upaniṣads etc., is borne by the references such as : '*puruṣa evedaṃ* (*Rgveda*)', '*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt*' (*Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, *kāṭhaka saṃhitā*), '*śvetamālabheta*' (*Taittiriya Saṃhitā*) '*ārāmaṃ tasya paśyanti*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*) etc.

2. *Mahābhārata* :

The authorship of *Mahābhārata* which includes *Gītā* in itself is generally attributed to Vyāsa. Anantavīrya subscribes to this contention (p. 518), since it must have been prevalent in his times. He quotes, '*ajño janturanīśo'-yam*' and '*kālāḥ pacati bhūtāni*' from *Vanaparva* and *Ādiparva* respectively.

3. *Works of Grammar* :

It seems that Anantavīrya was thoroughly acquainted with the *sūtras* of Pāṇini and Pātañjala-bhāṣya. He quotes from the former book—*arthavad-dhātu* and '*prakṛtipara eva pratyayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ pratyayapara eva ca prakṛtiḥ*' (*Pātañjala-Bhāṣya*, III. 1-2); and he gives the substance of this in these words : *na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā*'. But he depends mostly on *Jainendra-vyakaraṇa* of Pūjyapāda.

4. *Philosophical classics* :

Cārvāka : Anantavīrya quotes from *Tattvopaplavasīmha* (TPS) and explicitly mentions Jayarāsi as the author of TPS; his reference to '*paraparyanyogaparāṇi Bṛhaspateḥ sūtrāṇi*'², seems to be from TPS, but as the first leaf of the Ms. of TPS is missing, it is not traceable in it. He refers to one Aviddhakarāṇa in the *pūrvapakṣa* of *Cārvākas*³ about whom we will discuss later on.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika : Anantavīrya quotes Akṣapāda's *Nyāyasūtras* (NS) and Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyasūtra-bhāṣya* (NSB) in the *pūrvapakṣa*. He expands

¹ See App. 9 for all quotations.

² SVT, p. 277.

³ Vide Sec. dealing with Aviddhakarāṇas.

the *sūtra*, 'pūrvavaccheṣavat' of *Anumāna* section, into three *sūtras*; similarly he refers to *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara. He quotes the *sūtras* of Vaiśeṣika mentioning the authors as Kaṇacara and Kaṇabhakṣa. Some of the quotations from the *Vaiśeṣika* commentary are found in SVT (p. 56) which show that there were commentaries other than the available ones. At certain places he refers to *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* and its *Vyomavatī* commentary.

Sāṃkhya-Yoga: At several places the *sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali and Vyāsa's *bhāṣya* are quoted. The reference to 'indriyānyarthamālocaṃyanti ahaṃkārobbhimayate' is not found in the available commentary of *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*; perhaps, it was quoted from the ancient work on *Sāṃkhya*. Similarly he refers to 'gūṇānāṃ parami rūpam' which is quoted in *Yoga-bhāṣya* (IV. 13) as 'tathā ca śāstrānuśāsanam' and in *Bhāmati* (p. 352) it is attributed to Vārṣaganya.

Mīmāṃsa: Anantavīrya quotes from the *sūtras* of Jaimini, śabara-bhāṣya, *vṛtti* of Upavaṛṣa, and above all a great number of *śloka*s from *śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila, some of which are not found today. Similarly he refers to (p. 260) Prabhākara and quotes a *kārikā* 'na mīmāṃsa bhakṣane' in the name of Prabhākara, but it is traceable in Manu (V. 56).

Buddhism: It is no wonder that almost one-fourth of SVT is devoted to the criticism of Buddhists, since Akalaṅka was the champion critic of Buddhism. The *pūrvapakṣa* of SVT contains several references to *Tripiṭaka*, *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, *Mādhyamika-Kārikā* of Nāgārjuna, *Pramāṇasumuccaya* of Dignāga and its *vṛtti*, *Pramāṇavārtika*, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Vādanyāya*, *Hetubindu* and *Sambandha-parīkṣā* of Dharmakīrti etc. Out of many commentators of Dharmakīrti, the SVT copiously quotes Prajñākara, but some of the quotations are not traced in the recently published PVB of Prajñākara. Further he quotes a *śloka* attributing it to Gāḍgalakīrti¹ about whom nothing is known as yet. Arcaṭa is referred to and a verse attributed to him is not found in his *Hetubindutīkā*, the only available work; it may be from his other works. Besides these, other commentators such as Śāntabhadra, Kallaka (Karnaka) are referred to and quoted.

Jaina Works: Anantavīrya refers to his Jaina predecessors such as Umāsvāmi, Samantabhadra and others. A reference—'yayohi sahopalambha' in the name of Samantabhadra is found mutilated but is not available in the works of Samantabhadra. Nothing can be said definitely as to which Samantabhadra he is referring, admitting for a moment that it is of great

¹ SVT, p. 450

Samantabhadra it remains to be seen as to from which work he quotes. He quotes, 'je santavāya' from *Sanmati-tarka* of Siddhasena, 'anyathānupapannatva', from *Trilakṣaṇakadārdhana* of Pātrakesari and 'aśeṣavidiheksyate' from *Pātrakesari-stotra*. There is reference to *Kathātrayaḥṇa*, but it is not yet traced. The reference to *Cūrṇi* indicates the *vṛtti* of NV, a fact which is supported by the reference 'na caitad-bahī' referring to NV. The śloka, 'jñō jñeye kathamajñāḥ', from Yogabindu of Haribhadra; this very śloka is quoted by Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasahasrī*. The 'Jīvasiddhiprakaraṇa' is none other than the chapter 'Jīvasiddhi' of SV. There is reference to *svataḥ-prāmāṇyabhaṅga* of Anantakīrti and a verse from *Yāśastilaka* of Somadeva.

Thus, such of these quotations stand to the finest erudition of Anantavīrya.

5. Additional points of comparative studies

Bṛhat-Saṁhitā :

Bṛhat-saṁhitā (501 A.D.) of Ācārya Varāhamihira, a well-known work on Astrology, says, while discussing the nature of mind, that : "ātmā saha itī manasā mana indriyeṇa.....etc., it is commented by Bhaṭṭotpala (Śaka 888=966 A.D.) : 'ayamarthaḥ ātmā manasā saha Yujyate manas-ca indriyeṇa indriyamarthena'. This is also referred to in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (I. 1-4) and in PVVT (p. 177). Jayantabhaṭṭa, too, refers to it in this way : 'ātmā manasā sanijuyate mana indriyeṇa indriyamarthena' in his *Nyayamañjarī* (p. 70); from the nature of the sentence, it seems that it is from a Nyāya work which was versified by Varāha Mihira. In *Nyāya-bhāṣya* this sentence runs in these words—'na tarhi idanīni idam bhavati' which shows that originally this sentence belonged to pre-Nyāya-bhāṣya work of the Nyāya school.

Two Aviddhakarṇas :

Aviddhakarṇa is one of the forgotten philosophers of India, about whom very little has been known. But due to the recent researches in Buddhology, we have the knowledge of two Aviddhakarṇas, as will be discussed here in brief.

One Aviddhakarṇa was a Naiyāyika, who commented on *Nyāya bhāṣya*¹ as suggested by Vādanyāya (p. 78). The following is a summary of the philosophical views held by Aviddhakarṇa.

1. *Dravya* is knowable even without the knowledge of *rūpa*.¹
2. The whole and the part are different succeeding each other.

¹ Vide Hindi Intro. for a exhaustive collection of references, p. 72-74

3. If the proposition is said to be meaningless, the application is also meaningless.
4. The objects perceived by one or two senses are the creations of an Intelligent Being.
5. The soul is eternal and all-pervasive.
6. Destruction is affected by the cause.
7. Atoms are eternal.
8. Number is an independent category of Quality.
9. Aggregation, continuity and specific conditions etc., are not inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*).
10. Conclusion is category itself.
11. *Upamāna* (comparison) is different from Āgama.
12. Besides *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference) there are other *pramāṇas* and *prameyas* (object) besides *svalakṣaṇa* (particular) and *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* (universal).
13. Cause and Effect are not simultaneous.
14. According to Buddhists, there is no permanent soul, hence there is no possibility of knowledge of concomitance (*avinābhāva*).

All these views strongly support the contention that Aviddhakarṇa was a Naiyāyika philosopher. It has been seen that Śāntarakṣita, the author of *Tattvasamgraha*, and his commentator Kamalaśīla flourished in 762 A.D., who quotes Aviddhakarṇa ; therefore, he must be placed before 762 A.D. The same is the case with Karṇagomi who quotes him.

The TPS (p. 57) refers to the eternalistic view of Ātman held by *Naiyāyika*, a fact which is expressly attributed to Aviddhakarṇa by Kamalaśīla in his *Tattva-samgrahapañjikā* (p 82) Further, Aviddhakarṇa is referred to by Dharmakīrti in his *Vādanyāya*. This is clear by the commentary on it by Śāntarakṣita. He refers to Aviddhakarṇa after Uddyotakara meaning thereby that the former flourished after Uddyotakara ; that is, he might be an elder contemporary of Dharmakīrti ; this contention is supported by TPS itself. Hence Aviddhakarṇa can be assigned to the period of 620-700 A.D.

In Addition to this Aviddhakarṇa, the PVVT refers to one more Aviddhakarṇa who was the exponent of Cārvāka philosophy since his theories are :

1. Even if *Anumāna* be accepted as *Pramāṇa* from empirical standpoint still the definition of probans (līṅga) is not possible¹.
2. *Pramāṇa* consists in cognising an object which is not yet cognised. So, there is no possibility of valid inference.²
3. *Pramāṇa* is non-subordinate whereas inference is subordinate³

Anantavīrya refers to this Aviddhakarṇa in SVT (p. 306) as : “*itarasya acetanasya vā bhūmyādeḥ mūrtasya (jñānam) anena Aviddhakarṇasya samayo darśitaḥ*”, i.e. *jñāna* is nothing but the modification of the matter as maintained by Aviddhakarṇa.

This Aviddhakarṇa must have been prior to Karṇagomi (8th A.D.), since the latter quotes him. While discussing the views of Aviddhakarṇa there occurs ‘*Pramāṇasyāgaṇatvāt*’ which is quoted by Jayantabhaṭṭa also (9th c. A.D.) attributing it to Cārvāka Philosophy⁴. The said sentence is named, ‘*Paurandarasūtra*. in *Syādvādaratnākara* (p. 265), implying the existence of a work so named. It is possible that the author of *Paurandharasūtra* was Aviddhakarṇa

On the basis of these reasons adduced, Aviddhakarṇa can be assigned to the eighth century A.D.

(c) *The date of Anantavīrya :*

We do not possess any sufficient material about the life of Anantavīrya. The colophons of the present work SVT speak of Anantavīrya as “*Ravibhadrapādopajīvi*”; it means that Ravibhadra was the name of his preceptor. Nothing is known about Ravibhadra as regards his genealogy. Hence we have mostly to depend upon the epigraphical evidences and references to Anantavīrya in other works. From the following inscriptions we get information about several Anantavīryas.

(1) From Peggur Kannaḍa inscription⁵ it is found that Anantavīrya was the grand disciple of Virasena, Siddhāntadeva and disciple of Goṇasena Pandita Bhaṭṭāraka⁶. He was the resident of Sribelgol. The king Rakkasa of Beddoregare had donated Peraggadūr and Nayikhai. This inscription is dated Śaka 899 (977 A.D.).

¹ PVVT, p. 19

² *ibid*, p. 25

³ *ibid* p. 25

⁴ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 108 PKM, p. 180.

⁵ JSL. Vol. II, P. 199.

⁶ *Ibid*.

(2) The name of Anantavīrya occurs in the Maroḷa inscription of Bijapur district of the Bombay (now Mysore) state. This belongs to the period of Chalukya Jayasimha II and Jagadeka Malla I (1024 A.D.). The names of Kamaladeva Bhaṭṭāraka, Vimuktavratindra, Siddhāntadeva, Anṇiya Bhaṭṭāraka, Prabhācandra and Anantavīrya are in the serial order. Anantavīrya had the knowledge of all the *sāstras* but was particularly well versed in Jaina philosophy, he had two disciples—Guṇakīrti Siddhānta Bhaṭṭāraka and Devakīrti Paṇḍita. He probably belongs to the Yāpanīyasamṅha or Sūrasthagaṇa¹.

(3) In an inscription of Mugad, the name of Anantavīrya is referred to. This belongs to the period of Someśvara I (1045 A.D.).² It refers to the donation to Govardhanadeva, the senior religious preceptor of Kumudagaṇa of Yāpanīyasamṅha for the contribution of Samyaktva-Ratnākara Chaityālaya. Anantavīrya is referred with Govardhanadeva; but nothing is said about their relationship. Kumārakīrti was the colleague of Anantavīrya and Dāmanandī was the disciple of Kumārakīrti.

This Dāmanandī seems to be the same as referred to in *Jaina Śilālekha saṃgraha* No. 55 as the disciple of Caturmukhadeva who was the Sadharmā of Ācārya Prabhācandra the contemporary of Dhārādhīpa Bhojarāja; Prabhācandra had defeated Viṣṇubhaṭṭa and Mahāvādī. The historical period of Dhārādhīpa Bhoja is generally accepted as 1014-1053 A.D. Though both the inscriptions differ in the name of the preceptors of Dāmanandī still in view of the consistency of dates of both the inscriptions, the identification is possible.

(4) The stone inscription³, found in the quadrangle of the Pancabasti at Humach, refers to Anantavīrya as the commentator (*Vṛttikāra*) of *Akalanīkasūtras*⁴. It is mentioned therein that he belongs to the Ācāryas of Nandisamṅha. The inscription belongs to the period of 1077 A.D. it mentions Kumārasenadeva, Mounideva and Vimalacandra Bhaṭṭāraka; it further refers to Vādirāja as *Ṣaṭtarkaṣaṇmukha*.

(5) The stone inscription⁵ of Parśvanāthasvāmī Basti Cāmoḥrājanagara refers to Anantavīrya as belonging to the Dravida Samṅha. It bears the date, Śaka 1039 (1117 A.D.).

¹ BKI. Vol. I, Pt. I, No. 61.

² JSI. P. 142, BKI, I. 1. 78.

³ JSL. Vol. II. P. 294.

⁴ Ibid P. 395.

⁵ Ibid. p. 387.

(6) The Niḍigi stone inscription¹ refers to Anantavīrya as the Sun to the lotus garden of Krāṇūragaṇa.² It bears the date, Śaka 1039 (1117 A.D.).

(7) The Kadambahalli inscription³ refers to Anantavīrya as “*Rāddhān-tāriṇavapārāga, ādi-cāru-cāritra bhūdhara*”⁴ belonging to Sūrasthagaṇa. His disciple was Bālacandramuni. The inscription bears the date Śaka 1040 (1118 A.D.).

(8) The Kalluraguḍḍa inscription⁵, dated Śaka 1043 (1127 A.D.) of Siddheśvaramandira refers to Anantavīrya as *Suddhākeṣarākārada*,⁶ belonging to the Ācāryas of Krāṇūragaṇa. It refers to Anantavīrya and Muniçandra as colleagues of Prabhācandra who had his lay disciple named Bhujabala-gaṅga Barmadeva. The latter had four sons : Mārasinga, Nanniyagaṅga Rakkasagaṅga and Bhujabalagaṅga. The date of donation by the Barma-deva is shown as Śaka 976 (1054 A.D.). It shows that Rakkasagaṅgadeva, the lay disciple of Anantavīrya donated during the same period of time⁷.

(9) The stone inscription of Someśvaramandira at Purale refers to Anantavīrya, the Siddhāntakāra Prabhācandra's colleague Ābhinavagaṇa-dhara.⁸ He is referred also in the list of Ācāryas belonging to the *krāṇūra-gaṇa* of Mulasangha. Its date is Śaka 1056 (1132 A.D.). This inscription suggests that the donation was granted at the instance of the disciple of Prabhācandra Siddhāntadeva in Śaka 989 (1069 A.D.).

(10) The Humach inscription⁹ refers to Anantavīrya Mahāvādi as the junior colleague of Śrīpāladeva.¹⁰ He belongs to Nandigaṇa of Drāviḍa saṅgha. It bears the date Śaka 1069 (1147 A.D.).

The examination of the above mentioned ten inscriptions presents to us three Anantavīryas of different lineage.

(i) Anantavīrya mentioned in No. 4 belonging to the tradition of lineage Nandigana Aruṅgalānvaya of Dravidasaṅgha. He

¹ JSL Vol. II. p. 392.

² Ibid. p. 395.

³ Ibid. p. 399.

⁴ Ibid. p. 399.

⁵ JSL. Vol. II. p. 408.

⁶ Ibid. p. 416.

⁷ Ibid. p. 452.

⁸ Ibid. p. 464.

⁹ JSL. Vol. III. p. 66.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 72.

is said to be the commentator of *Akalaṅkasūtras*. 5th and 10th hold one and the same Anantavīrya mentioned in No. 4. He was the junior colleague of Śrīpāladeva, the great grand teacher of Vādirāja. Vādirāja belongs to the period of 1025 A.D. His teacher might have been just fifty years before that is, 975 A.D. and to this period only Anantavīrya must have belonged. No. 1 refers to one Anantavīrya as the grand disciple of Virāṣena-Siddhantādeva and disciple of Goṇaśena. The names of the latter two Ācāryas are not found in the list of Krānūragana. Hence it appears that this Anantavīrya belonged to Drāvidasaṁgha and not to Krānūragana. This Anantavīrya is not different from the one mentioned in No. 4, 5 and 10.

- (ii) Anantavīrya belonging to the Sūrasthagaṇa, is referred to as *ādicāritrabhūdhara* in No. 7. This Anantavīrya cannot be the commentator of *Akalaṅkasūtras* because of different lineage.
- (iii) No. 6, 8 and 9 refer to one Anantavīrya of Krānūragana. No. 2 and 3 also refer to Anantavīrya belonging to Yāpānīyas-aṁgha. Therefore, it can be said that this Anantavīrya is identical with Anantavīrya of Krānūragana.

As we have already stated that Anantavīrya, the author of SVT is mentioned as '*Ravibhadrapādopajīvi*', i.e. the pupil of Ravibhadra; further this Anantavīrya has referred to the other Anantavīrya, who commented on SV of Akalaṅka prior to him, thus we have two commentators of SV of the same name.

But from the inscriptions, as stated just before, we have information about three different Anantavīryas. The problem of identification of these two commentators with the three referred to in above inscriptions remains to be solved. For the sake of differentiation we will refer to the first Anantavīrya as *ṛddha* Anantavīrya and the second simply as Anantavīrya. Anantavīrya referred to in No. 4 as the *Vṛttikāra* of Akalaṅka can be identified with *Ṛddha* Anantavīrya and also with Anantavīrya the author of the SVT assuming that he had two preceptors, one being Ravibhadra. It cannot be ascertained definitely as to which Anantavīrya the Humach inscription refers to. It will be proved in the following pages that Anantavīrya, the author of the present commentary SVT must have belonged to a period later than 959 A.D. and earlier than 1025 A.D. As the identification is doubtful, we have to rely upon other evidences for fixing the date of Anantavīrya.

1. Textual Evidences :

The name of Anantavīrya is referred to in several works which are discussed below :

(1) *Tattvārthavārtika* refers to Anantavīrya Yati¹. He must have been much earlier than Akalaṅka as is clear from '*pratighātaśruteḥ*'.

From the following evidences it can be definitely proved that there was a commentary by another Anantavīrya prior to the author of the present work. He refers to the previous commentator Anantavīrya by name while commenting on v. 5 in the following words : *nanvayamartho'nantarakārikā-vṛttāvuktaḥ, na ca punastasyaivābhidhāne sa eva samarthito nāma atiprasaṅgāt, kintu anyasmāt hetoḥ, sa cātra noktaḥ, tasmāt uktārtho'nantara-śloko'yaṁ itya-nantavīryaḥ*'.

- (a) It is clear from the above quotation that Anantavīrya differed from the explanation given by the previous Anantavīrya.
- (b) It can be definitely proved by other references suggestive of the difference of opinion as well as variant reading, that there was in existence another commentary written before the present volume and that must be the one of *vṛddha* Anantavīrya.
- (c) It is certain that the author of SVT has little regard for the previous Anantavīrya. Therefore, it seems that our author gives his own identity by the word *Ravibhadrapādopajīvī*.
- (2) In the benedictory verse he writes.

*"devasyānantavīryo'pi padam vyaktam tu sarvataḥ,
na jānīte'kalaṅkasya citrametat param bhuvi"*.

It is not surprising to see that Anantavīrya, with such infinite capacity, cannot understand Akalaṅka clearly.

(3) Vādirājasūri, eulogising Anantavīrya in *Pārśvanātha-carita* speaks of him as a mighty cloud to the fire of nihilism of the Buddhists. He has referred to Anantavīrya as a flood of light illuminating the words of Akalaṅka. We know that *Pārśvanātha-carita* was composed in Śaka 947 (1025 A.D.)².

(4) Ācārya Prabhācandra refers to Anantavīrya along with Akalaṅka with the same degree of reverence to Jinendra ; further, he respectfully expresses his debt to Anantavīrya in studying Akalaṅka³. Prabhācandra had composed NKC during the regime of Dhārādhirāja Jayasīmhadeva

¹ TV. p. 154.

² *Pārśvanātha-Carita*, *Prasasti*, v. 5.

³ NKC, p. 605.

(V. 1112 ; 1055 A.D.).¹ The date of Prabhācandra can be fixed in between 960 and 1020 A.D.²

(5) Śāntiācārya, while discussing the problem of perception in *Jainatarkavārtika-vṛtti* (p. 77), refers to such phrase, 'smṛtyūhādīkamityeke'. The views referred to Anantavīrya are found in SVT³ based on Akalaṅka-nyāya⁴. The date of Śāntiācārya has been fixed between V. S. 1050 and 1175 (993-1118 A.D.)⁵.

(6) Vādidevasūri in his *Syādvādaratnākara* (p. 350) while critically examining the doctrine of identity of *dhāraṇā* and *saṃskāra* held by the great Vidyānanda, refers to Anantavīrya's view on the same topic : '*Anantavīryo'pi tathā nirṇātasya kālāntare tathāiva smaraṇahetuḥ saṃskāro dhāraṇā iti tadevāvadaḥ*'. Similarly Devasūri in his *Kevalibhuktisamarthana*, refers to Anantavīrya as : '*anantavīrya-prabhṛtipraṇītāḥ kuḥetavaḥ kevalibhuktisiddhyai, anye'pi ye te'pi nivāraṇīyāḥ*'. He was in the Ācārya status in V. S. 1174 (1117 A.D.)⁶; the period of his activities can be said to be from V. S. 1174 (1117 A.D.) to V. S. 1226 (1169 A.D.); because, he happened to die during the reign of Rājaraṣi Kumārapāla. The view about KB which Vādidevasuri refers to Anantavīrya is not found in the present text SVT.

But so far as the theory of non-difference between *dhāraṇā* and *saṃskāra*, held by Akalaṅka⁷ and justified by Vidyānanda,⁸ is concerned we find such discussion in SVT, for instance, while commenting upon the first verse of the second chapter, he interpretes '*saṃskāratām yātyapi*' as '*dhāraṇātmikā bhavati*'⁹. Anantavīrya was also the exponent of the said doctrine referred to above. It seems, that the reference to *Kevalibhukti* to which Vādidevasuri had made, may be in Anantavīrya's *Pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya* or it may refer to other Anantavīrya.

(7) After Prabhācandra's work *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, the commentary on *Parikṣāsmukhasūtra* of Maṇikyanandi, there has been one Anantavīrya, who wrote *Parikṣāsmukha Poṇjīkā*, named *Prameyaratnamālā*; this

¹ His record of gift has been found belonging to the V. S. 1112; see also *Rāiā-Bhoia* by Viśveśvaranātha Reu, Pp. 102-3.

² Vide NKC, vol. II, Intro. p. 48.

³ SVT, p. 223.

⁴ LTV, v. 61.

⁵ JTVV, Intro. k. 151.

⁶ *Jaina Sahityano Itihāsa*, p. 248.

⁷ LTV, v. 5.

⁸ TSLV, p. 220.

⁹ SVT, p. 120.

pañjikā is written for Śāntisena at the request of Hīrap, the beloved son of Vaijeya. The author of the *Pañjikā* refers to Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtanḍu* in these words. "*Prabhenduvacanodāracandrikāprasare satī*" therefore, we can say that he must be posterior to Prabhācandra (980-1015 A.D.) and obviously must be a different person from Anantavīrya, quoted by Prabhācandra, as the commentator of *Akalaṅka*. Pt. Āśādhara, in the *Svopajñātikā* on *Anagāradharmāmṛta*, quotes the benedictory verse of *Prameyaratnamālā*. He completed the *Anagāradharmāmṛta* in V. Samvat 1300 (1243 A.D.)¹. Hence, we can say that Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameyaratnamālā* belongs to the period of 1065-1243 A.D. His *Prameyaratnamālā* seems to have influenced Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* here and there². Hemacandra belongs to the period of 1088-1173 A.D.³, that is to say, that Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameyaratnamālā*, must be a scholar of eleventh century A.D., hence he must be altogether a different person from his namesake, the commentator of SV.

(8) Kavicakravartī Malliṣeṇa had completed his *Mahāpurāṇa* in Śaka Samvat 969 (1047 A.D.)⁴; he respectfully refers to Anantavīrya in the introductory part of his work⁵.

(9) Abhayacandrasūri in the commentary known as *Syādvādashūṣaṇa* on *Laghyastraya* refers to Anantavīrya with the adjective "*Jinendra*"; he had written this vṛtti after going through the *Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra, as is clear from his references such as "*Akalaṅka prabhāvyaṅgam*" etc. His date according to Pt. Nāthūrāma Premi's calculation, lies at the beginning of the thirteen century⁶. He is later than Prabhācandra (11th c. A.D.).

(10) Sāyaṇa Mādhavācārya, the author of *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*, in his examination of *Saptabhaṅgī* in the section dealing with Ārṇata-Darśana, refers to Anantavīrya in these words: "*tatsarvamanantavīryaḥ pratyapīpadat*". Further he writes "*tadvidhānavivakṣyām Syādstīti gatiṛbhavet, Syānnāstīti prayogaḥ syāttanniṣedhe vivakṣite*"; etc. but these verses are not found in SVT; nor do we find any discussion of the *Saptabhaṅgī*; it can be said that Sāyaṇamādhavācārya is quoting from some work of Anantavīrya which does not bear any relation whatsoever with the present work (SVT); so

¹ AD, p. 691.

² PM Notes, NKC, vol. II, Intro. p. 35.

³ PM Intro. p. 43.

⁴ JSI, p. 315.

⁵ K. B. Pathak, Art. in ABORI, XII. 40, p. 373.

⁶ LTS. Intro p. 5.

it can be surmised that either it belonged to the other Anantavīrya or to the other work of Anantavīrya, the author of SVT. It will be shown in the following pages that there is one work, *Pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya*, written by Anantavīrya which includes a chapter on *Saptabhaṅgi*; may be, the verses referred to above are from this work. The period of Sayanācārya is Śake 1312 (1390 A.D.)¹.

From the foregoing discussion emerge out the following Anantavīryas :

- (i) Anantavīryayati referred by Akalaṅka in his *Tattvārthavārtika*.
- (ii) Anantavīrya quoted by Ravibhadrāpāḍipāṇi i.e., Anantavīrya, the commentator of SV of Akalaṅka.
- (iii) Anantavīrya, the author of the present commentary on *Siddhiviniścaya*.
- (iv) Lastly, Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameyaratnamālā* who refers to PKM of Prabhācandra. Out of these four Anantavīryas, the one referred to by Akalaṅka in his TV, the first of all his works, must be a prior Ācārya to Akalaṅka himself, naturally he cannot be the *Akalaṅka-Sūtravṛttikāra* referred in the above mentioned inscription.

It has been seen already that *Prameyaratnamālā* was written by Anantavīrya at the request of Hīrap²; this author is definitely later than Prabhācandra, the author of *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa*. The commentator Anantavīrya, the author of SVT who is gratefully remembered by Prabhācandra is a certainly different person from Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameyaratnamālā*, who himself seems to be much obliged to Prabhācandra. Now the problem remains in regard to *vṛddha* Anantavīrya and Anantavīrya, the author of SVT. As regards the *vṛddha* Anantavīrya we do not have any work at all; naturally nothing can be said about his works and age etc. in the absence of any positive evidence about him, all that can be said is that he is referred to in SVT by Anantavīrya and that the way of examining his views show that he must have been a senior contemporary of Anantavīrya.

About the Anantavīrya referred to by Śāntyācārya, Vāḍidevasūri and Śāyaṇamādhavācārya in their respective works, we are not in any better position to say as to which of the two commentators they are referring, *vṛddha* Anantavīrya or Anantavīrya. It can be seen that out of these two

¹ *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, Intro. p. 33.

² *Vaijeyapriyaputrasya Hīrapasyoparodhataḥ Śāntiśeṇārthamārabdhvā Parikṣāmukha-Pañjikā. (Prameyaratnamālā Prastāvi)*

commentators, Anantavīrya refers to himself as *Ravibhadrapādopajivi*; suggestive of his distinctness from *vrddha* Anantavīrya.

In order to determine the date of Anantavīrya it is essential to rely upon the internal evidences of SVT. The following comparative study will help us determine the age of Anantavīrya, the author of SVT.

Vidyānanda :

Ācārya Anantavīrya quotes : '*ūho matinibandhanah*', in SVT (p. 189). This sentence occurs in TSLV (I. 13. 99) of Vidyānanda in this form : '*samāvopachhidūho'tra mānam malinibandhanah*'. In the present work SVT (p. 6) the author refers to some '*svayūthya*'¹ according to whom '*śraddhāketūhalotpāda*' is deemed as the purpose of *ādivākya*; the refutation of this is quoted in SVT taken from TSLV with the word '*apare*'. Therefore we can say that the works of Vidyānanda must have been before our Anantavīrya. Hence Anantavīrya cannot be prior to 850 A.D.

Ācārya Vālidevasūri in his SR (p. 350), commenting upon Vidyānanda's contention of the non-difference between *dhāraṇā* and *saṁskāra* refers to Anantavīrya as repeating the same view '*tadevāvadat*'. Hence it can be rightly said that Anantavīrya is posterior to Vidyānanda, or, in other words Anantavīrya belongs to the tradition of Vidyānanda's school of thought.

Anantakīrti :

Laghusarvajñasiddhi (LSS) and *Brhatsarvajñasiddhi* of Anantakīrti are published in *Laghūyastrayādi-saṁgraha*; a careful reading will convince that Anantakīrti was a renowned scholar of his time. In his *sarvajñasiddhi*; he has refuted the Brahmanic tradition of *apaureṣayatva* of the Vedas; he established the validity of the Canons taught only by the omniscient person. In the *pūrvapakṣa* of the section dealing with omniscience (BSS, Pp. 131-142) he refers to 64 verses in order beginning with '*yajjātīyairḥ pramāṇaistu*'; the same verses are quoted by Śāntisūri in his NVVV in the same order; out of these verses some belong to MSLV, PV, and TS Śāntisūri, in NVVV (p. 77) quotes '*svapnavijñānam yat spaṣṭamutpadyate ityanantakīrtya-dayah*' by which he refers to Anantakīrti's view that dream-knowledge is the same as mental perception. This is the view held by Anantakīrti, the author of BSS, in these words : '*tathā svapnaujñāne cānakṣaje*'pi *vaiśadyamupalabhyate*'² The period of Śāntisūri lies, according to Pt. Dalsukha Malvania, some where in the middle of 993-1162³.

¹ SVT, p. 6.

² BSS, p. 151.

³ NVVV, Intro. p. 151.

The date of Prabhācandra, the author of PKM and NKC is fixed from 980 A.D. to 1065 A.D.¹ Prabhācandra has copied almost verbatim from BSS of Anantakīrti, in the chapter on *Śarvajñasiddhi* in his works NKC and PKM. The last pages of BSS (Pp. 181-208), with little variation, have almost the identical appearance with the chapter on *mukṭivāda* of NKC (Pp. 838-847); even casual reading will show as if one is copied from the other. It appears to me that it is NKC that is developed on the lines of BSS; because, Śāntisūri, the contemporary of Prabhācandra refers to Anantakīrti.

Abhayadevasūri, the commentator of *Sanmati-tarka*, was contemporary of Dhārādhipati Muñja; his date, according to Pt. Sukhalalji, lies in the last quarter of the 10th c. and the first quarter of eleventh centuries of Vikrama¹. Abhayadevasūri, in chapter on *Śarvajñasiddhi* in *Sanmati-tarka* gives the main arguments in the same terms as those of *Śarvajñasiddhi* and also quotes *kārika*.

“*nakṣatrāgrahapañjaramaharniṣam lokakarmavikṣiptam
bhramati subhāsubhamakhilam prakāśayatpūrvajanmakṛtām*”

which is found with some other verse in BSS (p. 176); one thing becomes clear that there is influence of one over the other. From the evidence of Śāntasūri's quotation it can be proved that Anantakīrti must be earlier than 990 A.D., it is also probable that the contents of BSS might have been borrowed by the author of *Sanmati-tarkaṭikā*.

Ācārya Vādirāja in his *Pārśvanātha-carita* refers to Anantakīrti in the following terms :

*ātmanaiivādviṭiyena jīvasuddhim nibhadhntā,
anantakīrtinā mukṭirātrimārgeva lakṣyate,—v. 24.*

From this it can be inferred that he wrote a treatise named *Jīvasiddhi*. Pt. Nathuram Premi conjectures that Anantakīrti must have written a commentary on Samantabhadras' *Jīvasiddhi* which is quoted by Jinasena. Vādirājasuri relies on the same main arguments which are found in BSS of Anantakīrti; he is the same Anantakīrti who is referred by Vādirāja in *Pārśvanātha-carita*.

2. Epigraphical evidences :

The stone inscription of Candragiri² hills refers to Anantakīrti as the grand disciple of Meghacandra Traividya of Pustakagaccha, Desigana and


¹ NKC, vol. II, Intro. Pp. 48-58.

² JSI, p. 404.

Mulasarṅgha and disciple of Viranandi Traividya; he is described as well-versed in debates and learned in Śyadvāda philosophy. The inscription bears the date 1235 (1313 A.D.)¹; it also refers to the death of Śubhacandra, the disciple of Rāmacandra of the same tradition. The inscription No. 47² bears the date of the death of Meghacandra Traividya as Mārgasīrṣa Śuddha 14 Śaka 1037 (1115 A.D.).

Inscription No. 50 gives the date of the demise of Prabhācandra, the disciple of Meghacandra as 'āśvina śuddha daśami' Śaka 1068 (1146 A.D.); it also refers to two disciples of Meghacandra: Prabhācandra and Viranandi.³ It is shown that Meghacandra's disciple Prabhācandra caused *Mahāpūjā-Pratiṣṭhā* in Śaka 1041 (1118 A.D.)⁴.

Thus the Ācāryas of the tradition, referred to in the inscriptions will be of the order.



Plainly speaking Anantakīrti was the grand disciple of Meghacandra Traividya who died in 1115 A.D.; hence Anantakīrti can be assigned to the 12th c. A.D. obviously, Anantakīrti is decidedly a different person from his namesake referred to in *Pārśvanāth-carita* (1025 A.D.); if the age of those Ācāryas be supposed to be about one hundred and twentyfive years, disciples and grand disciples might be contemporaries; in that case, Anantavīrya referred to in the inscriptions could be identical with his namesake referred in *Pārśvanāth-carita*. But this push and pull theory is inadequate in this case.

The Śāntinātha Basadi at Bāndhavanagara was built in c. 1207 A.D. when king Brahmā of Kadamba dynasty was ruling. The temple was in charge of Anantakīrti Bhaṭṭāraka of *Tintindikagachha* of *Kṛāṇūragana*⁵ who is different from his namesake of Pustakagachha Desigana; he is also different from Anantakīrti, the author of *Jīvasiddhi*. The Cikkamāgaḍi inscription⁶ of Basavaṇṇamandira belongs to the 23rd year of Hoysala Vīra Ballāla (about c. 1212 A.D.). This inscription refers to the voluntary

¹ JSL. p. 30.

² Ibid, p. 64.

³ Ibid, p. 80.

⁴ JSL. p. 39.

⁵ B. A. Saletore, *Medieval Jainism*, p. 209.

⁶ JSL, vol. III, p. 232.

death of Jakkale ; it also mentions Anantakīrti as the preceptor of Jakkale, who may be identical with one mentioned as the head of Śāntinātha Basadi of Bāndhavanagara, since both belong to the same period.

Pt. Nathuram Premi believes that Anantakīrti might be prior to Vādirāja (1025 A.D.) and later than Jinasena ; for, Anantakīrti is mentioned after Jinasena (783 A.D.) by Vādirāja¹. We found from the comparison of Prabhācandra and Śāntisūrī with Anantakīrti that Anantakīrti's later period of life is definitely the same period as that of Prabhācandra which, in turn, coincides with the time limit of Vādirāja. Therefore, it is appropriate to fix the upper limit for Anantakīrti at 980 A.D. and the lower limit can be fixed in the light of the comparison of statements by Vidyānanda and Anantakīrti ; they are :

Vidyānand's TSLV

1. *sūkṣmādyarthopadeśo hi
tat-sāṅgāt-kartṛpūrvakah
Paropadeśalingākṣāṇapekṣā-
vitathatvataḥ*—p. 11

2. *svasambandhi yadidaṁ syād
vyabhicāripayonidheḥ
ambhaḥkumbhādi-samīkhyānaih
sadbhirajñāyamānakaih*—p. 13

Anantakīrti's BSS

1. *sūkṣmāntaritatadūrvārthāḥ kasyacit
pratyakṣāḥ anupadeśalingānanvaya-
vyatirekapūrvakāvīsamivādinaṣṭamu-
ṣṭicintālābhālābhasukhaduḥkhaḥ
grahoparāgādyupadeśakaraṇānyathā-
nupapatteḥ*—p. 130
2. *Pramāṇapañcakābhavalakṣaṇo'bhā-
vaḥ samudrodakaparisaṁīkhyānena
anaikāntikah*—LSS, p. 113

Similarly it may be mentioned that the trend of arguments of both the sections on *Sarvajñāsiddhi* and *Āptaparīkṣā* of Vidyānanda is the same.

Just as Ratnākaraśānti wrote *Kṣāṇabhāṅga-siddhi*, *Avayavinirākarāṇa* etc. in 10th c. A.D. ; so also Anantakīrti wrote *Jīvasiddhi*, *Laghusarvajñāsiddhi* and *Bṛhatsarvajñāsiddhi*.

Ācārya Anantavīrya refers to Anantakīrti's *Svataḥ-prāmāṇyabhāṅga* in his SVT (p. 234) ; the present text SVT (p. 708) refers to '*anupadeśalingā'-vyabhicārīnaṣṭamuṣṭyādyupadeśānyathānupapatteḥ*', following the method of Anantakīrti's BSS (p. 130) and LSS (p. 107). So far as our knowledge of Jaina literature goes, it can be said that it is the author of *Svataḥ-prāmāṇyabhāṅga* is the same as that of LSS and BSS of Anantakīrti. It is shown above that Anantakīrti belongs to the period between 840 A.D. and 980 A.D. Similarly, there is no wrong in fixing the date of Anantavīrya, the disciple of Ravibhadra in between 950 A.D. and 990 A.D.

¹ JSI, p. 404.

Somadeva :

Anantavīrya quotes (SVT, p. 260) the following with the word 'taduktam' in a chapter dealing with Karmabandha :

*eṣo'ham mama karma śarma harate tadbandhanānyāśravaiḥ,
te krodhādīvaśāḥ pramāḍajanitāḥ krodhādayaste'vratāt,
mithyājñānakṛtattato'smi satatam samyaktvavān savrataḥ,
dakṣaḥ kṣīṇakaṣyayoga-tapasām karteti mukto yatih—YST, p. 246*

the same idea is voiced in Guṇabhadra's *Ātmānusāsana* (v. 241) :

*asatyātmā stimitādibandhanagataḥ tad-bandhanānyāśravaiḥ,
te krodhādīkṛtāḥ pramāḍajanitāḥ krodhādayaste'vratāt,
mithyātvopacitāt sa eva samalaḥ kālādilabdhan kvacit,
samyaktvavratadakṣatākaluṣatāyogaiḥ kramānmucyate.*

Thus, there is not only a vivid comparison of ideas but so much of identical expression. The birth-date of the author of *Ātmānusāsana* is Śaka 740 (818 A.D.) and his period of activities extends upto 900 A.D.¹ Somadeva had completed his work *Yasastilaka-Campu* on Caitra Śuddha 13, Śaka 881 (959 A.D.) which is clear from his Praśasti¹. Hence, it can be said, with good certainty, that it is Guṇabhadra's verse that is transferred and transformed into *Yasastilaka*. Somadeva says 'iti ca subhāṣitamāsvanite nidhāya', after the verse cited above, meaning thereby that he is quoting some author but with some alteration. The SVT quotes this modified verse. Besides this version, Somadeva seems to have quoted 'pariṇāmameva kāranamāhuḥ' (v. 44) from *Ātmānusāsana* in his YST (p. 336) with slight alteration, i.e. he uses the word 'kuśalaḥ' in place of 'prājñāḥ' and so on.

On the strength of the modified quotation taken by SVT, we can fix the lower limit of Anantavīrya to be 960 A.D. On the basis of this it can be definitely said that Anantavīrya referred by Vādirāja in *Pārsvanātha-carita* is none other than the author of SVT; further, it was but proper for him to refer to him because, according to Humach inscription he was the colleague of Śrīpāl, the grand teacher of Vādirāja. Vādirāja had completed the *Pārsvanātha-carita* in Śaka 947 (1025 A.D.); then his grand teacher, if he be at least fifty years senior, should belong to 975 A.D.

In the light of these evidences the age of Anantavīrya can be fixed as extending from 950-990 A.D. This date is substantially supported by epigraphical evidences too.

¹ JSI, p. 141.

Briefly, the discussion can be summarised as below :

1. The age of Akalaṅka has been fixed as 720-780 A.D. ; so his commentator Anantavīrya must be later than this period.
2. Anantavīrya quotes Vidyānanda who flourished in 840 A.D.
3. Anantavīrya quotes *svataḥ-Prāmānya-bhaṅga* (840-950 A.D.) written after Vidyānanda, i.e. after 840 A.D.
4. Somadeva's YST (959 A.D.) is quoted by Anantavīrya.
5. Humach inscription refers to Anantavīrya as the colleague of the grand teacher of Vādirāja who flourished in 1025 A.D. ; hence it can be said that the grand teacher Śrīpāla and his colleague Anantavīrya lived in 975 A.D. i.e., fifty years before Vādirāja. On the strength of these proofs *Anantavīrya can be assigned to 950-990 A.D.*

3. Critique of Conflicting Views :

Dr. A. N. Upadhye, subjecting the view of Dr. K. B. Pathak¹ to critical examination, writes : "In his recent paper on Dharmakīrti and Bhāmaha, Dr. K. B. Pathak refers to Anantavīrya as a commentator of *Parīkṣāmukha* of Māṇikyanandi and also as the author of a commentary on the *Nyāyaviniścaya* of Akalaṅkadeva. Finally he concludes that this Anantavīrya belonged to the close of the tenth century A.C. from the facts that he is referred to by Vādirāja who wrote in Śaka 947 (1025 A.C.), by Mallīṣena in his *Mahāpurāṇa* written in Śaka 969 (1047 A.C.) and also by Nagara Inscription of Śaka 999 (1077 A.C.). With due deference to the learned scholar one has to say that there has been a gross misrepresentation and puzzle of facts in his remarks and his conclusion about the date is an illustration of loose logic".² With these remarks about Dr. K. B. Pathak, Dr. Upadhye concludes that : "So far as my knowledge of Jaina literature goes, I do not know of any commentary on that (NV) work by Anantavīrya"². Further, that Anantavīrya, the commentator of SV is different from his namesake, the author of *Prameyaratna-mālā*. Dr. Upadhye guesses the date of Anantavīrya as "though the exact date of Anantavīrya is still a desideratum this much is certain that he flourished some time after Akalaṅka (*circa* last quarter of the seventh century at the latest"³.)

Dr. Upadhye's suspicion about the possibility and availability of a commentary on NV of Anantavīrya is not without its worth. It is proved beyond any shadow of doubt that Anantavīrya, the disciple of Ravibhadra,

¹ ABORI, vol. XII, p. 373.

² ABORI, vol. XIII, Pt. ii, p. 161. ³ Ibid, p. 165

is altogether a different person from Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameyaratnamālā*. But the date of *Ravibhadrapādopajīvi* Anantavīrya suggested by him seems to be unacceptable in the light of the available evidences today; this has been sufficiently clarified in the preceding pages. The fact that Akalaṅka was a renowned teacher of 720-780 A.D. i.e., the last quarter of 8th century A.D. cannot enable us to suppose that his commentator belonged to the last quarter of the seventh century. I have proved that Anantavīrya, the disciple of Ravibhadra, belonged to the period of 950-990 A.D.¹ this conclusion is in harmony with the conclusion of Dr. Pathak; hence it seems impossible to hold that he belonged to the last quarter of the 8th century A.D. About *Vṛddha* Anantavīrya, only this much, can be said that he probably belonged to the earlier part of ninth or tenth century A.D. But it cannot be said about Anantavīrya, the author of SVT, that he belonged to a period prior to the last quarter of tenth century A.D. It is also proved that Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameyaratna-mālā* was a scholar of the eleventh century A.D.

Dr. Upadhye seems to rely upon the identification of Prabhācandra mentioned in *Ādipurāṇa* (858 A.D.) with his namesake, the author of NKC. It may be said, with due deference to his exemplary service, that Dr. Upadhye commits the mistake of identifying one with the other of the same name.

It should be noted here that Pt. Kailashcandraji has proved, with strong evidences, that Dhārānīvāsi Prabhācandra the author of NKC, is different from Prabhācandra, the author of *Candrodaya*, who is referred to by Jināsena in his *Ādipurāṇa*. The date of Prabhācandra, the author of NKC, is proved to be 980-1065 A.D.¹ So on the strength of Prabhācandra mentioned in *Ādipurāṇa* we cannot fix the date of Anantavīrya; but, to solve this problem we will have to take into consideration the date of the other Prabhācandra.

Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusan maintained that Anantavīrya had written a *vr̥tti* on NV and that Śāntisena and Śāntisūri were identical; on this identification he fixed the date of Anantavīrya, the author of *Prameyaratnamālā* to be 11th c. A.D.

Dr. Vidyābhusan's contentions are rightly refuted by Dr. Upadhye, except the time limit of Anantavīrya fixed by him, which is found to be correct as discussed above.

¹ NKC, vol. II, Intro, pp. 48-58.

(d) *Works of Anantavīrya*

Besides SVT, Anantavīrya seems to have written one more valuable work viz., *Pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya* or *Pramāṇasaṃgrahāṇkārā*. Wherever he does not intend to dwell more than necessary in SVT, he hints at the work *Pramāṇasaṃgraha bhāṣya* for detailed study, a fact which is supported by such words 'caritatī', 'vyākhyātā', 'uktam' etc. It is clear that *Pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya* was written before SVT. *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*¹ is too difficult to follow. The quotations, attributed to Anantavīrya and referred to by the authors of *syādvādaratnākara* and *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* which are not found in SVT may be from *Pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya* of Anantavīrya.

¹ Published in *Akalanīkagranthatraya*, Singlhi Jaina Series.

3. A CRITICAL STUDY OF SV, SVV AND SVT

(a) The author of SV and SVV: Akalaṅka:

Anantavīrya, the commentator of SV eulogises Akalaṅka with the adjective 'Jinendra' in the opening verses of the present work SVT, and pledges to comment on SV; besides, the following verses of SVT bespeak of Akalaṅkas' praise in glowing terms. Vidyānanda quotes SV (IX. 2): *śabdaḥ pudgalaparyāyaḥ* attributing it to Akalaṅka, in TSLV (p. 424) Vādirāja in his NVV mentioned SV as the work of Deva, i.e. Akalaṅka:

*etadeva svayaṁ devairuktaṁ siddhiviniścaya,
pratyāsattyaśayaikyam syāt¹*

Vādirājasūri, the author of *Syādvādaratnākara* (p. 641), explicitly refers to Akalaṅka as the author of SV: '*yadāḥ Akalaṅkaḥ Siddhiviniścaya—varṇa-samudayaḥ padamiti*'.

Evidently, Akalaṅka is the author of SV and SVV, since the references are self-expressive of the existence of SV and SVV of Akalaṅka.

(b) Historical background of the title of the work:

It is a tradition of long standing to have the titles of the works ending with 'viniścaya'; e.g. *Tiloyapaṇṇatti* (TP) (5th c. A.D.) frequently refers to a work '*Lokaviniścaya*'.² May be³, Akalaṅka, following this practice, named his works on Nyāya as *Nyāyaviniścaya* and *Siddhiviniścaya*; it has been already referred to the fact that there was a work named *Siddhiviniścaya* by Ārya Śivasvāmi of *Yāpanīyasamgha*,⁴ who flourished before Akalaṅka. But the chief source of inspiration for entitling his work with the suffix 'viniścaya' is *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti, in spite of Akalaṅka's different tradition from Buddhists. The works of the epoch-making philosopher, Dharmakīrti and his disciples and followers, have directly or indirectly provoked Akalaṅka to build his own system of logic, known as *Akalaṅkanyāya*, against the severe attacks of Buddhists.

(c) General outlines of the SV and SVV:

The SV contains twelve chapters, mostly dealing with epistemological concepts such as—*Pramāṇa*, *Naya* and *Nikṣepa* etc., the gist of which are given in the following pages.

¹ NVV. Vol. I p. 168.

² TP, IV, 1866, 1975, 1982, 2028; V. 68, 129, 167; VII. 203; VIII. 270, 386; IX. 9 etc.

³ TP, vol. II, Intro. p. 12.

⁴ *Infra* p. 59.

1. *Pratyākṣasiddhi*: The topics brought under discussion are the nature of *Pramāṇa*, the result of *Pramāṇa*, the proof of external objects, the validity and conspicuity of conceptual cognition (*savikalpa*), rejection of the validity of indeterminate perception, refutation of the indeterminate nature of self-cognisance, the establishment of valid knowledge on the strength of wide, not whole, application of non-discrepancy, the possibility of *mati* and *śruti* knowledge etc., without the application of words ; and so on.

2. *Savikalpasiddhi*: The description of *avagraha* (perception) etc., examination of mental perception, determinate (*savikalpa*) knowledge is not the resultant of indeterminate (*nīrvikalpa*) one ; each cognitive member of *avagraha* etc. (in order) is the cognitive organ and each succeeding member as the resultant ; impossibility of knowing other person if the Buddhist view is accepted etc.

3. *Pramāṇāntarasiddhi*: Establishment of recollection and recognition as separate *pramāṇa*, inclusion of comparison in recognition, justification of *tarka* as *pramāṇa*, the impossibility of the action in the philosophy of flux, justification of *utpāda* (creation) *vyaya* (destruction) and *sthiti* (subsistence), destruction as the creation of other modification, the establishment of eternity and identity-cum-difference of substance and modifications.

4. *Jīvasiddhi*: Mithyājñāna, the result of the operation of knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) Karmas, causal efficiency, continuum etc. untenable in momentariness, with respect to bondage *jīva* and *ajīva* are one though differing essentially in their nature, the causes of influx of Karmas, disbelief in *prajñāsat* and *prajñaptisat*, criticism of *Tattvopaplava* philosophy, refutation of *bhūtacaitanyavāda* (materialism), Nyāya-conception of soul, criticism of *sāṃkhya* theory of *tattvas*, the bondage of *Karmas* with the formless *śūnyatā*, the identity-cum-difference of *jñāna* etc. and *ātman*.

5. *Jalpasiddhi*: The nature of Disputation or wrangling (*jalpa*), the four-limbs of it, the connotation of *śabda*, *śabda* is not necessarily the indication of intention, criticism of the occasion of censure (*nigrahasthāna*) due to the statement of other than an essential condition of proof etc., definition of *jaya* (victory) and *parājaya* (defeat).

6. *Hetulakṣaṇa-siddhi*: The otherwise impossibility is the characteristic of reason invariable, concomitance is not conditioned by identity (*tādātmya*) and Causation (*tadutpatti*) only, justification of division of *hetu* (reason) ; justification of *pūrvacara* (prior), *uttaracara* (posterior) and *sahacara* (simultaneous), the possibility of *sattva hetu* etc. only in the *Anekānta* Philosophy.

7. *Sāstrasiddhi* : The value of *śruta* in spiritual path, the signification of *śabda*, the consciousness of Jiva while asleep, error of Jivas due to the rise of Karmas, refutation of theism, criticism of Nyāya conception of *mokṣa*, the possibility of par excellence of knowledge in man, non-discrepancy of *Syādvāda*, repudiation of *apauruṣeyatva* of *Veda* etc.

8. *Sarvajñasiddhi* : Knowledge of imperceptible things also is possible, *vaktṛtva* etc. are not contradictory with omniscience, proof of omniscience on the basis of non-contradictory reasons, the impossibility of omniscience in the Sāṅkhya theory—omniscience is the result of the total destruction of knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) Karmas etc.

9. *Śabdasiddhi* : the material nature of word, its nature of aggregation as shadow and light, the relation of the word and the meaning, word connotes particular object, significance of words even to establish the illusory nature of all things, if the particular is not signified by the word, it will become imperceptible, if the word denotes only the intention, there will be no discrimination between right and wrong, the discussion on the expression 'eva', refutation of *sphoṭa*.....etc.

10. *Arthanayasiddhi* : *naya* is the standpoint of the knower, it is also *pramāṇa*, two fundamental *nayas*, *Nirapekṣa Naya* (absolute) is *mithyā* (false), *Naigama-naya* (non-analytical), Sāṅkhya theory—a *Naigamā-bhāsa* (fallacy of *Naigama*), *saṁgraha naya* (collective) and its fallacy, *Vyavahāra-naya* (practical or empirical), *Ṛju-sūtra-naya* (immediate).....etc.

11. *Śabdanayasiddhi* : The discussion of the nature of *śabda*, refutation of *sphoṭa* (doctrine of phonetic explosion), rejection of the eternalistic view of the word—*śabdanaya*, description of *samabhirūḍhanaya* and *evamībhūtanaya* etc.

12. *Nikṣepasiddhi* : The nature of *nikṣepa* (aspect or imposition). Its four divisions are : *Nāma* (name), *Sthāpanā* (picture), *Dravya* and *Bhāva*. The first three are related to *Dravyāstika* and *bhāva* with *Paryāyāstika*.

The topics discussed in SV and SVV and other allied topics are elaborately discussed by Anantavīrya in SVT.

(d) *The style of SV and SVV* :

It has been discussed more than once that Akalaṅka became an unflagging logician after a period of his career as an expositor of tradition ; his logical dissertations stand by themselves for their rigid, compact and complicated style. Anantavīrya as has been found already, expresses his inability to follow Akalaṅka. He also refers to it (SV) as '*sūkti-sadratnākara*'¹. Vādirāja and Prabhācandra also express their inability

¹ SVT. p. 1.

to understand the works of Akalaṅka, a fact which is not mere expression of courtesy but a statement of truth and honesty.

The central interest of SV consists in criticising Dharmakīrti and his commentators, as is clear from the fact that almost one-third of the text is devoted for the purpose, at the same time other schools of thought such as Cārvāka, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya-yoga etc. are brought under critical examination.

Akalaṅkas' pointed references to other systems display not only the caustic remarks, but also embody the proverbial, idiomatic, illustrative and axiomatic statements full of wit and humour, intellect and insight; such as—*anātmajñātā, antargadū, andhayaṣṭikalpa, amalāliḍḍha, aślīlamevākulam, mastake śṛṅgām, rājapathikṛta, śilāplava, mūṣikālarakaviśavikāra*, . His works are the signal proofs of his acute and profound study of other systems; particularly of Buddhism. He expresses a lot in a few chosen words and phrases, which are above the level of the understanding of common readers. The main target of his searching criticism are Pramāṇavārtika and other works; casually he refers to other schools of Buddhism; but the outstanding example of his pungent criticism is in the context of refutation of Kumārila, who criticises the theory of omniscience.

(e) *The style of SVT*:

Anantavīrya explains and expands the original words of SV and SVV of Akalaṅka with a view to estimate and evaluate the criticism of other systems by Akalaṅka. Prabhācandra's expression

*trailokyodaravartivastuviṣayajñānaprabhāvodayaḥ,
duṣprāpō'pyakalaṇḍavasaraṇiḥ prāpto'trapuṇyodayāt,
svabhyastaśca vivecitaśca satatam so'nantavīryoktitaḥ,
bhūyānme nayanitidattamanasaḥ tad-bodhasiddhipradaḥ*—NKC p. 605

prove the value of Anantavīrya's commentary on Akalaṅka's works. Vādirāja too expresses his gratefulness to Anantavīrya whom he compares to a beacon-light so far as the studies in Akalaṅka are concerned¹.

Anantavīrya composes poetic prose bordering on *Campū* to explain the meaning of some sentences; of course, the formidable difficulty of rigid style of Akalaṅka is not easily overcome; even then Anantavīrya deserves the highest compliment for his illuminating commentary; besides he was a great terminologist.

There are several popular *proverbs* used in the SVT².

¹ *Vyañjayatyalamantavīryavāgḍipavartiranīṣaṁ pade-pade*—NVV, Intro. p. 1.

² Vide Hindi Intro. Pp. 93-4 for details.

(f) *Analysis of the Subject Matter :*

We propose now to discuss in detail the problems raised in SV, SVV and SVT bringing out the line of development of ideas in Indian logic in general and those in Jain logic in particular. The problems dealt with in all the chapters of SV etc. will be briefly discussed under four heads : 1. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 2. *Prameya-mīmāṃsā*, 3. *Naya-mīmāṃsā* and 4. *Nikṣepa-mīmāṃsā*.

1. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* includes *Pratyakṣa-siddhi savikalpasiddhi, sarva-jñāsiddhi, Pramāṇāntarasiddhi* and *Hetūlakṣaṇasiddhi*.
2. *Prameyamīmāṃsā* includes *Jīvasiddhi* and *śabdāsiddhi*.
3. *Nayamīmāṃsā* includes *Arthanayasiddhi*, and *śabdanaya-siddhi*.
4. *Nikṣepamīmāṃsā* discusses the summary of *Nikṣepasiddhi*.

1. *Pramanamimamsa*(i) *The Soul and the Knowledge :*

Before dwelling on the discussion of *pramāṇa* it seems necessary to bring out the relationship between *ātman* and *jñāna*. At the outset, it can be said that all the systems of Indian Philosophy, with the exception of Cārvāka, accept the *ātman* or *citta* as a separate entity. The soul is the substratum of transcendental knowledge.

According to Vedānt, Brahman which is of the nature of pure consciousness (*cit*), is the absolute reality or Supreme Truth. The quality of knowing does not constitute the nature of Brahman, for Brahman is above these limitations. This is the function of consciousness associated with *antaḥkāraṇa*¹. Brahman is of the purest form bereft of duality of the knower and the known.

Puruṣa, in Sāṃkhya system, is of the nature of consciousness (*cetana*)². Intelligence is not innate to *puruṣa* but an evolute of *Prakṛti*. So as long as the *puruṣa* is in contact with *Prakṛti*, the former is conscious of the functions of intelligence. As a result of the separation of *Puruṣa* from *Prakṛti*, cognitive processes cease to function and the *Puruṣa* remains as pure consciousness³.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems regard *jñāna* as an independent category, though the soul is the substratum. The peculiar feature of Naiyāyika system is that *jñāna* or knowledge is an attribute of the self, and that too, not an essential, but only an adventitious one. When the *ātman* attains

¹ Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p. 17.

² Yoga-bhāṣya, I. 9.

³ Yoga-sūtra, I. 3.

mokṣa the qualities are purged¹ out from it. It is not subject to the functions of knowledge and its accessories. Only at the mundane level it has a relationship with mind; hence it has the function of knowing.

Buddhists propound the beginningless stream of consciousness (*citta*) which takes the form of *ālayavijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*. There is no permanent substance serving as the matrix of this process; when the consciousness is void of influx of *avidyā* and *trṣṇā*, it becomes pure. This is the philosophical contention which is subsequent to the doctrines of Gautama Buddha. Buddha himself maintained that nothing can be predicated (*avyākṛta*) about *citta* at the time of *nirvāṇa*. Consequently, the concept of *Nirvāṇa* was explained by the example of a extinguishing lamp, with the result that most of the critics of Buddhist philosophy subscribe to the view that *citta* becomes non-entity at the time of *Nirvāṇa*. But the authors like Dharmakīrti and others are clear in their mind that there is a continuous stream of *citta*, pure and simple, which is quite different from matter.

Jainism endorses the view of three modes of the substance, *utpāda* (origination), *vyaya* (destruction) and *dhrāvya* (subsistence); every object whether it is material or not, is amenable to these three conditions; it undergoes changes maintaining at the same time the permanent nature; the intrinsic nature itself does not change to the extent of self-destruction nor does it remain ever stationary or *kuṣasthanīya* as in *Upanisads*. The *ātman* that undergoes such changes is of the nature of consciousness (*upa-yoga*); this consciousness, when it comprehends the external reality is *jñāna* and is *darśana* when it intuits the self. *Jñāna* is one of the modifications of the soul by virtue of which the object is known. It is quality (*guṇa*) also, since it modifies into various ways. In fact knowledge is innate and inherent in the soul; verily, *ātman* is knowledge and knowledge is *ātman*; *ātman* is of the nature of *anantacatuṣṭaya* and *jñāna* is one of them. From the standpoint of pure consciousness knowledge (*jñāna*) is a modification, but is *guṇa* also since it has its own modifications.

(ii) Only *Jñāna* is *Pramāṇa*:

By the statement—‘*pramīyate yena tatpramāṇam*’ it should be understood that *Pramāṇa* is the essential means of right knowledge (*pramā*). There is a controversy on the point of the means of *pramā*. Nyāya system holds both *sannikarṣa* (intercourse) and *jñāna* as means of *pramā*; ² for Vaiśeṣika,

¹ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 77.

² Nyāya-bhāṣya, I. 1. 3.

the *sannikarṣa*, *svarūpalocana* and *jñāna* are means of *pramā*¹; the activities of sense-organs are the instruments of right knowledge in *sāṃkhya*²; Prabhākara regards knowledge (*anubhūti*) as *pramāṇa*³; Buddhists maintain that non-discrepant knowledge is *pramāṇa*⁴; further, they contend that the 'sameness of form' (*sāruṣya*) and 'capability' (*yogyatā*) are also accepted as means of *pramā*⁵.

Thus it is seen that the means of cognition are *jñāna*, sense-organs and the conjunction of senses and objects (*sannikarṣa*). Out of these, Jains endorse the view that knowledge is the only means of *pramā*, since right knowledge (*pramā*) is of the nature of consciousness; that is to say, no non-conscious instruments are admissible as means of *pramā*; of course, sense-organs, their functions, and *sannikarṣa* bring about knowledge which serves as a valid means of right knowledge (*pramā*). Sense-organs etc., cannot be *pramāṇa* since the former are mediate means, while *jñāna* is an immediate means of *pramā*. Just as darkness is removed by light, because of contradictory nature, so in order to remove *ajñāna*, *jñāna* is necessary; hence *sannikarṣa* etc. which are not of the nature of *jñāna*, cannot be the means of *pramā*; though, sometimes, knowledge is produced out of *sannikarṣa* etc., it is not produced invariably; hence they cannot be *pramāṇa*; and knowledge is the guide for purposive actions, it cannot be other than knowledge.

This topic has been discussed in the present volume in details⁶.

(iii) *Jñāna as Self-cognition* :

According to Mīmāṃsā, *Jñāna* is non-perceptive (*parokṣa*) because *buddhi* itself is known by inference consequent upon the knowledge of objects apprehended by *buddhi*.⁷ But as the *buddhi* of ourselves is as imperceptive as the *buddhi* of others, so it is impossible to know the objects by our *buddhi* in as much as we do not know them by the help of the *buddhi* of others. Naiyāyika holds that *jñāna* is perceived not by itself but by the other knowledge. They argue that anything cannot act upon itself, just as a sharp edge cannot cut itself. But this view remains self-condemned by the example of a lamp which illumines itself and illuminates the objects

¹ *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 553.

² *Yogavārtika*, p. 30; *Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-bhāṣya*, I. 87.

³ *Sābarabhāṣya*, I. 1. 5.

⁴ PV, II. 1.

⁵ TS, v. 1344.

⁶ *Pratipatturapekṣam yat pramāṇam na tu pūrvakam*—SV, I. 3.

⁷ *Sābarabhāṣya*, I. 1. 5.

simultaneously. The Naiyāyika view suffers from the fallacy of *infinite regressus*.

Sāṅkhya holds that *buddhi* is the evolute of *Prakṛti*; the contact of *prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* results in the functioning of intelligence.

But rightly understood, *jñāna*, *buddhi* etc. are one and the same and are of the nature of consciousness; even though they have slight variations, they cannot transgress the limit of consciousness. If *puruṣa* is inactive, he cannot be the enjoyer; *cetana* and its qualities are self-illuminative just as a lamp.

All schools of Buddhism, irrespective of their differences, are unanimous in holding knowledge as self-cognised. According to Jain tradition, cognition of knowledge itself is always valid, but can be valid or invalid with regard to the objects.

(iv) *The Development of Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa :*

All the Jaina Ācāryas have accepted the self-cognition as one of the characteristics of valid knowledge. Samantabhadra and Siddhasena Divakara define *pramāṇa* as the knowledge which is of the self-revelatory character; Siddhasena develops the theory further by adding one more characteristic *bādhavarjita* i.e. admitting of no contradiction. Akalaṅka maintains the non-discrepancy (*avisamvāda*) as a test of *pramāṇa* and adds one more characteristic '*anadhigatārthagrāhi*' i.e., knowledge of object which is not yet cognised. Maṇikyanandī summarises the definition of *pramāṇa* in these words *svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakam* PMS, 1.1. previously not ascertained; it ascertains itself.

Vidyānanda holds that *pramāṇa* consists in ascertainment of itself as the object. He finds no necessity to add the characteristic '*anadhigatārthagrāhi*'. Akalaṅka found it necessary to characterise the source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as *avisamvāda*.

We have already discussed *sāṃvayahārika-pratyakṣa* in the preceding pages, now let us turn to the discussion of *mukhya pratyakṣa* or transcendental perception.

(v) *Kevala-jñāna :*

Kevala-jñāna is the result of the total destruction of the knowledge-obscuring Karmas; it is the consummation of all knowledge, as a result of which the soul perceives all the substances with all their modifications; it is supra-sensorial and of the purest form with which the soul shines in

its pristine glory. Ordinary knowledge is apprehensive whereas kevala-jñāna or omniscience is all comprehensive.

(vi) *The Historical background of the theory of Omniscience :*

It is a heritage of the Indian philosophy to advocate the close relation of omniscience with emancipation. The problem that arose before the spiritual aspirants, is the nature of mokṣa and the path constituting it; mokṣa-mārga presupposes the life of religious fervour; hence the problem: 'is realisation possible' arose?

There is a school of philosophers like Śābara, Kumārila etc. who hold that omniscience is impossible on the ground that religion is supra-sensorial; only the Vedas have the final word over such problems, as has been said, 'codanālakṣano'rthaḥ dharmah¹'. Naturally the upholders of Vedic authority formulated the theory of man's capability of achieving the super-sensorial knowledge. Besides, man is under the influence of *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *ajñāna* etc., hence they developed the theory that *Vedas* were *apauruṣeya*.

The acceptance of this dogma naturally led the exponents of *Mīmāṃsā* to decry omniscience. Kumārila declares that the denial of omniscience means the denial of perceptual knowledge of religion; the latter is possible only with the help of the Vedas and not by means of sense or super-sensuous perception etc., the *Mīmāṃsakas* have no objection if any one becomes omniscient by knowing the *Dharma* with the help of the Vedas and all other things by means of other *pramāṇas*¹.

The Buddhists, on the other hand accept that man is capable of perceiving *Dharma*; they support this contention by the example of Buddha who perceived *Dharma* as such in the form of *Caturārya satya*; according to them Buddha realised the great truth of life: that there is sorrow, cause of sorrow, the removal of sorrow and the way of removing sorrow. The fact of revelation of the truth of life implies that he himself should be taken as a *pramāṇa*.

Dharmakīrti does not deny the possibility of omniscience but emphasises the acquisition of knowledge of the essentials; he does not bother about the person whether he knows the things or not, which are not connected with his religious pursuit. Whereas Kumārila rejects the perception of *Dharma*, Dharmakīrti establishes it.

Prajñākaragupta, the commentator of Dharmakīrti, justifies the arguments of Dharmakīrti, in establishing the *dharmajña*; he further proved the

¹ TS, v. 3128.

sarvajñatva or omniscience, which can be attained by any spiritual aspirant; subject to the subduing of passions¹. Ācārya Śāntaraksita also proves that omniscient can know each and everything if he wants to know it, because he is void of obscurations of knowledge².

Yoga and Vaiśeṣika systems hold that omniscience is a *ṛddhi* or supernatural power which is not necessarily realisable by all unless special efforts are made.

Regarding Jainism, it is maintained that omniscient person perceives all substances with all their modifications related to—past, present and future³. It was believed before the period of Logical Reflection that, one who knows one thing knows all things, a fact which is not emphasised by the subsequent authors. Ācārya Kundakunda speaks of omniscience as the Kevali who knows and perceives all things; this is the view of *vyavahāra naya* or empirical stand point; and Kevali knows only his own self from the transcendental point of view. Obviously, the higher wisdom is evolved from within and not without⁴.

In *Pravacanasāra*,⁵ he speaks of Kevali as: He, who does not know simultaneously the objects of the three tenses, and the three worlds, can not know even a single substance with its infinite modifications. A single substance has infinite modes; if any one does not know all substances, how will he be able to know one?

To know *ghaṭa* is to know the intrinsic nature of it and knowledge of *ghaṭa* also, since it is the very nature of knowledge to reveal other objects and reveal itself. The ātman has infinite capacity to know all the objects; when one knows such capacity of the self, he has to know all the objects.

Samantabhadra establishes the perception of subtle, obscure and distant objects on the basis of inference.

Ācārya Virasena suggests one more argument for omniscience. According to him, *Kevalajñāna* is innate to the ātman; due to destruction-cum-subsidence of *Karmas* it functions as *matijñāna*; the self-cognised *matī* implies the fractional *Kevalajñāna*, just as the observation of a part of mount leads us to the perception of the mountain itself.

¹ PVB, p. 329.

² TS, v. 3328.

³ *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, *Payadī*; *Sūtra* 78; *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* 402.

⁴ "Je egaṁ jñāi se savvaṁ jñāi" *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* 123.

⁵ *Niyamasāra*, *gāthā*, 158.

⁶ *Pravacanasāra*, I. 47-49.

Jain Ācāryas did not emphasise like Dharmakīrti on *dharmajñā* but endeavoured to establish an omniscient person who must be *dharmajñā* as well. Akalaṅka, following his predecessors, says that the soul has the inherent capacity to comprehend the substance ; if it does not, it is due to the obscuration of that capacity by the veil of Karmic bondage ; the destruction of Karmas will result in the perception of all things¹. Further, he establishes the soundness of this doctrine in Siddhiviniscaya :

If supra-sensorial knowledge is inadmissible, how can we have the non-discrepant astrological divinations ? Hence it must be accepted that there is a faculty of knowledge which is super-sensuous and this type of knowledge is nothing but Kevalajñāna or omniscience¹.

The very progressive gradation of knowledge necessarily implies the highest magnitude of knowledge attainable by man¹. If a person has no capacity to know all, by means of Veda also he will not be able to know all ;² hence the vindication of the concept of *sarvajñā*. Impossibility of omniscience cannot be established without the knowledge of persons of all times. That is to say, one who rejects *sarvajñā* for all times must be a *sarvajñā*³. In this way, after giving the positive arguments, he relies on the negative argument that it is certain, there is no contradictory *pramāṇa*⁴ to reject the established omniscience ; he substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory *pramāṇas*⁵.

Mahāvīra, the last tīrthankara of the Jainas, was reputed as an omniscient person ; it is said that he was conscious of all the objects and at all times. It is perhaps, for this reason that Buddha himself declared as the knower of four Noble Truths and refused to believe that he was a *sarvajñā*.

This is attested by the contemporary Pali Pīṭakas which often ridicule the idea ; and later Buddhist scholars like Ācārya Dharmakīrti refer and ridicule the omniscience of Rṣabha and Mahāvīra as a fallacy of *drṣṭānta*⁶. Briefly, Mahāvīra was a *sarvajñā* and Buddha a *dharmajñā* ; as the consequence of this, the Buddhist philosophers are less interested in discussing the concept of *sarvajñā*, whereas the Jaina works are exhaltant and exuberant on this problem.

¹ SV, VIII. 8.

² ibid, VIII. 3.

³ ibid, VIII. 10, 14.

⁴ SV, VIII. 12-18 ; vide also AGT, intro. 11. 55-56 ; NVVV, II, intro. p. 26-27.

⁵ 'asti sarvajñah suniscitasambhavad-badhaka-pramanatvat sukhadivat.—SVV, VIII. 6.

⁶ Nyāyabindu, III. 131.

Accepting the fact that knowledge is an essential characteristic of *ātman*, there is hardly any doubt to hold that the omniscience will be the result of total destruction of the veil of *Karmas*; whatever may be the empirical tests of omniscience, the intrinsic purity and capability of perfection of the soul are unquestionable.

(vii) *Parokṣa Pramāṇa* :

Indirect valid knowledge is of two kinds : (1) *matī* and (2) *śruti*¹. It is believed that *smṛti*, *saṃjñā* (*pratyabhijñāna*), *cintā* (*tarka*), *abhinibodha* (*anumāna*) and *śruti* (*āgama*) are to be held as *parokṣa*,² the only difficulty was with *matī*, because of its sensuous nature ; this difficulty was solved by calling it as an empirical perception (*sāmvayavahārika pratyakṣa*).

Akalanāka regards *anumāna* as *manomati* in LTv. 67, and as *śruti* in TV, I. 20 ; *anumāna* is for one self which has the verbal designation (*anākṣaraśruti*) and the inference for others which is designated by words (*ākṣaraśruti*).

Akalanāka puts *smṛti* (memory), *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition), *cintā* (discursive thought) and *abhinibodha* (perceptual cognition) under mental perception (*manomati*)¹ when they are not associated with words ; and all these when associated with words, are brought under *śruti*³.

The problem arises regarding the exact line of demarcation between *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. Akalanāka himself makes it sufficiently clear. The problem is solved by the definition of *parokṣa*—*parokṣa* is non-distinct knowledge ; distinct knowledge is independent of other knowledge ; sensuous and mental perceptions are distinct, because they do not depend upon other knowledge, while *smṛti* etc. are dependent on other knowledge and hence indistinct or *parokṣa*⁴.

Cārvāka philosophy believes only in *pratyakṣa* derived from the sense-organs ; hence *parokṣa* has no place in this materialistic system ; naturally, non-discrepancy is not beyond the verification of sense-organ.

While rejecting this view, Akalanāka states that establishment of validity or invalidity is not possible without accepting the validity of *anumāna*.

¹ TSu, 1-10.

² LT, v. 67.

³ LT, v. 10 ; SVV, 1. 27.

⁴ LT, v. 4.

1. *Smṛti*, memory involves the knowledge of the past ; it presupposes a chain of experiences which result in precipitation of *samskāras* ; these very *samskāras* give rise to recollection of the past. It is valid knowledge because of its non-discrepancy¹.

According to Vedic school, *smṛti* is valid only in conformity with the dictates of *śruti* ; in other words, *śruti* is self-evident knowledge itself, while *smṛti* is dependent upon it ; it has no validity of its own.

Though Jayanta Bhaṭṭa believes in invalidity of *Smṛti*, he explains differently. According to him, *smṛti* is invalid, because it is not produced by the object². *Smṛti* is valid because it is just opposite to *vismaraṇa*, *saṁśaya* and *viparyaya*. It cannot be invalid even if it is dependent on previous experience ; for, the validity is not necessarily conditioned by the dependence or independence of experience ; otherwise even the inference will not be valid ; therefore, *smṛti* is *pramāṇa*, since there is non-discrepancy involved in it.

2. *Pratyabhijñāna* or Recognition is the synthetic result of perception and recollection ;³ it is of nature of 'that necessarily is it'—*tadevedam* (judgment of identity), 'it is like that'—*tatsadṛśam* (judgment of similarity), 'that is dissimilar to that'—*tad-vilakṣaṇam* (judgment of dissimilarity), 'this is different from that'—*tatpratīyogī* (judgment of difference), and so on. 'That necessarily is it' or *tadevedam* and others are discussed in detail elsewhere.⁴ All these types of recognition when they do not admit of discrepancy or contradiction, are *pramāṇas* by themselves.

Now an attempt will be made to meet the objections of other schools of Indian philosophy who deny it as *pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists observe that it is not a unique knowledge, but two cognitions are taken to be one viz., recollection indicated by the word 'that' and perception indicated by 'this'⁵.

This objection of Buddhists is on a slippery ground. They raise this objection in conformity and consistency with their position of the philosophy of flux or momentariness ; naturally any cognition involving 'sa evāyamiti' is illusory.

¹ SV, III. 2.

² *Nyāyamañjarī* (Vijayanagaram), p. 23.

³ SVV. III. 4-5 ; LTV v. 10 & 21, PMS, III. 5.

⁴ See the author's *Jaina-Darśana*, pp. 322ff.

⁵ PVB, p. 51 ; PVVT, p. 78.

Rightly understood the object which is envisaged by recognition cannot be comprehended by recollection and perception combined together. The sphere of recognition presupposes the substance in its relation to its antecedent and subsequent modal conditions. Certainly, this identity cannot be the object of recollection (*smṛti*).

The Naiyāyikas maintain that recognition is nothing but a species of perception¹. This is not correct: perception has its own limitations, since it refers to the actually present data only. Hence perception cannot be said to include the past data. Further, they argue that perception is assisted by memory which helps to recognise the object seen before. This view also is not beyond contradiction, since sense-organ although aided by memory cannot proceed beyond its sphere. Hence the correct position is to hold that the cognition of identity directly evolves out of the self, supported by unseen potency.

3. *Tarka* or inductive reasoning is an independent valid knowledge; because to know the concomitance there is no other valid means than *tarka*. If concomitance is not known there is no possibility of inference².

4. *Hetu*: In SV Akalaṅka gives special attention to *hetu*, because he already has discussed the definition of *anumāna* and its component parts elsewhere in detail³.

Keeping in view the three characteristics *pakṣadharma* etc. of *hetu* accepted by the Buddhists⁴ Akalaṅka establishes that only the *anyathānupapatti* or the *vipakṣavyāvṛtti* is the essential characteristic of *hetu*. He has explained that *anyathānupapatti* or *vipakṣavyāvṛtti* is nothing else than *avinābhāva* or *vyāpti*⁵. There are certain cases where *hetu* is devoid of its characteristics of *pakṣadharma* just as the rising of *Rohiṇi* in future is inferred on seeing the rise of *Kṛttikā*⁶. Further Akalaṅka argues that their most favourite *hetu*, *sattva* establishing the momentariness is such that it has no *sapakṣasattva*; and still they believe that *sattva* is a valid *hetu*. So it is quite clear that *sapakṣasattva* cannot be an essential characteristic of *hetu*⁷. According to the Buddhists *avinābhāva* is conditioned by the relation

¹ Nyāyamañjarī p. 224, 461.

² SV. III. 8, 9.

³ Vide NV, Ch. II; see also AGT, Intro. p. 58ff.

⁴ Nyāyapraveśa, p. 1.

⁵ SVV, VI. 2.

⁶ SV, VI. 16.

⁷ SV, VI. 16.

one of them may be there, but there are certain cases where we do not find either of them conditioning *avinābhāva* just as we can give an example of the above mentioned inference about the relation of *Rohini* and *Kṛttikā*¹.

When Akalaṅka did not accept the condition of *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* as conditions of *avinābhāva*, it is but appropriate for him to reject the classification of *hetu* based on them; and instead of only three types of *hetu* (*svābhāva*, *kārya* and *anupalabdhi*), Akalaṅka accepted *Kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara* also².

Special attention is given to establish *Kāraṇahetu*, because this was not accepted by the Buddhists; Akalaṅka has given many instances where the effect can be inferred with the help of cause (*kāraṇa*)³; while discussing *kāraṇahetu* he expressly mentions that we should see that only such cause may be taken as *hetu* which is sure to produce the effect. And such thing is possible when all other causes are present and there is no non-existence of obstruction (*pratibandhakābhāva*).

Dharmakīrti maintained that only through *dr̥ṣyāṇupalabdhi* one is able to infer the non-existence of a certain thing but the *adr̥ṣyāṇupalabdhi* produces the doubt about the non-existence of a certain thing⁴. With regard to this Akalaṅka maintains that the meaning of *dr̥ṣya* should not be taken as 'perceived' only but it should be taken as 'cognised' by any of the valid knowledge, be it *pratyakṣa* or other than *pratyakṣa*. So according to Akalaṅka the object which is non-sensuous can be negatived as the non-existence of consciousness is inferred in a dead body by certain signs⁵; otherwise even this cannot be decided whether a person is a ghost or not⁶.

Akalaṅka has exhaustively classified *hetu* in his other works⁷.

5. *Hetvābhāsa*: According to the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas the classification of *hetvābhāsa* was dependent upon the characteristics of *hetu*. Buddhists maintained the three characteristics, hence there are three *hetvābhāsas*, viz., *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *anaikāntika*, whereas the Naiyāyikas accepted the five characteristics, accordingly there were five types of *hetvābhāsas*, viz., three mentioned above plus *prakaraṇasama* and *asatpratipakṣa*

¹ SVV, VI. 2, 3.

² SVV, VI. 9, 16.

³ SV, VI. 9; LT, v. 13.

⁴ *Nyāyabindu*, II. 28-30, 46, 48, 49.

⁵ SV, VI. 35; *Aṣṭasatī* and *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 52.

⁶ SV, VI. 36 and LT, v. 15; vide Hindi Intro. p. 118 for details.

⁷ *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*, IV, p. 104ff; vide AGT, Intro. p. 16.

But as Akalaṅka rejected more than one characteristic so it was not possible for him to classify exactly the types of *hetvābhāsa*; This explains the various classifications available in Akalaṅka's works. He explicitly says that there is only one type of *hetvābhāsa* and that is *asiddha*¹ which is the resultant of the absence of *anyathānupapatti* and as there are various causes of the absence of *anyathānupapatti*, the *asiddha-hetvābhāsa* can be variously classified.

In NV (II. 195) we find :

*anyathāsaṁbhavābhāvabhedāt sa bahudhā smṛtaḥ,
viruddhāsiddhasandigdhairakiñcitkaravistaraiḥ.*

and in *Pramāṇasaṁgraha* (vv, 48-9) we find many more than mentioned in these words : *ajñātaḥ saṁśayaśiddhavyatirekānanvayāditaḥ*; the idea is expressed in SV (VI. 32). In this regard there is no unanimity in the followers of Akalaṅka. Vidyānanda and others classified *hetvābhāsa*s in three types² just as the Buddhists, while Māṇikyanandi and others classified them into four,³ adding one more type, viz., *akiñcitkara*. It should be noted here that though Māṇikyanandi accepts the separate class of *akiñcitkara* still he maintains that *akiñcitkara* is the result of the error in *pakṣa*. So one should be cautious in debates not to use such *hetu*⁴.

6. *Vāda* (debate): Generally Caraka, the Naiyāyikas, and the Buddhists describe the nature of debate; according to the Naiyāyikas, debate is of three types—*vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā*; *vāda*, generally, is between the teacher and the taught or between colleagues; while *jalpa* and *vitandā* take place where one of the parties is desirous of conquering the other; so in such debates unfair means (*chala*, *jāti*) are allowed. The aim of such debate is accepted as defending ones' own doctrines;⁵ but of the former, difference between *jalpa* and *vitandā* theory by friendly discussions. The i.e. *vāda* is to arrive at a certain is that in *jalpa* each of the participants has his own theory to defend while in *vitandā* one of them is not to establish his own theory but only refutes that of the opposite.

In Caraka *Vimānasthāna* the word *sandhāya-sambhāṣā* is used for the *vāda* while the term *virghya-sambhāṣā* for *jalpa* and *vitandā*. Though Naiyāyikas accept that, employment of *chala* (duet) and *jāti* (self-confuting reply) is not proper, since they are unfair means. Still there are certain

¹ NV, II. 365; SV, VI. 32; TSLV, p. 259.

² *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*.

³ *Parīkṣāmukha*, VI. 21.

⁴ *Parīkṣāmukha*, VI. 39 vide Hindi Intro. p. 121.

⁵ *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. 2-50

occasions when het opposition is so strong that one is not able to defend his theory by fair means with the result that his simple-minded followers may reject the theory and accept the opposite and may thus be misled. Only to avoid such occasions one is to resort to unfair means.¹

In ancient Buddhist logical works the position of Naiyāyikas with regard to debates seem to have been accepted². But seeing that such unfair means are not consistent with the fundamental moral tenets of Buddhism, Dharmakīrti denounced the employment of unfair means in debates³.

Akalaṅka has also accepted this position and upholds the theory of employing fair means for right aims⁴. Most of the Jaina authors after Akalaṅka follow him with the exception of Yaśovijaya, who like old Buddhists, accepted the use of unfair means in exceptional cases⁵. When there was no place for unfair means in debates, the difference between *vāda* and *jalpa* was reduced to nothing and as regards *vitāṇḍa*, Akalaṅka has clearly stated that it is the fallacy of *vāda*;⁶ so for Akalaṅka, there remains one type of debate, viz. *vāda*,⁷ which is also termed as *jalpa*⁸.

7. *Jaya-parājaya*: When unfair means were allowed by the Naiyāyikas and old Buddhists, such unfair means also were thought proper for the victory of one and defeat of the other, hence elaborate exposition and training were employed which can be seen in their respective works⁹.

Dharmakīrti¹⁰ was the first person to criticise such unfair means and established that the *vādi* should not employ such words which are not tantamount to establish (*asādhanaṅgavacana*) the proposition and if he does not expose the drawbacks of the opponent (*adoṣodbhāvana*), he is defeated. The *pratīvādi* is defeated if he is blaming the opponent wrongly and is not able to find the faults of the opponent. Though we see that Dharmakīrti reduced the great number of *nigrahassthānas* into two viz. *Asādhanaṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*, but he was himself entangled in various explanations of

¹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 11.

² Vide *Upāyahrdaya* and *Tarkaśāstra*.

³ *Vādanyāya*, p. 71.

⁴ SVV. V. 2.

⁵ *Vāda-dvātrīṃśatikā*, VIII. 6.

⁶ NV, II. 384.

⁷ *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*, v. 51.

⁸ SV. V. 2.

⁹ NS. Ch. V.

¹⁰ *Vādanyāya*, v. 1.

those words and further, the definition of *sādhana* and *doṣa* was such that the problem was not solved efficiently. The insurmountable difficulties were awaiting the final solution and this was brilliantly solved by Akalaṅka.

Akalaṅka¹ clearly says that if one is able to establish his own *pakṣa*,² it is *jaya* for him and defeat for the other, it is needless to state that according to Akalaṅka, the establishment of one's own theory is possible only by means of right reasoning. This constitutes the essential device in debates.³

8. *Āgama*: Before discussing the validity of *āgama*, it is necessary to know the views about the nature of *śabda* according to the Jains. In Jaina *āgamas*,⁴ the *śabda* has been established as having material nature (*pudgala*). Ācārya Akalaṅka has given arguments in favour of this theory and on the analogy of shadow and sunshine has firmly established the material nature of word⁵ and rejected the theory of the Naiyāyikas that the *śabda* is the quality of the sky. Further he has vehemently criticised the eternity of the word accepted by the *Mīmāṃsakas*,⁶ and has also criticised the *sphoṭa* theory of *Vaiyākaraṇas*.⁷ For the Jains, unlike the *Mīmāṃsakas*, the scriptures are the collection of the preachings of the *Tirthaṅkaras*. So it was necessary for Akalaṅka to refute the Vedic tradition of *apauruṣeṣyatva*⁸ and to establish the origin of the *āgamas*. Akalaṅka has rejected the validity of the *āgamas* established on the strength of *apauruṣeṣyatva*; and, affirmed the validity of the *āgama* on the strength of the virtues of the speaker.⁹ Thus, the scriptures of the Jains take the place of *śruti* and further, the scope of the *āgama-pramāṇa* is expanded when he says that anyone knowing and describing a thing *as such* becomes *Āpta*.¹⁰ So, not only the *Tirthaṅkaras* but an ordinary person can be an *āpta* in a limited sphere. Further a lively discussion on the meaning of words and the relation of words and the meaning is found in Akalaṅka's works, especially in SV. Akalaṅka has refuted in this connection the *apoha* of the Buddhists and other theories.

¹ SV, V. 1, 2.

² *tadukṣm-svapakṣasiddhirekasya nigraho'nyasya vādinah*—*Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 87.

³ Vide Hindi Intro. p. and Jaina Darśana p. 372ff.

⁴ Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XXVIII, 12. 13; TSu. V. 24.

⁵ SVT, IX. 2ff.

⁶ SV, VI. 2ff.

⁷ SV, VI. 5ff.

⁸ SV VII, 28. 29.

⁹ *ibid*, VII. 30.

¹⁰ *Aṣṭasāṭhī*, and *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 236; Vide Hindi Intro. p. 126 ff.

2. Prameya-Mimamsa

Jainism is frankly realistic and pluralistic ; in other words, it is pluralistic realism : realistic, because it believes in the existence of external world which includes substances, the existential entities, that are infinite and beginningless ; and pluralistic in so far it asserts the infinite number of souls, infinite number of material atoms, innumerable atoms of *kāla* (time); and *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa*, one each. The following *gāthā* (PaS, 15) summarises the metaphysical position of the Jainas :

*bhāvassa natthi nāso natthi abhāvassa ceva uppādo,
gunapajjaesu bhāvā uppāyavayam pakuvvanti.*

That is, neither an existent is destructible nor anything comes into existence afresh. All substances, with their various qualities and modifications, are coupled with origination, destruction and permanence ; all the existents are permanent, i.e. they are so of all times ; the number is neither diminished nor increased since the number of existents is fixed. The truth is *ex nihilo nihil fit*.¹

As referred already, that *sat* is subject to *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhravva* ; each substance takes the form of one modification, leaves it and develops some other quality ; this mode of change is applicable to both types of existents : *cetana* and *acetana* ; because the change is the core of reality ; it has been never stopped nor will it have an end still. The substance retains its nature in the process of change ; it does not allow any foreign element in it, for the substance is self-existent in itself.

It is the very nature of substance to persist inspite of transformation it undergoes every instant. The production of one, in this process is the destruction of the other and *vice versa* ; the theory of causality pervades the ontology. It is interesting and instructive to note the differences of Buddhists and Jainas, in connection with their views on the problem of *santāna* (continuum) and *dhravva* (permanance). Just as the Jainas regard the continuous modifications of the substance as production and destruction, Buddhists hold the constant flux of objects. Jainas believe in incessant modifications of the substance. According to Buddhists though there is flux continuity is expressed by the word *santāna*. According to the Jainas in spite of the modifications there is continuity expressed by the word *dhravva*. Both the Jainas and Buddhists believe that there is nothing which is without any change. So it is certain that both the Jainas and Buddhists believe that a particular component of *pariyāya* or *santāna* is not

¹ Cf. *Gītā*, II p. 16.

transferred to another substance or *santāna*. Naturally there arises the question regarding the exact line of demarcation between *santāna* and *dhrauvya*.

The Buddhists clearly maintain that there is continuity of the stream (*santāna*) but the experience of continuity in itself is an illusion because of the momentariness of the Knower and the Known. To illustrate this illusion they cite the example of an army and a line¹. They say the army is an abstract idea, so is the line (*pankti*), because though there is the reality of the soldiers etc. there is no substantial reality of an army as anything other than the soldiers.

So they maintained that *citta-santāna* has an end. This tantamounts to the saying that there is no *santāna*. So in this way, the very criterion of reality that the element is indestructible, is contradicted².

The Jains here maintained that *dhrauvya* is not an illusion, it is just real in as much as the components of the *santāna* are real. So there is no question of cessation of continuity of any existent. Even in Mokṣa, the soul in its pristine purity continues this momentary change and this fact of the Jains permeates all the existents.

The reality is also defined as universal-cum-particular; the universality is of two types: the *dhrauvya* called *ūrdhvatāsāmānya*, continuity in time of a particular substance, also known as *dravya* and *ekatva* and the other type known as *tiryak-sāmānya*, which is *sādṛśya* or similarity of various substances. This type of universality is not permanent and allpervasive, as held by the Naiyāyikas, but is extended to the limit of a particular. So according to the Jains this universality is many in kind and not one. Particulars are also of two types: one type is called *paryāya* of a particular substance and the other is the *vyatireka* i.e. independent substances spread out in the space.

To summarise, when the real is defined as *dravyaparyāyātma*, the substance is taken as *dravya* and its mode as *paryāyas*; and when the reality is defined as *sāmānya-viśeṣātma*, the *sāmānya* is taken as substance and *viśeṣa* as *paryāya*; moreover, the similarity is taken as *sāmānya* and individuality is taken as *viśeṣa*.

¹ *Santānaḥ samudāyāśca paṅktisenādivanmṛṣā*, Bodhicaryavatāra, p. 334.

² The later philosophers like Dharmakīrti etc, surrender their position by accepting that even in Nirvāna, *citta* continues its *santāna* as pure one. Vide TS, p. 184.

Keeping in view this theory of reality, Akalaṅka has criticised the Vedānta's absolutistic theory of one *Brahma*¹, the sāmkhya's oneness of *prakṛti*², the independent *sāmānya* and *vīśeṣa* which are the eternal entities according to Naiyāyikas,³ the *śabdabrahma* of Vaiyākaraṇas,⁴ *apoha* of the Bauddhas etc.⁵

3. Naya-mimamsa :

According to the Jains reality is of the nature of *anantadharma* or infinite attributes. The comprehension of all these attributes is not possible by an ordinary person, only an omniscient can have the comprehension of all the attributes ; so it is but natural that in relation to reality the ordinary cogniser may have the various modes of apprehensions because of his limitations as a result of his incompetency, liking and disliking and various such factors. These modes are termed as *nayas*. Akalaṅka defines *naya* as *jñātṛṇām abhisandhayaḥ khalu nayāḥ te dravyaparyāyataḥ* (SV. X. I). The Jaina philosophers have classified the modal apprehensions into *nayas* : *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*. The mode of apprehension which takes into consideration the universal, comes under *dravyārthika* ; and the mode of apprehension which takes into consideration the particular, is *paryāyārthika*. They are called respectively *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* also (TV. I. 33).

The relation between *naya* and *pramāṇa* is discussed by Akalaṅka. He is of the opinion that when one comprehends a substance on the ground of a particular attribute, that is to say, when he cognises the whole reality (*sakalādeśa*) through a particular attribute, it is called *pramāṇa* ; and when a person cognises the attributes of reality (*vikalādeśa*), it is called *naya* ; the reality as the aggregate of all the attributes is the object of *pramāṇa* while a particular attribute of the reality is *naya*.

So it is quite clear that *naya* is the outcome of the comprehension of *pramāṇa* and that *pramāṇa* is none other than *śrutajñāna*⁶.

It is obvious, that various schools of philosophy are the outcome of the absolutist view of a substance giving emphasis on certain aspects with the result that they reject downright the other aspects of reality.

¹ SV. VII 9, 10, X 10, XII 10.

² Ibid IV 15-20.

³ Ibid IV 23.

⁴ Ibid XI 5.

⁵ Ibid IX 13.

⁶ Ibid X 3.

Keeping such views in mind Akalaṅka has classified the *nayas* into right (*sunaya*) and wrong (*durnaya*).¹ That is to say that *sunaya*, though gives preference to one of the attributes, does not reject others; on the other hand, *durnaya* not only prefers but endorses that and rejects the rest.

Briefly we can say that *pramāṇa* comprehends one and all, *naya*, one, *durnaya* rejects other than one².

The aforesaid two *nayas* are further subdivided into seven: *naigama*, *saṃgraha* etc.³ These seven are classified again into *arthanaya* and *śabda-naya*; the first four—*naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra* and *rjusūtra* are called *arthanayas*; and the rest viz., *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evamibhūta* are *śabda-nayas*.⁴

Akalaṅka has attempted to include the various schools of Indian philosophy into *durnayas* related to the seven *nayas*.⁵

The statement of *naya* is to be qualified by the word 'syāt' which denotes the other attributes of a substance, which are not expressed by the statement. Some scholars, both modern and ancient, have wrong notions about this word. But Akalaṅka is manifestly clear that it does not denote the doubt,⁶ indecision and such other knowledge but it only asserts a certain point of view and denotes the existence of the other attributes not expressed by the words. Though sometimes some *naya* statements do not have this word, still it is to be understood.

The topics related to the *nayas* such as the definition and the scope of each *naya* and *nayābhāsa*,⁷ *syādvāda*, *saptabhaṅgi*, *sakalādeśa*, *vikalādeśa* etc., are exhaustively dealt with elsewhere.⁸ So it is needless to dwell at greater length.

4. Nikshepa-Mimamsa

One of the means to know the reality is *nikṣepa* or explaining the meaning or the connotation of the word. Jaina philosophers have devoted much attention to this aspect. They have evolved a special system of commenting on the old scriptural texts on the basis of *nikṣepas*. The

¹ SV, X. 4.

² *Aṣṭasāṭī*, *Aṣṭasaharī*, p. 290; for the relevant quotation vide *infra*, p. 64.

³ SV, X. 1.

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid, X. 1.

⁶ Lt, V. 62-63.

⁷ Hindi Intro, p. 144-149.

⁸ Introductions to AGT, NVV; and *Jainadarśana*, pp. 475-617.

words have various connotations and denotations and to find out the exact meaning out of them, which would fit in the context, is the aim of *nikṣepas*. The words sometimes connote the knowledge, sometimes external objects and also the words. So in order to remove the confusion the procedure of *nikṣepa* is essential to arrive at the right meaning. Just like *nayas*, *nikṣepas* are also of various types. But briefly they are classified into four: *Nāma*, *Sthāpana*, *Dravya* and *Bhāva*.¹ Akalaṅka explains this in these words:

*nikṣepo' nantakalpaścaturavaravidhaḥ prastutavyākriyārthaḥ,
tattvārthajñānaheturdvayanayaviśayaḥ samśayacchedakārī.*²

The *nāma-nikṣepa* deals with the words without their connotation. The *sthāpanā* deals with the meaning related to knowledge and *dravya* and *bhāva* deal with the external objects.

Now let us illustrate these *nikṣepas* taking the word *Indra* as an example. A person named Indra without any quality or capacity of the heavenly god Indra, is known by the name (*nāma*) *Indra*. Here the word *Indra* denotes only the name. The idol of Indra is also called *Indra*; but there is difference between a person called *Indra* and an idol called by that name. The person called *Indra* does not get that reverence which is due to an idol of *Indra*, because the idol of *Indra* is taken to represent the real *Indra*. So the idol can be called by the name *Indra* as well as the synonyms of *Indra* just like *Śakra*, *Puraṇḍhara* etc. But a person named *Indra* cannot be called by the above mentioned synonyms. The person who is to take birth as *Indra* is also called *Indra* and a person who has abandoned the position of *Indra* is also called *Indra*. This is the *dravya-nikṣepa* which takes into view the past as well as the future mode of a particular thing. When the word connotes its real meaning it is called *bhāva*; when *Indra* itself is called *Indra*, it is *bhāva*.

In common parlance of life, there are certain occasions when we attach importance to the *nāma* only and on other occasions we are concerned ourselves with *sthāpanā*, just as while playing chess we are not concerned with actual horses etc. but their representatives; and we see, for example, the boy is satisfied with the toy-horse instead of a real one.

The relation between *naya* and *nikṣepa* is also explained. The *nāma*, *sthāpana* and *dravya* are the objects of *dravyārthika-naya*, while the *bhāva* is the object of *paryāyārthika-naya*.

¹ SV, XII. 2.

² Ibid. XII. 1.

I have dealt with all these topics in detail in my book *Jaina-darśana* and the Hindi Introduction of the present volume and other introductions to various Jaina philosophical works edited by me ; most of them are of Akalaṅka. While discussing these subjects, the historical development and the philosophical aspect are taken into consideration. They are also discussed in a comparative manner, comparing each view with those of other systems of Indian philosophy. So repetition seems unnecessary here.
